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Preface 
VoxEU was a fairly audacious enterprise by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
joined by a consortium of national sites, to elevate the public discourse on economic 
issues.  The idea was to create a forum where economists could analyze pressing issues of 
the day at a higher level than possible in traditional media outlets.  At the same time, my 
colleagues and I on the editorial board stressed that all contribution also be accessible to a 
wide audience. 
That this experiment proved successful is clear looking back over the number of high-
quality contributions addressing one of the most pressing public policy challenges of the 
day—the ongoing crisis in global financial markets.  Collectively, the articles published 
on VoxEU over the past year provide an important resource to aid understanding how this 
crisis developed, how it is unfolding, and how policymakers should proceed from here. 
Because this represents a resource that should be available as widely as possible on a 
timely basis, I asked Carmen Reinhart to edit a brief volume compiling those 
contributions.  Together with her colleague at the University of Maryland’s School of 
Public Policy, Andrew Felton, the result is what follows, a primer on what is probably the 
worst financial crisis of our generation. 
 
— Richard Baldwin, Editor in Chief of VoxEU 
 
Introduction 
Global financial markets are showing strains on a scale and scope not witnessed in the 
past three-quarters of a century.  What started with elevated losses on U.S.-subprime 
mortgages has spread beyond the borders of the United States and the confines of the 
mortgage market.  Many risk spreads have ballooned, liquidity in some market segments 
has dried up, and large complex financial institutions have admitted significant losses.  
And bank runs are no longer the subject exclusively of history. 
These events have challenged policymakers, and the responses have varied across region.  
The European Central Bank has injected reserves in unprecedented volumes.  The Bank 
of England participated in the bail-out and, ultimately, the nationalization of a depository, 
Northern Rock.  The U.S. Federal Reserve has introduced a variety of new facilities and 
extended its support beyond the depository sector. 
These events have also challenged economists to explain why the crisis developed, how it 
is unfolding, and what can be done.  This volume compiles contributions by leading 
economists in VoxEU over the past year that attempt to answer these questions.  We have 
grouped these contributions into three sections corresponding to those three critical 
questions. 
1.  Why did the crisis happen? 
Although it is tempting to complain that the crisis was inevitable, some articles 
emphasize the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future.  Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and 
Laeven discuss the role of uncertainty in the subprime lending boom.   Persaud and 
Danielsson both discuss the overreliance on standardized quantitative risk models.  
Lastly, Wyplosz counsels caution when analyzing the crisis and its causes in the face of 
high uncertainty.   
Several articles search for the roots of the crisis in public policy—either monetary or 
regulatory.   On the monetary side, Cecchetti argues that monetary policy did not unduly 
increase risk-taking before the crisis.  Boeri and Guiso believe the opposite.  Ioannidou et 
al. avoid directly blaming the Federal Reserve for the crisis but do present empirical 
evidence that low interest rates—like those present in the U.S. in 2003 and 2004—
encourage ex-ante risk-taking.  Baldwin discusses the view of Martin Feldstein that the 
low U.S. saving rate and overinvestment in housing must inevitably lead to a fall in the 
value of the dollar.  Cardarelli et al. argue that financial innovation has led to the business 
cycle becoming more sensitive to changes in house prices, and that monetary policy did 
not sufficiently take this into account. 
Other articles focus on the regulatory system.  Tabellini blames some of the problem on 
the fragmented nature of the U.S. regulatory system.  Spaventa focuses on the growth of 
off-balance sheet banking activity and argues that regulators both missed the explosive 
growth of financing mechanisms like Structured Investment Vehicles and failed to see the 
hidden risks to the banking system that these unconventional instruments created. 
Several authors reach beyond the recent past to understand the present. Wolf compares 
current conditions to that of 1930s Europe and its exit from the gold standard.  Bordo and 
Reinhart both put the current crisis into historical perspective.   
2.  How is the crisis unfolding? 
As the crisis opened in late summer 2007, economists disagreed on its likely magnitude.  
It initially appeared to be a simple liquidity problem.  Monacelli thought that the 
problems were extensive but benign. Calomiris thought that “there is little reason to 
believe that a substantial decline in credit supply under the current circumstances will 
magnify the shocks and turn them into a recession.”  Buiter thought that the Federal 
Reserve’s first rate cut in September 2007 was unnecessary owing to the fiscal policy 
response.   
Buiter also cautioned everyone to remember the difference between “inside assets,” 
which are a zero-sum game that just transfer money between parties, and “outside 
assets,” which are real assets that lack an offsetting liability.  Vives suggested that the 
problems in modern markets such as asset-backed commercial paper, auction-rate 
securities, etc., directly parallel, and require the same response as an old-fashioned 
banking crisis:  Bagehot’s wisdom to lend freely against good collateral at penalty rates. 
However, Ubide presciently spelled out a variety of reasons why what appeared at first to 
be a simple liquidity problem masked far deeper credit pathologies.  Cristadoro and 
Veronese wrote about the difficulty of tracking economic growth in real-time, which was 
an extra source of confusion. 
Some authors tried to anticipate possible paths by which the crisis could spread.  Gros 
wondered if European house prices—which in some countries had risen even more 
quickly than U.S. prices—are vulnerable to a similar slump.  Snower tried to anticipate 
some of the possible international spillover effects from the U.S. problems. In another 
article, Snower outlined four “mega-dangers” to the financial system and suggested that 
our surprise at continued crises is more surprising than the crises themselves. 
Cecchetti continued his FAQ series with updates on the unprecedented Federal Reserve 
responses to the freeze in the money and credit markets.  These included the largest 
single cut in the federal funds target rate since the earl 1980s, currency swaps with 
foreign central banks, and three new lending mechanisms: the Term Auction Facility, the 
Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility.   
Monacelli published two articles critical of the European Central Bank’s decision to cut 
interest rates, saying that they lacked transparency and increased inflation risk.  However, 
Widgrén argued that the ECB was too slow to react, and institutional differences with the 
Fed made the ECB less able to respond quickly during a crisis. Wyplosz agreed that the 
Fed was more innovative than the ECB and quicker to react. 
Several articles deal with currency movements.  Corsetti argues that the U.S. trade deficit 
will be more responsive than in the past, helping restrain the dollar’s fall.  However, 
Baldwin summarized a Krugman article predicting a “pretty far and pretty fast” dollar 
decline. 
3.  What can be done? 
VoxEU has published several articles with policy suggestions to prevent this kind of 
crisis from happening again.  Information dissemination was a key theme.  In August, 
Onado focused on three aspects that later commentators would return to: credit ratings, 
evaluations of asset marketability, and transparency in the retail market for financial 
assets.  Giovannini and Spaventa urge greater dissemination of information and 
rethinking of the Basel II accord on bank capital requirements.  
Buiter wrote a series of articles on the policy lessons from the U.K.’s Northern Rock 
debacle.  He blamed both policies and institutional arrangements, including an ineffective 
deposit insurance scheme, poor regulatory coordination and division of responsibilities, 
and weaknesses of the supervisory standards embodied in Basel II. 
Portes wrote on regulatory reform, covering ratings agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and 
financial institutions.  Hildebrand also wrote about sovereign wealth funds, advocating 
that they adopt a voluntary code of conduct.  De la Dehesa urged more regulation of 
mortgage brokers, greater transparency, and methods to overcome banks’ principal-agent 
problems.  Persaud said that regulators need to accept that the commoditization of 
lending means that instability is built into the financial system and regulators need to 
proactively pursue counter-cyclical policies. 
The future of monetary policy and central banking was also a recurring theme.  
Leijonhufvud argued against inflation-rate targeting on the basis that the central bank 
could still find itself diverging from the Wicksellian ‘natural rate’ of interest that should 
be the central bank’s goal.  De Grauwe contended that inflation targeting restricts banks’ 
ability to restrain asset bubbles, while Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach warned against 
trying to use central bank policy to stabilize asset prices.   
Buiter and Sibert advocated the expanded use of liquidity policies rather than monetary 
easing.  They think that central banks should act as the “market maker of last resort.”  
Spaventa also proposes that the government should purchase illiquid securities, likening 
his proposal to the Brady Plan that unfroze the Latin American debt markets in 1989. 
Finally, thinking about currency arrangements has never been far from hand.  Frankel 
wrote that the euro could surpass the dollar as the world’s reserve currency within a 
decade, while Eichengreen warned that a breakup of the euro system would “trigger the 
mother of all financial crises.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did the crisis happen? 
Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven: The relationship between the recent 
boom and the current delinquencies in subprime mortgages 
Recent US mortgage market troubles unsteadied the global economy. This column 
summarises research analysing millions of loan applications to investigate the roots of 
the crisis. A credit boom may be to blame. 
Recent events in the market for mortgage-backed securities have placed the US subprime 
mortgage industry in the spotlight. Over the last decade, this market has expanded 
dramatically, evolving from a small niche segment into a major portion of the overall US 
mortgage market. Can the recent market turmoil – triggered by the sharp increase in 
delinquency rates – be related to this rapid expansion? In other words, is the recent 
experience, in part, the result of a credit boom gone bad? While many would say “yes” to 
these questions, rigorous empirical evidence on the matter has thus far been lacking. 
Credit booms 
There appears to be widespread agreement that periods of rapid credit growth tend to be 
accompanied by loosening lending standards. For instance, in a speech delivered before 
the Independent Community Bankers of America on March 7, 2001, former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan pointed to “an unfortunate tendency” among bankers 
to lend aggressively at the peak of a cycle and argued that most bad loans were made 
through this aggressive type of lending. 
Indeed, most major banking crises in the past 25 years have occurred in the wake of 
periods of extremely fast credit growth. Yet, not all credit booms are followed by banking 
crises. Indeed, most studies find that, while the probability of a banking crisis increases 
significantly (by between 50% and 75%) during booms, historically only about 20% of 
boom episodes have ended in a crisis. For example, out of 135 credit booms identified in 
Barajas et al. (2007) only 23 preceded systemic banking crises (about 17%), with that 
proportion rising to 31 (about 23%) if non-systemic episodes of financial distress are 
included. In contrast, about half of the banking crises in their sample were preceded by 
lending booms. Not surprisingly, larger and longer-lasting booms, and those coinciding 
with higher inflation and - to a lesser extent - lower growth, are more likely to end in a 
crisis. Booms associated with fast rising asset prices and real estate prices are also more 
likely to end in crises. 
The mortgage market 
Reminiscent of this pattern linking credit booms with banking crises, current mortgage 
delinquencies in the US subprime mortgage market appear indeed to be related to past 
credit growth (Figure 1). In a new working paper, we analyse data from over 50 million 
individual loan applications and find that delinquency rates rose more sharply in areas 
that experienced larger increases in the number and volume of originated loans (Dell’ 
Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2008). This relationship is linked to a decrease in lending 
standards, as measured by a significant increase in loan-to-income ratios and a decline in 
denial rates, not explained by improvement in the underlying economic fundamentals. 
 
In turn, the deterioration in lending standards can be linked to five main factors. 
1. Standards tended to decline more where the credit boom was larger. This is 
consistent with cross-country evidence on aggregate credit booms. 
2. Lower standards were associated with a fast rate of house price appreciation, 
consistent with the notion that lenders were to some extent gambling on a 
continuing housing boom, relying on the fact that borrowers in default could 
always liquidate the collateral and repay the loan. 
3. Changes in market structure mattered: lending standards declined more in regions 
where large (and aggressive) previously absent institutions entered the market. 
4. The increasing recourse by banks to loan sales and asset securitisation appears to 
have affected lender behaviour, with lending standards experiencing greater 
declines in areas where lenders sold a larger proportion of originated loans. 
5. Easy monetary conditions seem to have played a role, with the cycle in lending 
standards mimicking that of the Federal Fund rate. In the subprime mortgage 
market most of these effects appear to be stronger and more significant than in the 
prime mortgage market, where loan denial decisions seem to be more closely 
related to economic fundamentals. 
These findings are consistent with the notion that rapid credit growth episodes, due to the 
cyclicality of lending standards, might create vulnerabilities in the financial system. The 
subprime experience demonstrates that even highly-developed financial markets are not 
immune to problems associated with credit booms. 
Possible solutions 
What can be done to curb bad credit booms? Historically, the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic polices in reducing credit growth has varied (see, for example, Enoch 
and Ötker-Robe, 2007). While monetary tightening can reduce both the demand and 
supply of bank loans, its effectiveness is often limited by capital account openness. This 
is especially the case in small open economies and in countries with more advanced 
financial sectors, where banks have easy access to foreign credit, including from parent 
institutions. Monetary tightening may also lead to significant substitution between 
domestic and foreign-denominated credit, especially in countries with (perceived) rigid 
exchange rate regimes. Fiscal tightening may also help reduce the expansionary pressures 
associated with credit booms, though this is often not politically feasible. 
While prudential and supervision policies alone may prove not very effective in curbing 
credit growth, they may be very effective in reducing the risks associated with a boom. 
Such policies include prudential measures to ensure that banks and supervisors are 
equipped to deal with enhanced credit risk (such as higher capital and provisioning 
requirements, more intensive surveillance of potential problem banks, and appropriate 
disclosure requirements of banks’ risk management policies). Prudential measures may 
also target specific sources of risks (such as limits on sectoral loan concentration, tighter 
eligibility and collateral requirements for certain categories of loans, limits on foreign 
exchange exposure, and maturity mismatch regulations). Other measures may aim at 
reducing existing distortions and limiting the incentives for excessive borrowing and 
lending (such as the elimination of implicit guarantees or fiscal incentives for particular 
types of loans, and public risk awareness campaigns). 
In response to aggressive lending practices by mortgage lenders, several states in the US 
have enacted anti-predatory lending laws. By the end of 2004, at least 23 states had 
enacted predatory lending laws that regulated the provision of high-risk mortgages. 
However, research shows that these laws have not been effective in limiting the growth 
of such mortgages, at least in the US (see, for example, Ho and Pennington-Cross, 2007). 
At the end of 2006, US federal banking agencies issued two guidelines out of concern 
that financial institutions had become overexposed to the real estate sector while lending 
standards and risk management practices had been deteriorating, but these guidelines 
were too little, too late. 
International concerns 
Other countries thus far seem to have avoided a crisis in their nonprime mortgage 
markets. The UK, for example, where nonprime mortgages also constitute an increasingly 
large share of the overall mortgage market, has thus far avoided a surge in delinquencies 
of such mortgages (though in September 2007, the US subprime crisis indirectly did lead 
to liquidity problems and eventually a bank run on deposits at Northern Rock, the UK’s 
fifth largest mortgage lender at the time). Regulatory action on the part of the UK 
Financial Services Authority, resulting in the 2004 Regulation on Mortgages, which 
made mortgage lending more prescriptive and transparent in the UK, may have played a 
role. Of course, only time will tell how successful these actions have been. We would not 
be surprised to learn that lending standards have also deteriorated in mortgage markets 
outside the US. 
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Persaud: Why bank risk models failed 
4 April 2008 
Financial supervision arguably failed to prevent today's turmoil because it relied upon 
the very price-sensitive risk models that produced the crisis. This column calls for an 
ambitious departure from trends in modern financial regulation to correct the problem. 
Alan Greenspan and others have questioned why risk models, which are at the centre of 
financial supervision, failed to avoid or mitigate today's financial turmoil. There are two 
answers to this, one technical and the other philosophical. Neither is complex, but many 
regulators and central bankers chose to ignore them both. 
The technical explanation is that the market-sensitive risk models used by thousands of 
market participants work on the assumption that each user is the only person using them. 
This was not a bad approximation in 1952, when the intellectual underpinnings of these 
models were being developed at the Rand Corporation by Harry Markovitz and George 
Dantzig. This was a time of capital controls between countries, the segmentation of 
domestic financial markets and - to get the historical frame right - it was the time of the 
Morris Minor with its top speed of 59mph. 
In today's flat world, market participants from Argentina to New Zealand have the same 
data on the risk, returns and correlation of financial instruments, and use standard 
optimisation models, which throw up the same portfolios to be favoured and those not to 
be. Market participants don't stare helplessly at these results. They move into the 
favoured markets and out of the unfavoured. Enormous cross-border capital flows are 
unleashed. But under the weight of the herd, favoured instruments cannot remain 
undervalued, uncorrelated and low-risk. They are transformed into the precise opposite. 
When a market participant's risk model detects a rise in risk in his portfolio, perhaps 
because of some random rise in volatility, and he or she tries to reduce his exposure, 
many others are trying to do the same thing at the same time with the same assets. A 
vicious cycle ensues as vertical price falls, prompting further selling. Liquidity vanishes 
down a black hole. The degree to which this occurs has less to do with the precise 
financial instruments and more with the depth of diversity of investor behaviour. 
Paradoxically, the observation of areas of safety in risk models creates risks, and the 
observation of risk creates safety. Quantum physicists will note a parallel with 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. 
Policy-makers cannot claim to be surprised by all of this. The observation that market-
sensitive risk models, increasingly integrated into financial supervision in a prescriptive 
manner, were going to send the herd off the cliff edge was made soon after the last round 
of crises.1  Many policy officials in charge today responded then that these warnings were 
too extreme to be considered realistic. 
The reliance on risk models to protect us from crisis was always foolhardy. In terms of 
solutions, there is only space to observe that if we rely on market prices in our risk 
models and in value accounting, we must do so on the understanding that in rowdy times 
central banks will have to become buyers of last resort of distressed assets to avoid 
systemic collapse. This is the approach upon which we have stumbled. Central bankers 
now consider mortgage-backed securities as collateral for their loans to banks. But the 
asymmetry of being a buyer of last resort without also being a seller of last resort during 
the unsustainable boom will only condemn us to cycles of instability. 
The alternative is to try to avoid booms and crashes through regulatory and fiscal 
mechanisms designed to work against the incentives - fed through risk models, bonus 
payments and the like - for traders and investors to double up or more into something that 
the markets currently believe is a sure bet. This sounds fraught and policy-makers are not 
as ambitious as they once were. We no longer walk on the moon. Of course, President 
Kennedy's 1961 ambition to get to the moon within the decade was partly driven by a 
fear of the Soviets getting there first. Regulatory ambition should be set now, while the 
fear of the current crisis is fresh and not when the crisis is over and the seat belts are 
working again.  
  
  
                                                 
1 Avinash Persaud (2000). "Sending the herd off the cliff edge: the disturbing interaction 
between herding and market-sensitive risk management models," Jacques de Larosiere 
Prize Essay, Institute of International Finance, Washington. 
Danielsson: Blame the models 
8 May 2008 
In response to financial turmoil, supervisors are demanding more risk calculations. But 
model-driven mispricing produced the crisis, and risk models don’t perform during crisis 
conditions. The belief that a really complicated statistical model must be right is merely 
foolish sophistication. 
A well-known American economist, drafted during World War II to work in the US 
Army meteorological service in England, got a phone call from a general in May 1944 
asking for the weather forecast for Normandy in early June. The economist replied that it 
was impossible to forecast weather that far into the future. The general wholeheartedly 
agreed but nevertheless needed the number now for planning purposes. 
Similar logic lies at the heart of the current crisis 
Statistical modelling increasingly drives decision-making in the financial system while at 
the same time significant questions remain about model reliability and whether market 
participants trust these models. If we ask practitioners, regulators, or academics what they 
think of the quality of the statistical models underpinning pricing and risk analysis, their 
response is frequently negative. At the same time, many of these same individuals have 
no qualms about an ever-increasing use of models, not only for internal risk control but 
especially for the assessment of systemic risk and therefore the regulation of financial 
institutions.2 To have numbers seems to be more important than whether the numbers are 
reliable. This is a paradox. How can we simultaneously mistrust models and advocate 
their use? 
What’s in a rating? 
Understanding this paradox helps in understanding both how the crisis came about and 
the frequently inappropriate responses to the crisis. At the heart of the crisis is the quality 
of ratings on structured investment vehicles (SIVs). These ratings are generated by highly 
sophisticated statistical models. 
Subprime mortgages have generated most headlines. That is of course simplistic. A single 
asset class worth only $400 billion should not be able to cause such turmoil. And indeed, 
the problem lies elsewhere, with how financial institutions packaged subprime loans into 
SIVs and conduits and the low quality of their ratings. 
The main problem with the ratings of SIVs was the incorrect risk assessment provided by 
rating agencies, who underestimated the default correlation in mortgages by assuming 
that mortgage defaults are fairly independent events. Of course, at the height of the 
business cycle that may be true, but even a cursory glance at history reveals that 
mortgage defaults become highly correlated in downturns. Unfortunately, the data 
samples used to rate SIVs often were not long enough to include a recession. 
Ultimately this implies that the quality of SIV ratings left something to be desired. 
However, the rating agencies have an 80-year history of evaluating corporate obligations, 
                                                 
2 For example, see Nassim Taleb (2007). "Fooled by randomness: the hidden role of 
chance in life and the markets" Penguin Books. 
which does give us a benchmark to assess the ratings quality. Unfortunately, the quality 
of SIV ratings differs from the quality of ratings of regular corporations. A AAA for a 
SIV is not the same as a AAA for Microsoft. 
And the market was not fooled. After all, why would a AAA-rated SIV earn 200 basis 
points above a AAA-rated corporate bond? One cannot escape the feeling that many 
players understood what was going on but happily went along. The pension fund manager 
buying such SIVs may have been incompetent, but he or she was more likely simply 
bypassing restrictions on buying high-risk assets. 
Foolish sophistication 
Underpinning this whole process is a view that sophistication implies quality: a really 
complicated statistical model must be right. That might be true if the laws of physics 
were akin to the statistical laws of finance. However finance is not physics, it is more 
complex, see e.g. Danielsson (2002). 
In physics the phenomena being measured does not generally change with measurement. 
In the finance that is not true. Financial modelling changes the statistical laws governing 
the financial system in real-time. The reason is that market participants react to 
measurements and therefore change the underlying statistical processes. The modellers 
are always playing catch-up with each other. This becomes especially pronounced when 
the financial system gets into a crisis. 
This is a phenomena we call endogenous risk, which emphasises the importance of 
interactions between institutions in determining market outcomes. Day-to-day, when 
everything is calm, we can ignore endogenous risk. In crisis, we cannot. And that is when 
the models fail. 
This does not mean that models are without merits. On the contrary, they have a valuable 
use in the internal risk management processes of financial institutions, where the focus is 
on relatively frequent small events. The reliability of models designed for such purposes 
is readily assessed by a technique called backtesting, which is fundamental to the risk 
management process and is a key component in the Basel Accords. 
Most models used to assess the probability of small frequent events can also be used to 
forecast the probability of large infrequent events. However, such extrapolation is 
inappropriate. Not only are the models calibrated and tested with particular events in 
mind, but it is impossible to tailor model quality to large infrequent events nor to assess 
the quality of such forecasts. 
Taken to the extreme, I have seen banks required to calculate the risk of annual losses 
once every thousand years, the so-called 99.9% annual losses. However, the fact that we 
can get such numbers does not mean the numbers mean anything. The problem is that we 
cannot backtest at such extreme frequencies. Similar arguments apply to many other 
calculations such as expected shortfall or tail value-at-risk. Fundamental to the scientific 
process is verification, in our case backtesting. Neither the 99.9% models, nor most tail 
value-at-risk models can be backtested and therefore cannot be considered scientific. 
Demanding numbers 
We do however see increasing demands from supervisors for exactly the calculation of 
such numbers as a response to the crisis. Of course the underlying motivation is the 
worthwhile goal of trying to quantify financial stability and systemic risk. However, 
exploiting the banks’ internal models for this purpose is not the right way to do it. The 
internal models were not designed with this in mind and to do this calculation is a drain 
on the banks’ risk management resources. It is the lazy way out. If we don't understand 
how the system works, generating numbers may give us comfort. But the numbers do not 
imply understanding. 
Indeed, the current crisis took everybody by surprise in spite of all the sophisticated 
models, all the stress testing, and all the numbers. I think the primary lesson from the 
crisis is that the financial institutions that had a good handle on liquidity risk management 
came out best. It was management and internal processes that mattered – not model 
quality. Indeed, the problem created by the conduits cannot be solved by models, but the 
problem could have been prevented by better management and especially better 
regulations. 
With these facts increasingly understood, it is incomprehensible to me why supervisors 
are increasingly advocating the use of models in assessing the risk of individual 
institutions and financial stability. If model-driven mispricing enabled the crisis to 
happen, what makes us believe that the future models will be any better? 
Therefore one of the most important lessons from the crisis has been the exposure of the 
unreliability of models and the importance of management. The view frequently 
expressed by supervisors that the solution to a problem like the subprime crisis is Basel II 
is not really true. The reason is that Basel II is based on modelling. What is missing is for 
the supervisors and the central banks to understand the products being traded in the 
markets and have an idea of the magnitude, potential for systemic risk, and interactions 
between institutions and endogenous risk, coupled with a willingness to act when 
necessary. In this crisis the key problem lies with bank supervision and central banking, 
as well as the banks themselves. 
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Wyplosz: Subprime 'crisis': observations on the emerging debate 
16 August 2007 
A basic principle of high uncertainty is to be careful. This principle also applies to 
analyses of the situation, even if decisiveness in the face of turmoil is at a premium. 
Better wait than make things worse. Here a few observations to sort through the 
emerging debate. 
As financial anxiety keeps mounting worldwide, comments flourish and joyfully 
contradict each other. Central banks are bailing out dangerous gamblers, says one. They 
are skillfully preventing a 1929-style crash, says another one. Things are being gradually 
normalized, some assert. This is just the beginning of a vicious circle of unforeseen 
meltdown, just wait, warn others. 
One thing all agree about is that uncertainty, which market participants with short 
memories — many of whom were teenagers or unborn the last big time around — 
thought was a thing of the past, has made a striking comeback. Uncertainty did not just 
hit markets all over the world, it is affecting our understanding as well, hence the wide 
disparity of opinions. A basic principle of high uncertainty is to be careful. This principle 
also applies to analyses of the situation, even if decisiveness in the face of turmoil is at a 
premium. Better wait than make things worse. Here are a few observations to sort 
through the emerging debate. 
The origin of the problem is pretty well understood and adequately described in <a 
href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/466" target="_blank">Stephen 
Cecchetti’s posting</a>. As the US housing bubble is working its way out, mortgaged 
loans go sour. Since the institutions that granted these loans have promptly sold them on 
— this is the securitization process — to other institutions, which sold them on to others, 
and so on again and again, those who suffer losses are the ultimate holders. There are so 
many of them, all over the world, that no one knows where the losses are being borne. It 
could even be you, through your pension fund or some innocuous-looking investment. 
The second observation that all agree about, is that the total size of the now-infamous 
subprime loans, even augmented by normal mortgages, does not add up to a huge 
amount. Normally, most financial institutions should be able to absorb them with much 
damage. Of course, a few may have bought too much of the stuff and they will go belly-
up, but that is how things normally are. Most significant financial institutions should be 
able to absorb those particular losses. 
Here comes the securitization story, and it is not controversial either. The dilution of risk 
is a good thing, no doubt about it. But it is generally the case that any good thing has 
some drawback. In this case the drawback is that no one knows who holds how much of 
these bad loans. Where things got bad is that, the same as many other human beings, and 
maybe a little moreso, financiers are prone to mood swings. When all was going well, 
they trusted each other as if they had gone to the same schools, which in fact they did. 
When the situation soured, they went at light speed to the other corner and started to 
suspect that everyone else was more in trouble, especially those they knew best because 
they went to school together. So the interbank market froze. 
This is where disagreements emerge. Did the central banks do the right thing? Some 
observers lament that they should act as lenders of last resort, which means intervening 
sparingly at punishing cost. The problem with that view is that central banks did not 
intervene as lenders of last resort. All central banks have the responsibility of assuring the 
orderly functioning of the financial markets. The interbank market is the mother of all 
financial markets, and it was drying up. So the central banks had no choice but to restart 
them. In addition, modern central banks operate by announcing an interest rate, the 
interbank rate. If they don’t enforce that rate, they destroy their own chosen strategy, 
which has served them well so far. This strategy allows them to change the interbank rate 
any time they wish. But until they do so, they have no choice but to make that rate stick. 
As for punishment, who were they supposed to punish? Not a particular bank, this time. 
The market, then? Collective punishment is generally a bad idea. In this case, it would be 
a terrible idea. If central banks punish the interbank market, they punish all financial 
markets, and therefore they punish all those who depend on these markets, which means 
almost all of humanity. Even Castro and Kim Jong Il. 
The next big disagreement is whether things will become worse. It is easy to build 
scenarios that lead to disaster. Many excellent stories circulate and, like any good horror 
stories, they ring true. They usually describe hedge funds with serious exposure to 
subprime loans as quickly trying to restore solvency by selling their best assets, pushing 
their value down. Even hedge funds that are not exposed to bad loans may be fighting for 
their lives if their clients withdraw funds, either because they are worried or because they 
must, given their own regulations or rules. Rating agencies are then forced to downgrade 
loads of assets and funds whose fundamentals are perfectly safe, simply because they are 
being downloaded on the market. At that stage, 1929 starts looking heavenly in 
comparison with what happens next. Well, that could be what is in store. But note that it 
does not have to be so. 
Remember first that, on its own, the mortgage crisis is small beer. Recall next that most 
serious financial institutions must have made adequate provisions to face this long-
expected crisis, some call it normalization. Note that the large central banks have shown 
that they have learnt the lesson from past crisis and quickly moved to provide the 
interbank markets with the required liquidity. The situation is basically sound. But 
financial markets are always subject to self-fulfilling prophecies: if they believe that 
things will go wrong, things go wrong. That’s where we stand now. 
Isn’t it very frustrating to find ourselves, once again,  on the verge of disaster and realize 
that our well-being depends on the whims of a few financiers not particularly known for 
being sedate? Why can’t we prevent this once and for all? The sad thing is that armies of 
regulators and supervisors have being doing just that for years and years. Remember 
Basel II, meant to be even better than Basel I? Nowadays banks are so tightly regulated 
that it is almost not fun anymore to be a banker. Well, almost. Banking is about lending, 
and lending is risky. In addition, as we all know, high risk means high (expected) return. 
Naturally, bankers have responded to regulation by carrying on with lending, risky and 
not risky, but they have been subcontracting the risk that they are not supposed to hold. 
The great securitization wave is partly a consequence of the great regulation operation. 
The deeper moral is simple. Financial markets exist to do risky things. The more risk they 
take, the higher the (expected) returns. You can use regulation to squeeze risk out of a 
segment of the market, say banks, but you don’t eliminate the risk, you just move it 
elsewhere. New segments, say hedge funds, emerge to take over the risk and the high 
(expected) returns that go with it. The problem is that little is known of the new segment 
and its players, so the armies of regulators and supervisors that protect us look in the 
wrong direction because they don’t know where to look. There has been much talk about 
regulating the hedge funds; it might happen, so the game will move elsewhere. The only 
way to eliminate financial crises is to fully eliminate risk. Kim Jung Il knows how; 
eliminate financial institutions. But that means no (expected) returns. 
 
Cecchetti: Subprime Series, part 1: Financial crises are not going away 
26 November 2007 
Here is the first in a series of 4 essays exploring the lessons from the subprime turmoil. It 
sets the stage for the series, arguing that financial crises are intrinsic to the modern 
economy, but both individuals and governments should make adjustments to reduce the 
frequency of financial crises and their impact on the broader economy. 
While the crisis may not be over, we can still pause and take stock. What lessons should 
we take away from the turmoil that began in early August 2007? Most of what I will 
discuss is not new. But recent events have brought some important issues into better 
focus. Reflecting on the central causes of the problems we currently face leads me to 
conclude: there will always be a next crisis. 
Its centrality to industrial economic activity, combined with a potential for abuse, has 
made the financial system is one of the most heavily regulated part of our economy. 
Through a variety of regulators and supervisors with overlapping responsibilities, 
governments make voluminous rules and then set out to enforce them. The idea of a 
laissez faire financial system makes no sense even to most ardent champions of the free 
market. 
Even with intense oversight by the governmental authorities – in the United States we 
have the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the Federal Reserve, as well as state banking authorities – crises 
continue to come. One reason for this is the natural tendency of officials to fight the last 
battle; looking for systemic weaknesses revealed by the most recent crisis. So, when 
complex automated trading schemes were thought to have contributed to the October 
1987 stock market crash, circuit breakers were put in place that shut down computers-
based order systems when indices move by more than a certain amount. In the aftermath 
of the Asian crisis, the IMF created new lending facilities in an attempt to address issues 
of contagion – in essence, to deal with countries that were innocent victims of problems 
created elsewhere. And when LTCM collapsed there was a flurry of activity to 
understand and the potential impact of what were called “highly leveraged institutions”.   
As necessary as each of these reforms may have been, we are not going to stop 
tomorrow’s crises by looking backward. Financial innovators will always seek out the 
weakest point in the system. Innovations will both exploit flaws in the regulatory and 
supervisory apparatus, and manipulate the inherent limitations of the relationship 
between asset managers and their investor clients. The 2007 crisis provides examples of 
both of these. Let’s look at each in turn. 
Innovations exploited flaws in the regulatory and supervisory apparatus 
Financial institutions have been allowed to reduce the capital that they hold by shifting 
assets to various legal entities that they did not own – what we now know refer to as 
“conduits” and “special investment vehicles” (SIV). (Every financial crisis seems to 
come with a new vocabulary.) Instead of owning the assets, which would have attracted a 
capital charge, the banks issued various guarantees to the SIVs; guarantees that did not 
require the banks to hold capital. 
The purpose of a financial institution’s capital is to act as insurance against drops in the 
value of its assets. The idea is that even if some portion of a bank’s loan portfolio goes 
bad, there will still be sufficient resources to pay off depositors.  Since capital is 
expensive, bank owners and managers are always on the lookout for ways to reduce the 
amount they have to hold. It is important to keep in mind that under any system of rules, 
clever (and very highly paid) bankers will always develop strategies for holding the risks 
that they wanted as cheaply as they can, thereby minimizing their capital. 
Manipulation of the asset manager-client relationship 
But this is not the only problem. Financial innovators will also seek ways in which to 
exploit the relationship between the ultimate investor (the principal) and the managers of 
the investor’s assets (the agent).   The problem is that the agent acts primarily in his or 
her personal interest, which may or may not be the same as the interest of the principal. 
The principal-agent problem is impossible to escape. 
Think about the manager of a pension fund who is looking for a place to put some cash.  
Rules, both governmental and institutional, restrict the choices to high-rated fixed-income 
securities. The manager finds some AAA-rated bond that has a slightly higher yield than 
the rest. Because of differences in liquidity risk, for example, one bond might have a 
yield that is 20 or 30 basis points (0.30 or 0.30 percentage points) higher. Looking at this 
higher-yielding option, the pension-fund manager notices that there is a very slightly 
higher probability of a loss. But, on closer examination, he sees that this higher-yielding 
bond will only start experiencing difficulties if there is a system-wide catastrophe. 
Knowing that in the event of crisis, he will have bigger problems that just this one bond, 
the manager buys it; thereby beating the benchmark against which his performance is 
measured.I submit that there is no way to stop this. Managers of financial institutions will 
always search for the boundaries defined by the regulatory apparatus, and they will find 
them. After all, detailed regulations are a guide for how to legally avoid the spirit of the 
law. And the more detailed the rules, the more ingenious the avoidance. This brand of 
ingenuity is very highly rewarded, so I am sure these strategies will continue. 
Conclusions 
So, what to do? Both individuals and government officials need to make adjustments. 
Individual investors need to demand more information and they need to get it in a 
digestible form. As individuals we should adhere to the same principle that President 
Ronald Reagan followed in agreements over nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union: 
Trust, but verify. We should insist that asset managers and underwriters start by 
disclosing both the detailed characteristics of what they are selling together with their 
costs and fees. This will allow us to know what we buy, as well understand the incentives 
that our bankers face. 
As for government officials, most of the lessons point to clarifying the relative riskiness 
associated with various parts of the financial system. Elsewhere I have suggested that at 
least some of the problems revealed by the current crisis can be ameliorated by increasing 
the standardization of securities and encouraging trading to migrate to organized 
exchanges. 
Next columns 
In the next essays in this series I will continue along this theme. Part 2 discusses the 
lesson I have taken away from the Bank of England’s recent experience – that a lender of 
last resort is no substitute for deposit insurance. In Part 3, I address whether central banks 
should have a direct role in financial supervision, concluding that they should. And 
finally, in Part 4, I examine whether central bank actions have created moral hazard, 
encouraging asset managers to take on more risk than is in society’s interest. My answer 
is no. 
 
Deposit insurance has a dramatic impact on the amount of capital a bank holds. With 
deposit insurance, depositors do not care about the assets on their bank’s balance sheet. 
And without supervision from their liability holders (the depositors) there is a natural 
tendency to increase the risk that they take. The bank’s owners and managers get the 
upside if the higher-risk loans and investments yield high returns, while the deposit 
insurer faces the downside if the risky assets fail to do not payoff. The response to this is 
to regulate banks and force them to hold capital. 
The argument that follows is due to Joshua D. Coval, Jakub W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford, 
“Economic Catastrophe Bonds,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-102, June 
2007. 
I made this proposal initially in “A Better Way to Organize Securities Markets” Financial 
Times, 4 October 2007, and provide more details in “Preparing for the Next Financial 
Crisis” published initially at www.eurointelligence.com on 5 November 2007, and 
reprinted at www.voxeu.com on 18 November 2007. 
 
Cecchetti: Subprime Series, part 2: Deposit insurance and the lender of 
last resort 
28 November 2007 
The second essay in this 4-part series discusses the lesson from the Bank of England’s 
recent experience, arguing that a lender of last resort is no substitute for a well-designed 
deposit insurance mechanism. 
For decades a debate has been simmering over the advisability of deposit insurance. One 
side produces evidence that insuring deposits makes financial crises more likely.3 These 
critics of deposit insurance as the first line of defence against bank panics go on to argue 
that that the central bank, in its role as lender of last resort, can stem bank panics. 
Countering this is the view that, as a set of hard and fast rules, deposit insurance is more 
                                                 
3 This is the conclusion reached by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward Kane in their 
summary of international research on this issue. See their paper “Deposit insurance 
around the globe: where does it work?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2002, 
volume 16, no. 2, 175–95. 
robust than discretionary central bank lending. In my view, the September 2007 bank run 
experienced by the British mortgage lender Northern Rock settles this debate once and 
for all – deposit insurance is essential to financial stability. 
To understand this conclusion, we need to look carefully at experiences with central bank 
extensions of credit – discount lending – and at the varying experience with deposit 
insurance. Let’s start with the lender of last resort. 
Lender of last resort 
In 1873, Walter Bagehot suggested that, in order to prevent the failure of solvent but 
illiquid financial institutions, the central bank should lend freely on good collateral at a 
penalty rate.4 By lending freely, he meant providing liquidity on demand to any bank that 
asked. Good collateral would ensure that the borrowing bank was in fact solvent, and a 
high interest rate would penalize the bank for failing to manage its assets sufficiently 
cautiously. While such a system could work to stem financial contagion, it has a critical 
flaw. For Bagehot-style lending to work, central bank officials who approve the loan 
applications must be able to distinguish an illiquid from an insolvent institution. But since 
there are no operating financial markets and no prices for financial instruments during 
times of crisis, computing the market value of a bank’s asset is almost impossible. 
Because a bank will go to the central bank for a direct loan only after exhausting all 
opportunities to sell its assets and borrow from other banks without collateral, the need to 
seek a loan from the government draws its solvency into question.5 
Deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance operates in a way that contrasts sharply with the lender of last resort. A 
standard system has an explicit deposit limit that protects the bank’s liability holders – 
usually small depositors – from loss in the event that the bank fails. Guarantees are 
financed by an insurance fund that collects premiums from the banks. Logic and 
experience teach us both that insurers have to be national in scope and backed, implicitly 
if not explicitly, by the national government treasury’s taxing authority. Funds that are 
either private or provided by regional governments are simply incapable of credibly 
guaranteeing the deposits in the entire banking system of a country. 
But as I suggested at the outset, deposit insurance has its problems. We know that 
insurance changes people’s behaviour. Protected depositors have no incentive to monitor 
their bankers’ behaviour. Knowing this, bankers take on more risk than they would 
normally, since they get the benefits while the government assumes the costs. In 
                                                 
4 The original source is Walter Bagehot Lombard Street: A Description of the Money 
Market. London: Henry S. Kin & Co., 1873. 
5 Another flaw in the Bagehot framework is that banks appear to attach a stigma to 
discount borrowing. For example, in over one-third of the days between 9 August and 21 
November 2007 there were federal funds transactions reported at rates in excess of the 
discount lending rate. In one case, on 25 October 2007 when the lending rate was set at 
5.25 percent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports an intra-day high 15 
percent. 
protecting depositors, then, the deposit insurance encourages creates moral hazard – 
something it has in common with the lender of last resort. 
Which is better? 
How can we figure out whether the lender of last resort or deposit insurance works 
better? A physical scientist faced with such a question would run a controlled experiment, 
drawing inferences from variation in experimental conditions. Monetary and financial 
policy-makers cannot do this – imagine a statement announcing a policy action beginning 
something like this: “Having achieved our stabilization objectives, we have decided to 
run an experiment that will help us with further management of the economic and 
financial system...” 
There is an alternative to irresponsible policy experiments: figuring out which policies 
are likely to work best requires that we can look at the consequences of differences that 
occur on their own. Comparing the mid-September 2007 bank run experienced by UK 
mortgage lender Northern Rock with recent events in the United States provides us with 
just such a natural experiment. 
The US example is typical of how the loss of depositors’ confidence, regardless of its 
source, can lead to a run. The Abacus Savings Bank serves large numbers of Chinese 
immigrants in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In April 2003 news spread 
through the Chinese-language media that one of the bank’s New York City managers had 
embezzled more than $1 million. Frightened depositors, unfamiliar with the safeguards in 
place at US banks, converged on three of the institution’s branches to withdraw their 
balances. Because Abacus Savings was financially sound, having recently concluded its 
annual government examination, it was able to meet all requested withdrawals during the 
course of the day. In the end, as a US Treasury official observed, the real danger was that 
depositors might be robbed carrying large quantities of cash away from the bank. Leaving 
their funds in the bank would have been safer. But rumour and a lack of familiarity with 
government-sponsored deposit insurance – Federal Deposit Insurance insured every 
depositor up to $100,000 – caused depositors to panic.6 
Contrast this with the recent British experience, where deposit insurance covers 100% of 
the first ₤2000 and 90% of the next ₤33,000, and even then payouts can take months. 
Under these circumstances, the lender of last resort is an important component of the 
defense against runs.7 
Central banks are extremely wary of taking on any sort of credit risk; in some cases there 
may be legal prohibitions against it. In lending operations, this translates into caution in 
the determining the acceptability of collateral. And here is where the problem occurs. In 
order to carry out their responsibility, central bankers must answer two important 
                                                 
6 See James Barron, “Chinatown Bank Endures Run as Fear Trumps Reassurances,” New 
York Times, 23 April 2003. 
7 For an exhaustive description of deposit insurance systems in the EU see Robert A. 
Eisenbeis and George G. Kaufman, “Cross-Border Banking: Challenges for Deposit 
Insurance and Financial Stability in the European Union,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, October 2006. 
questions: (1) Is the borrower solvent? and (2) are the assets being brought as collateral 
of sufficient value?8 
The Northern Rock case brings the weaknesses of this system into stark relief. The broad 
outlines of the case are as follows. Northern Rock is a mortgage lender that financed its 
long-term lending with funds raised in short-term money markets. When, starting in mid-
August 2007, the commercial paper markets came under stress, Northern Rock started 
having trouble issuing sufficient liabilities to support the level of assets on its balance 
sheet. 
The natural move at this point was to seek funds from the Bank of England. But lending 
requires that the answer to the two questions about solvency and collateral quality are 
both “yes”. Were they for Northern Rock? I have no idea. Some combination of people in 
the Bank of England and the UK Financial Services Authority may have known, but I 
wonder. Since Northern Rock is rumored to have had exposure to American subprime 
mortgages, securities for which prices were nearly impossible to come by, it is no 
exaggeration to suggest that no-one was in a position to accurately evaluate solvency. As 
for the value of the collateral, again it was likely very difficult to tell. 
Problem with last resort lending 
So, here’s the problem: discount lending requires discretionary evaluations based on 
incomplete information during a crisis. Deposit insurance is a set of pre-announced rules. 
The lesson I take away from this is that if you want to stop bank runs – and I think we all 
do – rules are better. 
This all leads us to thinking more carefully about how to design deposit insurance. Here, 
we have quite a bit of experience. As is always the case, the details matter and not all 
schemes are created equal. A successful deposit-insurance system – one that insulates a 
commercial bank’s retail customers from financial crisis – has a number of essential 
elements. Prime among them is the ability of supervisors to close preemptively an 
institution prior to insolvency. This is what, in the United States, is called ‘prompt 
                                                 
8 As an episode twenty years ago demonstrates, the Federal Reserve turns out to have 
substantial discretion in answering these questions. On 20 November 1985, a software 
error prevented the Bank of New York from keeping track of its Treasury bond trades. 
For 90 minutes transactions poured in, and the bank accumulated and paid for U.S. 
Treasury bonds, notes, and bills. Importantly, BONY promised to make payments 
without actually having the funds. But when the time came to deliver the securities and 
collect from the buyers, BONY employees could not tell who the buyers and sellers were, 
or what quantities and prices they had agreed to—the information had been erased. By 
the end of the day, the Bank of New York had bought and failed to deliver so many 
securities that it was committed to paying out $23 billion that it did not have. The Federal 
Reserve stepped in and made an overnight loan equal to that amount, taking virtually the 
entire bank—buildings, furniture and all—as collateral. See the discussion in Stephen G. 
Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets, 2nd Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 
Irwin, 2008. 
corrective action,” and it is part of the detailed regulatory and supervisory apparatus that 
must accompany deposit insurance. 
In addition to this, there is a need for quick resolution that leaves depositors unaffected. 
Furthermore, since deposit insurance is about keeping depositors from withdrawing their 
balances, there must be a mechanism whereby institutions can be closed in a way that 
depositors do not notice. At its peak, during the clean-up of the US savings and loan 
crisis, American authorities were closing depository institutions at a rate in excess of 2 
per working day – and they were doing it without any disruption to individuals’ access to 
their deposit balances. 
A well-designed rules-based deposit insurance scheme is the first step 
Returning to my conclusion, I will reiterate that the current episode makes clear that a 
well-designed rules-based deposit insurance scheme should be the first step in protecting 
the banking system from future financial crises. 
 
Cecchetti: Subprime Series, part 3: Why central banks should be 
financial supervisors 
30 November 2007 
The third essay in this 4-part series argues that central banks should have a direct role in 
financial supervision. 
Central bankers regularly describe price stability as an essential foundation for maximum 
sustainable growth. Well, financial stability is another one. In fact, without a stable, well-
functioning, financial system, there is no way that an economy can flourish. A well-
functioning financial system is like the plumbing. When it works we take it for granted; 
when it doesn’t, watch out. But, as we have seen recently, financial markets and 
institutions can malfunction on a moments notice. To prevent this, governments regulate 
and supervise financial institutions and markets. And best practice dictates that financial 
stability is one of the primary objectives of the central bank. 
Central banks and financial supervision 
For over a decade there has been a debate over how to structure government oversight.  
What responsibilities should reside in the central bank?  Different countries resolve this 
question differently.  In places like Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States and 
New Zealand, the central bank supervises banks.  By contrast, in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan, supervision is done by an independent authority.  Is one of these 
organizational arrangements better than the other?  Does one size fit all? 
The events of the summer and fall of 2007 shed new light on this question, and my 
conclusion is that there is now an even stronger argument for placing supervisory 
authority inside of the central bank.  As events unfolded through August and September, 
it became increasingly clear that having the bank supervisors separated from the liquidity 
provider placed added stress on the system.9 
Pros and cons of separation 
To understand this conclusion let me very briefly summarize the traditional arguments for 
and against separation of the monetary and supervisory authorities.10 Starting with the 
former, the most compelling rationale for separation is the potential for conflict of 
interest. The central bank will be hesitant to impose monetary restraint out of concern for 
the damage it might do to the banks it supervises. The central bank will protect banks 
rather than the public interest. Making banks look bad makes supervisors look bad. So, 
allowing banks to fail would affect the central banker/supervisor’s reputation. 
In this same vein, Goodhart11 argues for separation based on the fact that the 
embarrassment of poor supervisory performance could damage the reputation of the 
central bank.  Monetary policy-makers who are viewed as incompetent have a difficult 
time achieving their objectives. 
Turning to the arguments against separation, there is the general question of whether a 
central bank can deal effectively with threats to financial stability without being a 
supervisor.  There are a variety of reasons that the answer might be no. 
First and foremost, as a supervisor, the central bank has expertise in evaluating conditions 
in the banking sector, in the payments systems, and in capital markets more generally. 
During periods when financial stability is threatened, when there is the threat that 
problems in one institution will spread, such evaluations must be done extremely quickly. 
Importantly, the central bank will be in a position to make informed decisions about the 
tradeoffs among its goals, knowing whether provision of liquidity will jeopardize its 
                                                 
9 The chronology of events is now well known, so I will not repeat them here.  For a 
discussion of the initial stages, see my description at “Market Liquidity and Short Term 
Credit: The Financial Crisis of August 2007” available at <a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.ifk-
cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/events/ecbwatchers/20070907ecb_cecchetti_document.pdf 
">www.ifk-
cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/events/ecbwatchers/20070907ecb_cecchetti_document.pdf.</
a> 
10 For a detailed and very thought-provoking discussion see both the text and the 
references in Ben S. Bernanke, “Central banking and Bank Supervision in the United 
States,” speech delivered at the Allied Social Science Association Annual Meeting, 
Chicago, Illinois, 5 January 2007 available at <a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070105a.htm">ww
w.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070105a.htm.</a> 
11 See Charles Goodhart, “The Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision,” 
Occasional Papers, no.1, Basel Switzerland: Financial Stability Institute, November 2000 
available at <a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm">www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm</a>. 
macroeconomic stabilization objectives, for example.  They are in the best position to 
evaluate the long-term costs of what may be seen as short-run bailouts.  Put another way, 
appropriate actions require that monetary policymakers and bank supervisors internalize 
each others objectives. Separation makes this difficult. 
Second, separation can lead central bankers to ignore the impact of monetary policy on 
banking system health.  A simple example of this is the potential for capital requirements 
to exacerbate business cycle fluctuations.  Granted, this seems unlikely, but regardless, 
the argument goes as follows: when the economy starts to slow, the quality of bank assets 
decline.  This, in turn, reduces the level of capital, increasing leverage.  Banks respond by 
cutting back on lending, slowing the economy even further.  Combating this requires that 
monetary policymakers take explicit account of banking-system health when making 
their decisions.  And, without adequate supervisory information, there is concern that 
they might not. 
Most relevant to the recent experience is the fact that in their day-to-day interactions with 
commercial banks (and other financial institutions) central bankers need to manage credit 
risk both in the payments system and in their lending operations.  In the United States, for 
example, the Federal Reserve allows banks what are known as “daylight overdrafts” on 
their reserve accounts.  That is, the Fed extends very short-term credit to banks that 
makes payments with insufficient balances.12 
As the lender of last resort, central banks worldwide take on credit risk.  To do so 
responsibly requires information about the borrower.  The evidence suggests that this is 
nearly impossible without having fast and complete access to supervisory information.  
An example will help to illustrate the problem policymakers’ face. 
An example 
On 20 November 1988 a computer software error prevented the Bank of New York from 
keeping track of its US Treasury securities trading.13  For 90 minutes orders poured in 
and the bank made payments without having the funds as normal.  But when it came time 
to deliver the bonds and collect from the buyers, the information had been erased from 
the system. By the end of the day, the Bank of New York had bought and failed to deliver 
                                                 
12 Because reserve balances are not remunerated in the American system — that is, there 
is no interest paid on the balances banks hold at the Fed — there is an incentive to 
economize on the level of reserves held.  This has created a system in which banks 
regularly overdraw their accounts early in the day, making payments prior to receiving 
them.  The Fed has announced that starting in 2011 it will start paying interest on reserve 
balances, at which point the day-light overdrafts seem likely to disappear. 
13 At the time, computers could store only 32,000 transactions at a time.  When more 
transactions arrived than the computer could handle, the software’s counter restarted at 
zero.  Since the counter number was the key to where the trading information was stored, 
the information was effectively erased.  Had all the original transactions been processed 
before the counter restarted, there would have been no problem. See the discussion in 
Stephen G. Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets, 2nd Edition.  Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, Irwin, 2008. 
so many securities that it was committed to paying out $23 billion that it did not have.  
The Federal Reserve, knowing from its up-to-date supervisory records that the bank was 
solvent, made an emergency $23 billion loan taking the entire bank as collateral and 
averting a systemic financial crisis.  Importantly, only a supervisor was in a position to 
know that the Bank of New York’s need to borrow was legitimate and did not arise from 
fraud. 
A central bank needs to manage credit risk both in the operation of the payments system 
and in lending operations.  In short-term lending it relies heavily on supervisory 
information.  While this can normally be obtained from the supervisor, when an 
institution comes under stress it can be essential to have people in the central bank who 
know what is going on. 
We can summarize the argument against separation as being about efficiency in the 
production and use of timely information on the one hand, and the ability to internalize 
the tradeoffs on the other.  Separation means something akin to the children’s game of 
“telephone,” where a message is whispered from one child to the next, getting distorted at 
each step along the way.  While internalization of the tradeoffs means that the central 
bank is best positioned to decide whether actions aimed at calming financial markets 
today forsake macroeconomic stabilization objectives tomorrow. 
I find all of this persuasive.  But for those people who do not, recent events add another 
argument for central banks retaining supervisory powers.  Looking at the Northern Rock 
episode one has to wonder whether individuals would have behaved the way that they did 
if they had all been working inside the same institution. Recall what happened in mid-
September.  Shortly after Bank of England Governor Mervyn King sent a letter to the 
Treasury Committee of the House of Commons,14  the U.K. Financial Services Authority 
made it known both that Northern Rock was on the verge of collapse, and that 
supervisors had known this for some time.  Contrary to wide-spread perception of the 
position taken just a few days earlier in the Governor’s letter, the Bank of England was 
forced to make a substantial emergency loan, substantially tarnishing their public image. 
Northern Rock lessons 
I have no special knowledge of the merits of this particular case.  Should Northern Rock 
have been extended this loan or forced into bankruptcy? Could the FSA have taken 
preemptive action to avoid reaching this point? What was in the best long-term interests 
of the British public in this specific case?  It will take some time to sort out the answers 
to these questions and determine whether specific legal changes are needed.  What I will 
say is that things surely would have gone more smoothly had the Bank of England had 
supervisory authority so that the officials with intimate knowledge of Northern Rock’s 
                                                 
14 Mervyn King, “Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do?” paper 
submitted by the Governor of the Bank of England to the Treasury Committee of the 
U.K. Parliament, 12 September 2007, available at <a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/treasurycommittee/"
>www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/treasurycommittee/</a> 
balance sheet would have been sitting at the table on a regular basis with the management 
of the central bank. 
Operations in a midst of a financial crisis are more like maneuvers during a war.  And in 
the heat of a battle, it is essential that a single person be in charge.  That is why the 
military is organized with a clear chain of command.  Separation of supervision from the 
central bank is like having two generals with potentially different objectives giving orders 
to the same army. It is hard to see how this could possibly work. 
So, as I consider the lessons that we should take away from the financial turmoil of 2007, 
one of them is that it makes sense to place at least some supervisory authority inside of 
the central bank. 
 
Cecchetti: Subprime Series, part 4: Does well-designed monetary policy 
encourage risk taking? 
3 December 2007 
The final essay examines whether central bank actions have created moral hazard, 
encouraging asset managers to take on more risk than is in society’s interest; the answer 
is “no”. 
Yes, but isn’t that what it’s supposed to do? In order to meet the objectives of high, stable 
growth and low, stable inflation monetary policymakers must insulate the real economy 
from financial sector shocks. That is, central bankers strive to keep credit market 
disturbances problems from spreading to the economy at large. This, I submit, is the most 
important lesson we have learned from analyzing the monetary policy failures that led to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.15 
Analysis of the 2007 financial crisis has been filled with comments about “moral hazard” 
and the “Bernanke put.”  The thrust of these criticisms is that recent monetary policy 
actions by the Federal Reserve provided ex post insurance to institutions that engaged in 
reckless behaviour.  It is claimed that such policymaker-designed bailouts underwrite risk 
taking that leads, inevitably, to the next financial crisis. 
In the first essay in this series, I explain why financial crises of the sort that we have been 
experiencing recently have been, and are likely to continue to be, a repeated consequence 
of the interaction of incentives and innovation.16  Here, I argue that a central bank that 
takes an appropriate risk management perspective is a stabilizing force, strengthening 
rather than weakening the financial system. 
Moral hazard 
To understand this conclusion, it is useful to begin with a few definitions. Let’s start with 
                                                 
15 This is the essential insight of Chairman Bernanke’s path-breaking work collected in 
Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2004. 
16 See “Financial Crises Are Not Going Away.” 
moral hazard.  To 19th century insurers, a moral hazard was a person who was unusually 
susceptible to the temptations created by insurance. That is, someone whose character 
made them predisposed to carelessness and fraud.17  Modern (neoclassical) economics 
steers clear of such normative connotations, defining moral hazard as the risk that a 
borrower, or someone who is insured, will behave in a way that is not in the interest of 
the lender, or the person selling the insurance.18 
As a general rule, the existence of insurance is a good thing, both providing 
diversification for individuals who cannot obtain it otherwise, and allowing risk to go to 
those able to bear it.  The fact that people can purchase fire insurance for their homes is 
what makes mortgages possible.  This is just one example among many of how the 
modern financial system improves the efficient operation of the economy. 
It is important to accept that insurance changes incentives.  But that is an argument for 
careful design, not for elimination.19 
Bernanke put or fire insurance? 
The term Bernanke put is the descendant of “Greenspan put.” My favorite source for 
conventional wisdom, Wikipedia, defines the latter as the “perceived attempt of then-
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, of ensuring liquidity in capital 
markets by lowering interest rates if necessary.”  (I did not write this entry.)20  The term 
was coined in 1998 after the Fed lowered interest rates following the collapse of the 
investment firm Long-Term Capital Management. The effect of this rate reduction was 
that investors borrowed funds more cheaply to invest in the securities market, thereby 
averting a potential downswing in the markets.21 
I believe that critical interpretations of these actions get it exactly wrong. As Chairman 
Bernanke said on 31 August 2007, “It is not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve — 
nor would it be appropriate — to protect lenders and investors from the consequences of 
                                                 
17 For a fascinating history of the term “moral hazard” see Tom Baker, “On the 
Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” Texas Law Review, vol 75, no 2, December 1996, pg. 237-
292. 
18 For a detailed discussion of the implications of moral hazard in finance see Chapter 11 
of Stephen G. Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets, 2nd Edition, Boston, 
Mass.:  McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2008. 
19 For an excellent discussion of why traditional concepts of moral hazard are not 
applicable to the current circumstance see Lawrence Summers, “Moral Hazard 
Fundamentalists,” Financial Times, 23 September 2007. 
20 A textbook definition of a put option goes something like this: “A contract that confers 
the right, but not the obligation, to sell a financial instrument at a predetermined price 
prior to the expiration date of the option.” For someone who plans to sell the asset in the 
future, a put option ensures that the price at which the asset can be sold will not go down. 
21 The result of the Greenspan put was that equity investors experienced substantial losses 
as US stock market capitalization fell from $20 trillion at the 2001 peak to $11 trillion a 
mere two years later.  A 45 percent loss hardly seems like iron-clad insurance. 
their financial decisions.”22  It is, however, the responsibility of the Federal Reserve, and 
all central banks, to make sure very bad things do not happen; protecting the public from 
adverse consequences of financial turmoil and reducing the volatility in the economy as a 
whole. That is, something exactly analogous to fire insurance. 
Does it create moral hazard to make the worst possible economic outcomes extremely 
unlikely?  The answer is surely no.  We should not be forced to buy insurance against 
things that policymakers can keep from happening in the first place.  What should 
happen, however, is that individuals who take more risk face the possibility of more pain. 
Okay, returning to the current instance, we can now ask two questions: 
1. Have central bankers’ actions reduced the likelihood of the worst possible 
outcomes? 
2. Have individuals and institutions that took more risk paid a higher price? 
It seems to me that the answer to both of these questions is unequivocally yes.  The 
purpose of the Federal Reserve’s actions — reducing the federal funds rate target by a 
total of 75 basis points and the discount rate by 125 basis points — have been aimed at 
making sure very bad things do not happen.23  And, if my reading of the news is accurate, 
losses are being distributed based on how much risk people took. 
Conclusions 
I have suggested we consider four concrete: 
o Trust, but verify.  Investors should insist that asset managers and underwriters 
start by disclosing both the detailed characteristics of what they are selling 
together with their costs and fees.  This will allow us to know what we buy and 
understand our bankers’ incentives. 
o Standardisation and trading.  Governments could help clarify the relative riskiness 
of assets by fostering the standardization of securities and encouraging trading on 
organized exchanges. 
o Deposit insurance. A well-designed, rules-based deposit insurance scheme is 
essential to protecting the banking system from future financial crises. Lender of 
last resort actions are no substitute for deposit insurance. 
o Central banks should be financial regulators. Central banks should have a direct 
role in financial supervision. In times of financial crisis — as in times of war — 
good policy-making requires a single ‘general’ directing the operations. 
                                                 
22 “Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy,” speech presented at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 
23 Some people characterized these interest rate reductions as a bailout.  But since every 
debt instrument has both a buyers and a sellers, when interest rates changes create 
transfers; someone wins and someone loses.  And, the winnings exactly cancel the losses.  
So, when the FOMC reduced the federal funds rate target, whether you won or lost 
depends on whether you had an existing fixed-rate loan (lenders win and borrowers lose) 
or either an existing adjustable-rate loan or a new loan (borrowers win and lenders lose).  
I can’t see how such transfers, which always exist whenever interest rates change, create 
a bailout. 
My final conclusion is negative. Some observers worry that recent central bankers’ 
responses to the subprime crisis of 2007 will encourage asset managers to take on more 
risk than is in society’s interest. I believe that this is wrong. Punishment is being meted 
out to many of those whose risky behaviour led to the problems, while central banks’ 
actions have, so far, reduced the collateral damage that this crisis could have inflicted on 
the economy. 
 
Boeri and Guiso: Subprime crisis: Greenspan’s Legacy 
23 August 2007 
The subprime crisis has its origin in Greenspan’s low interest rate policy. His successor 
should take care to reassure the markets in the short run without laying the foundations 
for a new overreaction “a la Greenspan”. 
It's difficult to predict how long the crisis in the world's financial markets will last. Its 
dynamics recalls that of previous crises, such as that of 1998 (the Russian default and the 
collapse of LTCM), which have by now been forgotten by many. An excess of liquidity 
(i.e. an abundance of loans at low cost) has suddenly been transformed into a dearth of 
liquidity; many dealers find it hard to sell the assets in their portfolios. The present crisis 
bears little resemblance to the 1929 Great Depression, contrary to what some politicians 
and commentators assert. Fortunately Fed President Ben Bernanke has studied the Great 
Depression in depth. According to the analysis he did as an academic24, the "Great 
Depression" was unleashed by a collapse of production and consumption, amplified by a 
drastic reduction in the supply of bank credit which came about largely because the Fed 
failed to act as a lender of last resort. Exactly the opposite is happening today. The world 
economy continues to grow at sustained rates since central banks have so far fulfilled 
their roles of supplying the necessary liquidity to the market. The only (perhaps non–
negligible) aspect that the current crisis shares with the Great Depression is that its 
epicenter is the US. 
Back to the present 
It's useful to disentangle the causes of the crisis. Three factors contribute to the current 
crisis that was triggered by the expectation of defaults on subprime mortgages in the US. 
o The low financial literacy of US households; 
o The financial innovation that has resulted in the massive securitisation of illiquid 
assets, and; 
o The low interest rate policy followed by Alan Greenspan’s Fed from 2001 to 
2004. 
The third cause is by far the most important. Without Greenspan’s policy, the present 
crisis probably would have never occurred. 
                                                 
24 Ben Bernanke (1983) Nonmonetary effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of 
the Great Depression, American Economic Review, 73:257-276. 
Low Financial Literacy 
The first ingredient of the crisis is a blend of bad information, financial inexperience and 
myopia of consumers/investors. They fell for the prospect of getting a mortgage at rates 
never seen before and then extrapolating these rates out for thirty years. This myopia was 
encouraged and indeed exploited by banks and other lenders eager to attract and retain 
clients. This is surprisingly similar to what has been seen in the past when banks and 
intermediaries have advised their clients to invest in financial assets ill-suited to their 
ability to bear risk. In both cases, a biased advisor is the reflection of a clear conflict of 
interest in the financial industry. Financial literacy is low not only in financially 
backward countries (as one would expect), but also in the US. Only two out of three 
Americans are familiar with the law of compound interest; less than half know how to 
measure the effects of inflation on the costs of indebtedness. Financial literacy is 
particularly low among those who have taken out subprime mortgages. The 
intermediaries exploited this financial illiteracy. 
Securitisation 
The second ingredient is the pace of financial innovation during the last ten years and the 
securitisation that it produced. Today it is easy to “liquidify” a portfolio of illiquid credits 
(typically a combination of bank loans or mortgages) so they can be packaged into 
investor portfolios. Any bank with distressed loans has used this technique to securitise 
its own credits. Like all financial innovations, this too has pros and cons. The advantage 
is that by making an illiquid credit liquid, one can achieve important efficiency gains; 
investors can take longer-term positions and so earn a higher return. It also spreads the 
risk of insolvency across a much wider group, reducing the level of risk exposure of any 
individual agent. But securitisations also have their disadvantages. They weaken the 
incentives of financial intermediaries to monitor the behavior of the original borrower. In 
addition, since a credit that has become risky can be liquidated more easily, banks have 
less incentive to screen borrowers carefully. This opens the credit-markets doors to poor 
quality borrowers. 
Low interest rates 
The first two factors aren't new. Without the third factor – the legacy of the “central 
banker of the century” – the crisis probably would have never occurred. The monetary 
policy of low interest rates – introduced by Alan Greenspan in response to the post-9/11 
recession and the collapse of the new economy “bubble” – injected an enormous amount 
of liquidity into the global monetary system. This reduced short-term interest rates to 1% 
– their lowest level in 50 years. What’s more, Greenspan spent the next two years 
maintaining interest rates at levels significantly below equilibrium.25 Interest rates were 
kept at low levels for a long time, and were often negative in inflation-adjusted terms. 
The result was no surprise. Low returns on traditional investments pushed investors and 
lenders to take bigger risks to get better returns. Financial intermediaries, in search of 
profits, extended credit to families and companies with limited financial strength. 
                                                 
25 See Lombardi, M. E S.Sgherri, (Un)naturally low? Sequential Monte Carlo tracking of 
the US Natural Interest Rate, ECB Working Papers, No.794, August 2007. 
Investors with varying degrees of expertise duly reallocated their portfolios towards more 
lucrative but riskier assets in an attempt to increase their wealth and preserve its 
purchasing power. The low borrowing rates for both short and long-term maturity 
attracted throngs of borrowers – families above all who were seduced by the possibility 
of acquiring assets that for had always been beyond their means. At the same time, house 
prices soared, ultimately encouraging the additional extension of credit; the value of real 
estate seemed almost guaranteed. 
The song of the Keynesian sirens 
Thanks Alan! Today we’re paying the cost of your overreaction to the 2001 recession. 
The ECB was wisely prudent and only let itself be partially tempted by Keynesian 
arguments for reduced interest rates (which were already absurdly low) as a tool for 
attacking European stagnation. Many would like the ECB to lower rates now, arguing 
that to avoid a new “Great Depression” Europe needs Keynesian policy of the type 
followed in the USA, Great Britain and Germany after the 1929 collapse. 
We think it is far better to avoid repeating Greenspan’s error, and to avoid monetary 
policies that are too accommodating for too long. At present, central banks are acting 
correctly by injecting liquidity into the system. In such crises, one must be afraid of fear. 
Expectations can unleash downward spirals that make the most pessimistic prophecies 
come true. In addition, the market crisis hits everyone indiscriminately — even those 
who did not make money by extending mortgages too readily. Last Friday’s press release 
of the Federal Open Market Committee didn’t clarify whether half-point cut in the 
discount rate as intended to merely prevent a downward expectations spiral or whether it 
was the prelude to yet another overreaction to the market crisis. It’s important to show 
soon that the lesson of Greenspan’s error has been learned. We should not overreact, as 
has been done so many times in the past, by sowing the seeds of a future crisis today. 
 
 
 
Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro: The impact of short-term interest 
rates on risk-taking: hard evidence 
Do low levels of short-term interest encourage risk-taking that can be considered 
‘excessive’? Do low interest rates imply higher credit risk in the short-run? In the 
medium-run? New empirical research suggests that the answers are a resounding ‘yes’, a 
subtle ‘no’ and a qualifying ‘it depends’. 
In the heat of the summer turmoil in the global financial markets, observers immediately 
argued that the low levels of short-term interest rates during the 2002-2005 period created 
the conditions for excessive risk-taking and were consequently one of the main causes of 
these almost unprecedented credit market convulsions.26,27 Despite the theoretical appeal 
and wide-spread resonance of this contention,28 no detailed empirical evidence — as far 
as we are aware — has established a clear and direct link from monetary policy onto bank 
risk-taking.29 
To analyse the impact of short-term interest rates on bank risk-taking is not 
straightforward. Monetary policy is endogenous: when financial stability is jeopardised, 
for example, monetary authorities may react by lowering interest rates, making any 
econometric identification extremely difficult. After the collapse of LTCM in 1998, for 
example, the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds rate during the ensuing period of 
high financial uncertainty. 
An excellent setting to econometrically identify the impact of short-term interest rates on 
bank risk-taking is Bolivia. In recent years, the boliviano was pegged to the US dollar 
and the financial system was highly dollarised. During this period, the proper measure of 
short-term interest rates in Bolivia was the US federal funds rate, which is exogenous to 
Bolivian economic conditions. Hence, using the Bolivian credit registry, we analyse on a 
loan-by-loan basis the impact of the US federal funds on risk-taking and credit risk. The 
registry contains detailed contract information on all loans issued by any bank operating 
in the country as well as several measures of bank risk-taking such as ex-post loan 
                                                 
26 For details see Ioannidou, V.P., S. Ongena, and J.L. Peydró, (2007) "Monetary Policy 
and Subprime Lending: "A Tall Tale of Low Federal Funds Rates, Hazardous Loans, and 
Reduced Loan Spreads", CentER - Tilburg University / European Central Bank, Mimeo. 
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for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects 
of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?”, CEPR DP 6514. Any views expressed are only 
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27 See for example “How Credit Got so Easy and Why It Is Tightening”, Front Page, The 
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Guiso (2007) “Subprime Crisis: Greenspan’s Legacy”. 
28 See Matsuyama, K., (2007) "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," American Economic 
Review 97; Dell'ariccia, G., and R. Marquez, (2006) "Lending Booms and Lending 
Standards," Journal of Finance 61; Rajan, R., (2006) "Has Finance Made the World 
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29 In contrast, the effects of monetary policy on the volume of credit have been widely 
studied and documented: Bernanke, B.S., and A.S. Blinder, (1992) "The Federal Funds 
Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission," American Economic Review 82; 
Bernanke, B.S., and M. Gertler, (1995) "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of 
Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives 9; Kashyap, A.K., and 
J.C. Stein, (2000) "What Do a Million Banks Have to Say about the Transmission of 
Monetary Policy," American Economic Review 90. 
performance, internal credit ratings, loan rates, and borrower credit history. The analysis 
draws from the 1999-2003 period, when the funds rate varied between 0.98% and 6.5%, 
and the boliviano was pegged to the US dollar. 
We find that short-term interest rates affect risk-taking and credit risk. In particular, low 
interest rates encourage ex-ante risk-taking. Prior to loan origination, low interest rates 
imply that banks soften their lending standards for new loans – banks give more loans to 
borrowers with lower credit score and/or with bad credit history. Not only do banks take 
loans with higher ex-ante risk but also grant new loans that have higher ex-post credit 
risk, which we measure using a loan’s hazard rate, i.e. the default rate per unit of time. In 
addition, banks do not seem to price these extra risks they take. This finding suggest that 
our results are not driven by a higher demand for loans from risky firms (vis-à-vis less 
risky firms) when interest rates are low.30 All in all, low short-term interest rates seem to 
increase the banks’ appetite for risk. 
We also find that banks which are less-well monitored and disciplined (i.e., subject to 
more moral hazard) not only take on more risk but they especially take it when interest 
rates are low. Low rates therefore imply excessive risk-taking. When rates are low not 
only do these banks take on more risk, but loan spreads are further reduced at these banks 
despite the higher ex-post realisation of credit risk. 
We also analyse in a duration model how the stance and the path of interest rates affect 
credit risk. We find that the hazard rate increases with lower interest rates at loan 
origination but also increases as a result of higher rates during the life of the loan. 
Consequently, there is a completely different impact of lower interest rates on the credit 
risk of new vis-à-vis outstanding loans. In the short-term, lower interest rates reduce the 
total amount of credit risk of the banks since the volume of outstanding loans is larger 
than the volume of new loans. In the medium-term, however, very low interest rates 
worsen credit risk, especially if interest rates rise at least back to the ‘normal’ levels and 
the banks’ portfolios are loaded with riskier loans from the era of ‘cheap’ money! 
Some policy implications 
We find that the level of short-term interest affects bank risk-taking and the ‘amount of 
credit risk in the system’. Banks remain at the core of the financial system and credit risk 
is the most important risk banks face. Consequently, the stance and the path of monetary 
policy significantly affect financial stability. Indeed, very low interest rates for too long 
make the reversal to higher ‘normal’ rates hazardous. Therefore, prudential supervision 
cannot act independently of the stance of monetary policy. (In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests that the two functions may affect and even complement the behaviour of the 
monetary authority.31) When short-term interest rates are too low and there is excessive 
                                                 
30 In Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss, (1981) "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information," American Economic Review 71, the demand for funds from risky 
borrowers increases when interest rates are higher. 
31 See for example, Peek, J., E. S. Rosengren, and G. M. Tootell, (1999) “Is Bank 
Supervision Central to Central Banking,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 and 
liquidity in the financial markets, prudential standards may have to be tightened, through 
dynamic and forward-looking capital requirements and/or provisioning, for example. 
The critical moment for financial instability comes, when short-term interest rates were 
unusually low for a long time and then return at least, for example, to their ‘normal’ 
levels. In fact, we find that the lower the interest rates were and the higher they move up 
afterwards, the worse credit risk will be. During this critical period of transition to higher 
interest rates, liquidity requirements should increase to offset the higher instability. When 
interest rates rise, in contrast, we find that bank risk-taking is reduced as lending 
standards get tougher. Hence, capital requirements should not be tightened then, it’s too 
late! Regulatory capital should have been higher before this moment of rising interest 
rates, when the rates were low and risk-taking excessive. 
All in all, our findings suggest 1) that prudential supervision cannot act independently of 
the stance and path of monetary policy, 2) that wide and fast variations from low-to-high 
interest rates have a negative impact on financial stability, and 3) that ‘cheap’ money is 
not a free lunch. 
 
Baldwin: Feldstein’s view on the dollar 
20 November 2007 
In a May 2007 essay, Martin Feldstein argued that a drop in US mortgage refinancing 
would raise US personal saving and this would necessitate a fall in the dollar. That’s 
looking pretty good at the moment. Here his basic logic is explained. 
President Kennedy said “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” If the 
dollar’s slide is a defeat, then contrary to Kennedy’s wisdom, this defeat has a thousand 
fathers. Any number of observers now tell us that it was inevitable. One of my hobbies is 
to go back and see who saw it coming. Not from a pure forecasting perspective, but from 
an economic logic perspective. Who understood the key economic factors in advance and 
had the conviction to write them down? Marty Feldstein is one of those and this column 
presents my interpretation of the economic reasoning in his May 2007 paper.32 
Macro and micro 
Feldstein’s dollar story turns mostly on the savings/investment relationship, so a short 
detour is necessary. 
Something that stumps every undergraduate, and not a few PhD economists, is how a 
nation’s trade deficit, or more precisely, its current account deficit can be two things at 
once: #1) The gap between national investment and national savings, and #2) the 
difference between exports and imports. This is not a ‘can be’ relationship; it is a ‘must 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ioannidou, V. P., (2005) “Does Monetary Policy Affect the Central Bank's Role in Bank 
Supervision?,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 14. 
32 Feldstein, M (2007). “<a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13114">Why is the dollar so high?</a>“ NBER WP, 
13114, May 2007. 
be’. Number two requires no explanation; it’s just a definition. Number one follows from 
a line or two of national-accounts algebra. A nation’s aggregate purchase of goods is the 
sum of what its public and private sectors spend on consumption and investment. Its 
aggregate sales of goods equal the value of what its public and private sectors produce 
and this, in turn, is its aggregate income. Plainly, the difference between a nation’s 
spending and earning must be its trade balance with the rest of the world; if its aggregate 
purchases exceed its production/income, then some foreign goods must, on net, be 
coming in to satisfy the excess demand. Finally, since income must be either consumed 
or saved, the spending-earning gap is also the investment-saving gap; consumption 
cancels from both sides of the equation. 
Savings in the driver’s seat 
Feldstein makes a bold simplification that helps him to think clearly about the messy 
world. He takes US savings and investment as primitives and views the value of the 
dollar as the variable that adjusts to make things fit. As he writes it: “This line of 
reasoning leads us to the low level of the U.S. saving rate as the primary cause of the high 
level of the dollar.” 
The logic is simple. If we take US savings and investment behaviour as data, then the 
supply and demand for US and foreign goods can only clear if their relative price is right 
(assuming unemployment is at its natural rate). In the real world, much of the adjustment 
of the US-versus-foreign relative prices takes place through the nominal exchange rate, at 
least in the short and medium term. (Goods prices in their own currency typically move 
sluggishly.) 
So there we are. The US’s net purchase of foreign goods is predetermined by its 
savings/investment gap and the dollar must jump to make people happy buying and 
supply the necessary net flow of foreign goods.33 
So far, the reasoning has been little more than a string of tautologies. The real 
explanation comes in understanding why US savings was so low relative to its 
investment. 
Why the low savings? 
Feldstein focuses on personal savings. “Two primary forces have been driving down the 
household saving rate,” he wrote, “increasing wealth and, more recently, mortgage 
refinancing.” (My emphasis.) Writing in May (although the first draft was given in 
January 2007), he states that US portfolios have done wonderfully, rising 120% in real 
terms since 1990; owner-occupied housing prices rose much more. US workers thought: 
‘With my nest-egg rising at this pace on autopilot, why save anything at all?’ And they 
didn’t. Personal saving rates fell since the 1990s, dropping more sharply from mid-2003 
                                                 
33 All this reminds me of the undergraduate lectures I sat through in 1977 (Andre Sapir 
and Rachel McCulloch were the profs). Back then, one of the leading exchange rate 
models — the income-elasticity approach — took the trade gap as the ‘horse’ and the 
‘exchange rate’ as the ‘cart’. The whole, Dornbusch over-shoorting-uncovered-interest-
rate parity logic was not fully accepted since private trade in financial assets was fairly 
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to -1.5% of disposable income. In other words, Americans weren’t just not saving, they 
were actually consuming some of their stock of savings each year. 
A hefty share of this dis-savings came through mortgage refinancing (two-thirds of 
American households own their own residence). With the Fed holding interest rates to 
1% and promising to raise it only slowly, it made sense to refinance. Americans would 
pay off their existing mortgage by borrowing at new lower interest rates. This is just plain 
financial good-sense — something that even Warren Buffet would approve of — but the 
rising home value meant that Americans had more valuable collateral in their hands (the 
house itself). This made it possible, if not wise, for them to borrow more than they 
needed to pay off the mortgage. ‘Taking money out of the house,’ was what it was called. 
Why relatively high investment? 
The other side of the savings-investment gap also needs explaining. Feldstein writes: “the 
rate of investment continued at a relatively high level because the fall in saving did not 
cause the rate of interest to rise.” This happened due to what others have called the global 
glut of savings. “Three sources of such capital inflow have been particularly important. 
First, the Chinese government stabilized the exchange rate between the dollar and the 
renminbi by buying large volumes of US Treasury securities, thus keeping down the 
interest rate on those bonds. Second, the Bank of Japan has pursued a low interest 
strategy, with the short rate close to zero. This encouraged private individuals in Japan 
and abroad to borrow yen, sell the yen for dollars, and invest the funds in dollar 
securities. This ‘yen carry trade’ kept US rates lower than they would otherwise have 
been. And the rapid rise in the price of oil has created large amounts of investable funds 
in the oil producing countries which have been temporarily invested in dollar securities.” 
Dollar drop: it was the housing crisis 
Now comes my favourite part of the logic. Feldstein not only calls the dollar’s drop, he 
links it to developments in the US housing market. True, his logic did not lead him to 
predict the subprime crisis, but that is more a matter of how, not what. 
He notes that bringing down the trade deficit will require a closing of the 
saving/investment gap. He wrote that this would come mostly from higher savings: “The 
household saving rate will rise because the two primary forces that have driven savings 
down will come to an end. First, the sharp rise in wealth caused by a billionormal gains in 
share prices and house prices will not continue. Home prices are already beginning to 
decline and the prices of stocks are not likely to outperform earnings in the future in the 
way that they did in the past. Second, the mortgage refinancing will not continue to 
generate spendable cash for households as it has in the past. The decline in mortgage 
refinancing has not yet begun. But at a certain point there will be very few households 
with mortgage rates that exceed the rates available on new mortgages. There will also no 
longer be a stock of net equity that can be accessed by borrowing.” 
The rest of the essay discusses why the foreign exchange market didn’t anticipate the 
adjustment that Feldstein said must occur. His reasons are less remarkable — Asian 
official intervention and myopic investors. 
Back to the future 
Feldstein’s insight looks pretty good in hindsight, but his foresight is not yet all behind 
us. He also considers two ways that the whole thing could unwind and what they mean 
for the US macroeconomy. 
“The primary risk going forward,” he wrote, “is that the decline of the dollar and the rise 
of the saving rate will happen at different speeds, leading to domestic imbalances.” His 
second scenario is looking best at the moment. Here it is. 
If the US saving rate rises without a dollar drop, there is no narrowing of the trade gap to 
offset the closing saving/investment gap. Aggregate demand falls and we get a US 
recession or at least growth deceleration. More to the point facing us today, Feldstein 
notes that since a falling dollar stimulates net exports only with a lag, avoiding a 
slowdown in US aggregate demand growth would have required the dollar to fall before 
the saving rate rises, maybe a couple of quarters earlier. Or, as he puts it: “the domestic 
weakness will occur unless the dollar decline precedes the rise in saving.” 
Conclusions 
If you follow Feldstein logic, keep an eye on US saving and investment if you want to 
know how low the dollar must go. 
 
Cardarelli et al: The changing housing cycle and its implications for 
monetary policy 
Recent housing finance innovations have changed the relationship between house prices 
and the business cycle. This column suggests that these changes amplify spillovers from 
the housing sector to the rest of the economy and recommends that monetary policy 
respond more aggressively to the housing market. 
After several years of rapid price increases, house price growth has decelerated in many 
advanced economies, and in a few of them – the United Stated and Ireland – house prices 
have fallen during the past year (Figure 1). Real residential investment has also slowed in 
several countries, including the United States, Australia, and, especially, Ireland, where it 
has fallen by about 3 percentage points of GDP since its peak four years ago. 
Figure 1: 
 
Although few people would disagree that such developments may have important 
implications for the level of economic activity, considerable uncertainty still exists about 
the link between the housing sector and the business cycle. In particular, there are varying 
estimates of the extent to which house price fluctuations affect consumer spending and 
the dynamics of residential investment. Moreover, the prospect of a sharp boom-bust 
cycle in the housing sector in several advanced economies has reignited the debate on 
how monetary policy should respond to developments in the housing sector. 
The uncertainty on the role of housing in the business cycle and in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism has been compounded by dramatic changes over the past two 
decades in how housing is financed in several advanced economies. There has been a 
shift toward a more competitive housing finance model.34 The new model has made it 
easier for households to access housing-related credit through diverse funding sources, 
lender types, and loan products, contributing to the rapid growth of mortgage debt in a 
number of countries – including subprime lending to households with impaired or 
insufficient credit histories. 
In Chapter 3 of the April 2008 World Economic Outlook, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/index.htm>  we investigate whether 
the changes in housing finance over the past two decades have altered the links between 
the housing sector and economic activity. We also explore the implications of housing 
sector developments for the conduct of monetary policy. In this column, we report the 
three main conclusions of our study. 
Housing and the business cycle 
                                                 
34 See papers presented at the 2007 Jackson Hole Economic Symposium. 
<http://www.kc.frb.org/home/subwebnav.cfm?level=3&theID=10548&SubWeb=5> 
Our research shows that significant cross-country differences exist in mortgage contracts. 
We rank the development of mortgage markets in 18 advanced economies by the extent 
to which households find easy access to housing-related credit. We find that that the 
United States, Denmark, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands appear to have the most 
“developed” mortgage markets, which allow households greater access to housing-related 
financing, whereas households in continental Europe tend to have more limited access to 
such financing (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
 
These differences are relevant because movements in house prices influence household 
spending plans, mainly through the role of housing as collateral. Indeed, we show that 
both the correlation between consumption and house prices at business cycle frequencies 
and the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth are stronger in economies 
with higher values of the mortgage index. 
While the changes in the system of housing finance over the last two decades may have 
increased the potential role for the collateral effects of house prices, in principle the effect 
of these changes on consumption and output volatility is ambiguous, as two 
countervailing effects may be at work. First, households’ ability to smooth consumption 
in the face of adverse income shocks may be enhanced through more ready access to 
financing collateralised by home equity.35 Second, macroeconomic fluctuations may be 
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amplified by endogenous variations in collateral constraints tied to real estate values – the 
“financial accelerator” analysed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).36 
We find that that the second effect may be prevailing: spillovers from the housing sector 
to the rest of the economy are estimated to be larger in economies where it is easier to 
access mortgage credit and use homes as collateral. This is because movements in house 
prices influence household spending plans through the role of housing as collateral – for 
example, increases in house prices raise the value of the collateral available to 
households, loosen borrowing constraints, and support spending. 
Transmitting monetary policy 
Can monetary policy smooth the impact of developments in the housing market on the 
broader economy? Some observers have raised doubts as to whether this is still the case, 
because greater integration of mortgage markets with the rest of the financial system may 
have reduced the importance of mortgage credit availability as a channel of monetary 
policy transmission.37 
However, we find that financial deregulation may have strengthened the role of housing 
in monetary policy transmission, because easier access to housing collateral may have 
linked house prices more closely to monetary policy. We also find that the effects of 
monetary policy changes on output are larger in those economies where housing finance 
markets are relatively more developed and competitive. 
More aggressive monetary policy stance 
Based on these findings, we suggest that the response of monetary policy to changes in 
the housing sector should vary depending on the level of development of mortgage 
markets. First, monetary policy makers may need to respond more aggressively to a 
housing demand shock in economies with more developed mortgage markets – that is, 
with a higher loan-to-value ratio and thus, presumably, a higher stock of mortgage debt. 
They might also need to respond more aggressively to a financial shock affecting the 
amount of credit available for any given level of house prices. Hence, the model used in 
the chapter would “predict” a more aggressive reduction of interest rates in the United 
States compared to the euro area in the face of the recent turmoil in the credit markets – 
in line with what has been observed so far. Second, we suggests that, in economies with 
more developed mortgage markets, economic stabilisation could be improved by a 
monetary policy approach that responds to house price developments in addition to 
consumer price inflation and output developments. 
Some key caveats apply to these findings. First, given the uncertainty over the factors 
driving house price dynamics – in particular, whether they reflect changes in 
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<http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/Sympos/2007/PDF/OpeningRemarks_0415.pdf> 
fundamentals or speculative forces – and their impact on the economy, house prices 
should be considered within a risk management approach to monetary policy. Second, 
paying attention to house price developments does not require changing existing 
monetary policy approaches. Rather, these approaches should be interpreted in a more 
flexible manner, for example, by extending the time horizon over which inflation and 
output are returned to target. However, it is important that such an approach be applied 
symmetrically: an aggressive easing would be justified in response to concerns from a 
rapid slowdown of the housing sector, but some “leaning against the wind” may also 
prove useful to limit the risk of a build-up of housing market and financial imbalances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tabellini: Why did bank supervision fail? 
19 March 2008 
The recent financial trouble has prompted much examination of private financial 
institutions, but few have asked why regulatory supervision did not prevent the crisis. 
This column argues that supervisory failure was also due to regulatory competition 
between national authorities and calls for a consolidated EU authority. 
The ongoing financial turmoil is spurring a large number of reports on what went wrong 
and how to avoid future relapses. A clear picture of why major financial institutions made 
big mistakes and of systematic distortions in their incentive structures is now emerging. 
But on a key question there is a deafening silence: why did bank supervision fail? This is 
worrying, because with hindsight it is becoming increasingly obvious that supervisory 
authorities too made some big mistakes. Understanding why this occurred is important, if 
we want to avoid future repetitions. 
A particularly comprehensive and lucid analysis of the deep causes of the ongoing crisis 
is contained in the Interim Report of the Financial Stability Forum presented by Governor 
Mario Draghi at the G7 meeting in Tokyo. The report draws attention to three specific 
problems (besides the poor and fraudulent practices in the US subprime market): 
o Shortcomings in firms’ risk management practices. In particular, too little 
understanding of exposure to liquidity and market risk. 
o Poor due diligence practices, including excessive and misplaced reliance of credit 
rating agencies. 
o Imperfect public disclosure of the links between on and off balance sheet items. 
Of course, these are only proximate causes, and the report asks: “Why did financial 
institutions make these major mistakes?” The answer given is twofold. On the one hand, 
poor judgement was almost certainly involved. The rapid pace of financial innovation 
meant that even sophisticated investors did not always fully understand the risk properties 
of the complex structures that were built. The systemic implications of these financial 
arrangements were even more poorly understood. Probably, although the report does not 
say this, investors were fooled into collectively overestimating the resilience of global 
financial markets. 
On the other hand, there were systematic incentive distortions. First, the “originate and 
distribute” model entails obvious moral hazard problems. Second, credit rating agencies 
face a conflict of interest. Third, management compensation schemes reward myopic risk 
taking behaviour; it is rational for me to under-insure against the occurrence of rare 
disruptive events, if my bonus only depends on short-term performance indicators. 
All this is good and sound – and far from trivial. But it is only part of the story. The other 
part is that banking supervision did not prevent these shortcomings from occurring. Each 
one of the proximate causes listed above could have been prevented or at least 
discouraged by better and more proactive financial supervision. Supervisory authorities 
did not discourage the build up of off-balance sheet risk exposure, although it was often 
induced by regulatory arbitrage. They did not seem to care about, or they simply ignored, 
the implicit contingent liabilities that this entailed for banks’ balance sheets. The 
relevance of liquidity and market risk (as opposed to default risk) was neglected. 
Insuring adequate risk management of modern complex financial institutions is a joint 
responsibility of the management of such institutions and of the supervisory authorities. 
If risk management proves inadequate, it is a joint failure, not just a management failure. 
Asking why supervision failed is just as relevant as asking what went wrong inside the 
private financial institutions. 
Why did supervision fail? 
Two answers can be given. The first one is bureaucratic inertia together with poor 
judgement. Just as it happened with sophisticated investors, the rapid pace of financial 
innovation may have led astray well-intentioned supervisory authorities. Everyone, from 
the top banker to the last employee of government bureaucracies, did not fully understand 
the huge risks that were piling up in these complex financial structures. Moreover, while 
bank regulators and supervisors are traditionally worried about capital adequacy ratios, 
they were just too slow to adapt their priorities and practice to the new dangers: lack of 
liquidity and market risk. They were also unlucky, because the financial turmoil hit them 
right in the transition between Basel I and Basel II. We cannot rule out that in a year or so 
financial supervision would have been in a position to identify and remedy the weak 
points in the system. Finally, light supervision might also have reflected excessive 
confidence in the self-regulating abilities of modern financial institutions and an 
ideological conviction that over-regulation was the more relevant danger to be avoided. 
This explanation of why supervision failed is plausible and likely to contain important 
elements of truth. But it is incomplete. Much information was actually available, and 
there were mounting signs of concerns of too much complacency, both by individual 
investors and by public officials. Yet the information was not acted upon. This suggests 
that other forces were at work. 
The second possible answer is distorted incentives. Bureaucratic organizations respond to 
incentives, just like financial institutions and their top managers. The main suspect here is 
regulatory competition. Imposing sound risk management procedures raises costs. It is 
quite likely that the lax supervisory standards and practice also reflected the concern that 
the domestic industry would be hurt relative to foreign based competitors or the fear that 
some institutions would shift part of their business to regulatory heavens. 
What can be done to remedy these incentive problems and achieve an effective 
international coordination of banking supervision? To some extent, the answer can only 
be provided by the supervisory authorities themselves, with reference to specific and 
concrete details. But whatever is done, it will not completely solve the problem. The 
Basel frameworks have been designed to prevent this kind of harmful regulatory 
competition. But while Basel I is based on hard numbers, the more flexible supervision 
under Basel II can be implemented with different degrees of stringency at the authorities’ 
discretion. This means that the distortions caused by regulatory competition will not go 
away. It is not enough to agree that supervisors need to encourage better risk 
management practice and the build up of adequate liquidity buffers. One also needs to 
worry about whether national supervisors acting unilaterally will have the resolve and 
incentives to take effective actions. If their incentives were too weak just before this 
crisis, they will remain weak once this storm is gone. 
The need for EU supervision 
Worldwide coordination of bank supervision can only be achieved through informal 
means. But Europe can be much more ambitious. It is time to think about replacing 
national regulation and supervision of banks with an EU-level agency. Besides the issue 
of regulatory competition, there are additional and important arguments in favour of an 
EU-level supervisory authority. It is almost self-evident that cross border banking 
requires some form of trans-national or super-national supervisory entity. Moreover, 
while local knowledge may be important, modern financial arrangements have become so 
complex that there are relevant economies of scale in concentrating the needed expertise 
inside a single supervisory agency. 
One should always be wary of taking rushed decisions during a crisis, because the 
likelihood of making mistakes is very high. But the case in favour of a EU-wide 
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks is overwhelming. The crisis and the failure 
of national supervisory agencies provide a unique opportunity to overcome bureaucratic 
and political opposition to this institutional innovation. 
 
 
Spaventa: Subprime crisis and credit risk transfer: something amiss 
6 September 2007 
Securitisation transferred credit risk from bank’s balance sheets to the market. The 
subprime problem became a crisis when some of this risk landed back on banks. 
Regulators need to find a way to deal with the off-balance sheet operations of banks that 
made this possible and to improve transparency concerning banks’ effective exposure to 
risk.  
By now everyone in Europe knows all about American subprime loans – ranging from 
“Alt-A” to the “ninja” variety (granted with “no verification of income, job status or 
assets”). Still, it is not obvious why an even pronounced increase in delinquency rates on 
such loans, with the attendant losses on mortgage exposures, should have sparked a 
financial crisis that touched all classes of assets globally, even those relatively immune 
from credit risk. True, the share of the less safe loans in the issuance of mortgage-backed 
securities had almost doubled in the past few years. But an estimate of the direct losses of 
the actual and expected defaults ranges between 100 and 200 billion dollars – relatively 
little, considering the valued of aggregate of financial assets (and also in comparison with 
the 5 trillion dollars lost in the dot.com crisis). 
We know how the crisis has unfolded.38 After a sharp drop in the prices and market 
liquidity of all mortgage-backed securities, an equally sharp increase in the price of risk 
and in spreads, and a drying-up of the issuance of all asset-backed securities, contagion 
extended to the short-term end of the financial market — first to a wide class of 
commercial paper and then to the money and interbank markets. As uncertainty and 
mutual mistrust spread to counterparties (even banking counterparties), overnight interest 
rates jumped and, as they say, cash became king. The repeated injections of liquidity on 
the part of various monetary authorities have so far provided only limited solace to this 
state of affairs. All this is clear, but the question is: Why should a surge of subprime 
defaults affect (though not disruptively for the moment) the banking system and (more 
worryingly) general credit conditions? 
The question arises because the subprime mortgage-backed securities that sparked the 
crisis represent an extreme version of the credit risk transfer process in which the core 
banks have been engaged for a long time pursuing the “originate and distribute” business 
model. The banks originate the loans and then distribute the underlying risk to a myriad 
of outside investors. This made credit “something that is largely bought and sold on the 
markets, rather than held … on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries”.39 Among 
the undisputable merits of this model (more complete markets, a wider range of 
instruments available to investors, enhanced liquidity, improved allocation of resources) 
is that the transfer of credit risk away from banking intermediaries would make the 
system more resilient to financial shocks. The fragmentation of risk and its distribution to 
non-bank players providing liquidity in several markets would alleviate the systemic 
consequences and allow an easier absorption of such shocks.  This, however, is not what 
has happened. Though the credit underlying all kinds of  asset-backed securities and of 
credit derivatives should no longer be on the balance sheet of the originating banks, the 
collapse of one segment of those securities has affected and is affecting the banking 
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system. Why is that? The answer is that part of the credit risk flowed back to some banks, 
though not on to their books. 
This has mostly happened through the growing diffusion of “conduits” and structured 
investment vehicles, widely know as SIVs.40 These are entities, off the banks’ balance 
sheet, that invest long-term, largely in high-yield asset-backed securities, and raise short-
term finance by issuing correspondingly collateralized commercial paper (so-called asset-
backed commercial paper). The banks provide such entities with financial guarantees that 
only appear below-the-line in their balance sheet, playing the role of last-resort liquidity 
providers if and when difficulties of refinancing arise. The precise extent of such 
commitments in the aggregate and for individual banks is unknown. According to market 
estimates reported by the BIS outstanding asset-backed commercial paper reached a sum 
of $1.5 trillion last March, of which some $300 billion was based on mortgage-backed 
assets. According to another estimate, European banks have more than $500 billion 
invested in asset-backed-commercial-paper conduits with German banks holding a 
quarter of this sum. 
This crisis, however it ends, is likely to prompt ill-conceived regulatory proposals. But, if 
there is one field where something ought to be done, even before damning the sins of 
rating agencies, it is to find a way to deal with the off-balance sheet operations of banks 
and achieve greater transparency of their effective exposure to risk. 
 
 
Wolf: Scylla and Charybdis: What Europe’s exit from gold in the 1930s 
says about the euro 
21 February 2008 
Europe suffered the collapse of a currency system when countries abandoned the gold-
exchange standard in the 1930s. What lessons does that break-up offer for the euro 
today? 
Nothing lasts forever. The fall of the dollar continues to strengthen the euro, while there 
are signs that financial turbulence will put the euro-zone under stress for some time to 
come. Given this, exit from the euro is now conceivable – if not very practical, as Barry 
Eichengreen has argued – especially where economic pressure meets a political climate 
for change, as in Italy. The closest match in history appears to be the exit of European 
economies from the gold-exchange standard in the wake of the Great Depression. Can a 
look back help us to assess the current risks for a break-up of the euro? Yes, it can help. 
But mind the gap. The euro is different and will be with us for a while.     
1930s exits 
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In 1929, tightening monetary conditions in the US reduced capital outflows to the rest of 
the world and forced deficit countries to tackle their imbalances. This put countries on the 
gold-exchange standard between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, adherence to 
the system — neither imposing capital controls nor devaluing the currency — implied a 
painful increase in real factor costs and reduced international competitiveness. On the 
other hand, unilateral steps towards devaluation or capital controls risked diminishing 
confidence in the stability of the national currency. And such confidence was highly 
valued in European countries that had just experienced a hyperinflation, had not yet 
established any track record of monetary policy, or just badly needed foreign capital for 
domestic development. 
However, the pattern of exit from the gold-exchange standard in the 1930s was quite 
peculiar and suggests that more than that simple trade-off affected the monetary regime 
choices of European countries. Germany left gold in July 1931, soon followed by the 
Habsburg successors Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and also Sweden in September 
1931, only the latter two being net-capital exporters. In contrast, Italy left gold only in 
1934, while (capital-rich) France in the west and (capital-poor) Poland in the east adhered 
to the gold-exchange standard until the bitter end in 1936. In recent research, I analyse 
exit probabilities using a large new set of monthly panel data for Europe over the period 
January 1928 through December 1936. Briefly, the key determinants were national 
institutions, cross-border economic integration, and the stability of the financial sector 
(Wolf 2008). 
Why did they leave? 
The analysis of the interwar experience also shows that neighbours matter: countries 
tended to follow their main economic partner in their monetary regime choice, ceteris 
paribus. For example, Sweden’s decision to exit in September 1931 was clearly driven by 
its commercial interest in trade with England, which had just announced its exit. But 
some neighbours were better liked than others. Poland was eager to tighten its economic 
and political links with France in order to distance itself from Germany, in stark contrast 
to Austria, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia in the early 1930s. The new Polish state that had 
re-emerged on the European map in 1918 needed France to limit its massive dependence 
on Germany and Austria, inherited from 123 years of occupation. In this respect, the euro 
is certainly different: all members of today’s euro area are part of one tightly integrated 
market for goods and capital (and increasingly also for labour and services), with the 
monetary union merely part of a multidimensional economic network. Leaving the euro 
to help competitiveness would not be a very promising strategy because of the large 
negative side effects, as argued in Eichengreen (2007). Among other things, an exit 
would imply political costs, such as possible exclusion from other EU-related decisions. 
But what about the financial sector? The empirical evidence for the interwar years 
suggests that financial turbulence was an additional trigger for exit (as suggested in “third 
generation models of currency crises”). For Austria, Hungary and Germany, one can 
make the case that efforts to rescue struggling banks eventually made the exit from gold 
inevitable. Could a similar financial crisis force a country out of the euro? The answer is 
not that simple. Pan-European banks whose activities span several euro-countries are 
rapidly emerging, while financial market supervision remains largely national. If 
problems emerge in a large pan-European bank, the current institutional framework 
would not be suited to a timely and quick intervention. Financial turmoil has a growing 
potential to challenge the monetary system, and a European banking crisis could put 
existing European institutions, including the euro, under massive stress.  Hence, the 
question is not so much whether any country could be forced to leave the euro in reaction 
to a banking crisis, but whether the euro could be weakened to such an extent that exit 
became an option again. The mismatch between a monetary union and national financial 
market supervision needs to be addressed. 
A reassuring history lesson 
The euro will be under pressure over the next years, but there is good reason to believe 
that it will prove more robust than the interwar gold-exchange standard. Every year of 
good performance relative to other key currencies and every further deepening of 
integration within the euro- area will increase its chances of living a long life. 
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Bordo: The crisis of 2007: some lessons from history 
17 December 2007 
There is a strong tendency in the media and policy circles to view each crisis as totally 
new and unexpected. Financial crises, however, are as old as financial markets. Here are 
the lessons drawn by one of the world’s leading economic historians of financial crises.  
Recent financial instability triggered by the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
market has many features with great resonance from financial history. 
o The crisis occurred following two years of rising policy interest rates. 
o Its causes include lax oversight and a relaxation of normal standards of prudent 
lending in a period of abnormally low interest rates. 
o The default on a significant fraction of subprime mortgages has produced 
spillover effects around the world via the securitized mortgage derivatives into 
which these mortgages were bundled, to the balance sheets of hedge funds, 
investment banks and conduits (which are bank owned but off their balance 
sheets) which intermediate between mortgage and other asset backed commercial 
paper and long term securities. 
o The uncertainty about the value of the securities collateralized by these mortgages 
spread uncertainty about the value of commercial paper collateral, and uncertainty 
about the soundness of loans for leveraged buyouts. 
o All this has led to the freezing up of the interbank lending market across the world 
in August 2007 and substantial liquidity injections by the ECB and the Federal 
Reserve to avert a credit crunch from impacting on the real economy. 
o The credit crunch has not yet been alleviated and a recession in the US with 
consequences for Europe and other countries threatens. 
 
A historical perspective 
Many of the financial institutions and instruments caught up in the crisis are part of the 
centuries old phenomenon of financial innovation. The new instruments --often devised 
to avoid regulation — are then proved to be successful or not by the test of financial 
stress such as we have been recently encountering. The rise and fall of financial 
institutions and instruments occurs as part of a lending boom and bust cycle financed by 
bank credit. The credit cycle is connected to the business cycle. 
Irving Fisher and others have told the story of a business cycle upswing driven by a 
displacement leading to an investment boom financed by bank credit and new credit 
instruments. The boom leads to a state of euphoria and possibly an asset bubble. A state 
of over-indebtedness develops which often ends in a bust. 
A key dynamic in the crisis is information asymmetry manifest in the spread between 
risky and safe securities. The bust would in the past often lead to bank failures and 
possibly panics. The process could be short circuited by a lender of last resort providing 
ample liquidity at a penalty rate. 
Countercyclical monetary policy is also an integral part of the boom-bust credit cycle. 
For example the historical record shows that stock market booms occur in environments 
of low inflation, rising real GDP growth and low policy interest rates. As the boom 
progresses and inflationary pressure builds up, central banks inevitably tighten policy to 
trigger the ensuing crash. The story is similar for housing. 
Stock market crashes have serious real consequences via wealth effects and possible 
liquidity crises. Housing busts, in addition to directly producing negative effects on the 
real economy, can also destabilize the banking system. These risks are present in the 
current housing bust. 
Bordo (2007) presents some historical empirical evidence for the U.S. from 1921 to the 
present on the relationship between credit crunches, recessions, financial crises and 
monetary policy.  I plot the monthly spreads between the Baa corporate bond rate and the 
ten year Treasury constant maturity bond rate, as a measure of the financial markets 
assessment of credit risk. I also show NBER recession dates and major financial market 
events including stock market crashes, financial crises and some major political events 
that affected financial markets. I also show policy interest rates (the federal funds rate 
and the discount rate). 
The patterns revealed by the data show that peaks in the credit cycle proxied by the 
spreads are often lined up with the upper turning points of the business cycle. Also many 
of the events like banking crises and stock market crashes occur close to the peaks. 
Furthermore, policy rates peak very close to or before the peaks of the credit cycle. 
The historical relationship for the U.S. between real housing prices (and other measures 
of the housing market)  ,the business cycle and policy rates reveals a similar pattern . 
Tightening of monetary policy is associated with reversals of real housing prices and 
business cycle downturns. 
Financial innovation and financial crises 
Historically, financial crises originate on the liability side of banks balance sheets as 
depositors rush to convert deposits into currency in the face of a financial shock. In recent 
decades, since the advent of deposit insurance, pressure has come form the asset side. 
Examples include the commercial paper market in the 1970 Penn Central crisis, emerging 
market debt on money center banks in 1982 and hedge funds in the LTCM meltdown in 
1998. An historical example was the 1763 crisis in the market for bills of exchange. 
In many of these cases financial innovation which increased leverage and was often 
devised to circumvent regulations was an integral part of the story of the boom. Examples 
include Penn Central in 1970 with innovation in the commercial paper market; the 
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s with junk bonds; LTCM with derivatives and hedge 
funds and today with the securitization of subprime mortgages. In this episode risk has 
been shifted from the originating bank into mortgage-backed securities which bundles 
shaky risk with the creditworthy. Asset backed securities were absorbed by hedge funds, 
offshore banks and commercial paper. The shifting of risk from the banks to the financial 
markets as banks tried to avoid regulated capital requirements did not reduce systemic 
risk and increased the risk of a more widespread meltdown. Indeed the exposure of the 
non bank financial sector has ultimately put pressure on the banking system. 
International spillovers 
Financial crises have always had an international dimension. Contagion spreads through 
asset markets, international banking and the exchange rate standard. The Baring Crisis of 
1890, when Argentina defaulted on its debt, is a classic historical example of contagion. 
Tightening by the Bank of England created the backdrop for the crisis. It led to sudden 
stops in lending from the European core to the periphery. This led to currency crises and 
debt defaults in a pattern similar to 1997-98. 
The current crisis has spread between advanced countries via the holding of opaque 
subprime mortgage derivatives in diverse banks in Europe and elsewhere. Emerging 
countries have so far avoided crises because of defensive measures, especially large 
foreign exchange reserves, in reaction to the 1990s meltdown. However, if the credit 
crunch continues and the U.S. economy goes into recession, the emerging countries will 
also be affected. 
Policy lessons 
Lesson #1: Anna Schwartz once made a distinction between real financial crises, defined 
as a scramble for liquidity requiring lender of last resort action and pseudo crises (asset 
busts leading to wealth losses) which do not require the lender of last resort. The recent 
wealth losses by hedge funds and others represent pseudo crises. 
However the spillover of the subprime crisis into the interbank loan market and the 
freezing of liquidity to the banking system has posed the threat of a real crisis and have 
been dealt with properly by the ECB and the Federal Reserve. By contrast the Bank of 
England initially followed a strict Bagehot policy of keeping its discount window open at 
a penalty rate. The run on Northern Rock on September 14, 2007 and the Bank’s apparent 
volte-face likely did not reflect the failure of the Bank’s lender-of-last-resort policy but 
perceived inadequacies in the UK’s deposit insurance, the lack of coordination between 
the Financial Stability Authority and the Bank, and political pressure. 
Lesson #2: The Federal Reserve by cutting its Funds rate by 100 basis points between 
September and December has correctly followed the conventional approach to monetary 
policy by temporarily putting its inflation objectives in abeyance to prevent an incipient 
recession. As long as the Fed’s commitment to its goal of a low inflation nominal anchor 
is perceived to be credible, such easing should not be inflationary. However once the 
threat of recession dissipates it behooves the Fed if it wishes to maintain its credibility, to 
take back the money and raise rates. The ECB and Bank of England as of now have not 
cut their policy rates although they have been countering the liquidity crisis by injecting 
funds into the money markets. Should the risk of recession become as serious as in the 
U.S. they should follow the Fed’s example. 
Lesson #3: The Fed has followed the conventional wisdom and acted reactively by 
dealing with the consequences of an asset boom after it has bust. However there may be a 
case for the central bank in some circumstances acting in a preemptive manner to 
forestall a low probability event such as a national housing bust. 
Finally I speculate on whether the recent financial crisis could have been avoided if the 
Fed had not provided as much liquidity as it did from 2001 to 2004. The Fed injected 
liquidity following shocks (the tech bust, 9/11) that might lead to financial crises, but 
when no financial crises occurred, it permitted the additional funds to remain in the 
money market. It also overreacted to the threat of deflation in 2003-2004 which most 
likely was of the “good” (productivity driven) variety rather than the “bad” recessionary 
variety. 
If consequent upon these  events the markets had not been infused with liquidity as much 
as they were and for so long, then interest rates would not have been as low in recent 
years as they were and the housing boom which just bust may not have expanded  as 
much as it did. 
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Reinhart: Reflections on the International Dimensions and Policy 
Lessons of the US Subprime Crisis 
15 March 2008 
We may just have started to feel the pain. Asset price drops – including housing – are 
common markers in all the big banking crises over the past 30 years. GDP declines after 
such crises were both large (-2% on average) and protracted (2 years to return to trend); 
in the 5 biggest crises, the numbers were -5% and 3 years. This column, based on the 
author’s testimony to the Congress, picks through the causes and consequences. It argues 
that when it comes to ‘cures,’ it would be far better to get the job done right than get the 
job done quickly. 
“There is nothing new except what is forgotten.” - Mlle. Rose Bertin 
Financial Crisis: the setting 
Across countries and over the centuries, economic crises of all types follow a similar 
pattern.41 An innovation emerges.  Sometimes it is a new tool of science of industry, such 
as the diving bell, steam engine, or the radio.  Sometime it is a tool of financial 
engineering, such as the joint-stock company, junk bonds, or collateralised debt 
obligations.  Investors may be wary at first, but then they see that extraordinary returns 
appear available on these new instruments and they rush in.  Financial 
intermediaries&mdash;banks and investment companies&mdash;stretch their balance 
sheets so as not to be left out. The upward surge in asset prices continues, and that 
generation of financial market participants concludes that rules have been rewritten. Risk 
has been tamed, and leverage is always rewarded.  All too often, policy makers assert that 
the asset-price boom is a vote of confidence for their regime&mdash;that “this time is 
different”. Seldom, to my knowledge, do they protest that perhaps the world has not 
changed and that the old rules of valuation still apply. 
But the old rules do apply. The asset price rise peters out, sometimes from exhaustion on 
its own or sometimes because of a real shock to the economy. This exposes the 
weaknesses of the balance sheets of those who justified high leverage by the expectation 
of outsized capital gains. Many financial firms admit losses, and some ultimately fail. All 
those financial firms hunker down, constricting credit availability in an effort to slim their 
balance sheets. With wealth lower and credit harder to get, economic activity typically 
contracts. Only after the losses are flushed out of the financial system and often with the 
encouragement of lagging monetary and fiscal ease does the economy recover. 
The role of the real estate market 
This sorry spectacle repeats itself in the various types of crises, but the most relevant to 
the present situation is the aftermath of banking crises. In recent work with Kenneth 
Rogoff, I documented eighteen such episodes in industrial economies over the past thirty 
years.42,43  Declines in assets, including those of both houses and equities that the US has 
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Other Banking and Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark 
(1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy 
experienced over the past year, are common markers of the onset of banking crises. In the 
worst five banking crises (The Big Five) in industrial countries over the past thirty years, 
the value of houses fell about 25 percent on average from their peak (Figure 1) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and sources cited therein. 
The fallout of banking crises 
The cautionary lesson for today’s situation in the United States is that the decline in 
output after a banking crisis is both large and protracted (Figure 2). The average drop in 
(real per capita) output growth is over 2 percent, and it typically takes two years to return 
to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases, the drop in annual output growth from peak 
to trough is over 5 percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend even after 
three years.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and 
United States (1984). 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and sources cited therein. 
The international repercussions of the US crisis: contagion or confusion? 
Swift international spillovers are not a new phenomenon. In this regard, the panic of 
1907, which began in the US and quickly spread to other advanced economies 
(particularly, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden), serves as an illustrative 
historical benchmark for modern-day financial contagion.44 Like in the present episode, 
emerging markets were mostly spared in 1907; the only casualty in that episode was 
Mexico. 
There is little doubt that the US crisis has spilled over into other markets. Two major 
advanced economies, Japan and Germany, have been singled out by the financial press as 
being particularly hard-hit. There is no denying that German and Japanese financial 
institutions sought more attractive returns in the US subprime market, perhaps owing to 
the fact that profit opportunities in domestic real estate were limited at best and dismal at 
worst (Figure 3). Indeed, after the fact, it has become evident that financial institutions in 
these countries had nontrivial exposure to the US subprime market.45 This is a classic 
channel of transmission or contagion, through which a crisis in one country spreads 
                                                 
44 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
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these countries the full extent of exposure is, as yet, unknown. 
across international borders. In the present context, however, contagion or spillovers are 
only a part of the story 
If other countries are experiencing economic difficulties at the same time as the US, it is 
due to the fact that many of the features that characterised the run-up to the subprime 
crisis in the US were also present in many other advanced economies. Specifically, many 
countries in Europe and elsewhere (New Zealand, for example) were having their own 
home-grown real estate bubbles (Figure 3). This, in and of itself makes, these countries 
vulnerable to the usual nasty consequences of asset market crashes&mdash;irrespective 
of what may be happening in the United States. This cannot be pinned on the US 
subprime fiasco or on contagion. The odds of a correction were already present 
 
Sources: Shiller, and Bank of International Settlements. 
Policy Lessons: the banana republic approach to banking supervision 
As Venezuela’s worst banking crisis unfolded in 1994-1995 (conservative estimates of 
the bailout costs of that crisis are at around 18 percent of GDP), no one in that country 
seemed to know whose responsibility it was to supervise the financial institutions. As is 
usual in most banking crises, lending standards had become lax, there was interconnected 
lending, and there was plenty of plain old-fashioned graft. The central bank blamed the 
main regulatory agency (SUDEBAN), the regulatory agency blamed the deposit 
insurance agency (FOGADE), and everyone else blamed the central bank.46 
At the time of that crisis, the received wisdom was that such supervisory disarray could 
only happen in an emerging market; advanced economies had outgrown such chaos. We 
now know better. 
For starters, part of the supervisory responsibilities in the US is delegated to the states, 
which is to say that 50 emerging markets agencies were partially responsible for the 
oversight of real estate lending. Supervisors failed to caution depositories as they offered 
potential borrowers unsuitable mortgages.   They also acquiesced as complicated 
structures were booked off the balance sheet, even though, in the event, they were not 
treated as such by corporate headquarters at the first sign of stress. And after the fact, 
they have pointed to the other guy as responsible for the problem.  
No doubt, change is needed in both the private and public sectors. My immediate fear is 
that, as in most prior episodes, the initial reaction will be overdone and inefficient. 
Financial institutions are already tightening the terms and standards for new lending at a 
ferocious clip. Rating agencies, following their pro-cyclical tendencies, will overreact as 
well in the effort to distract the investing public from their laxness of the past few years 
by strict standards going forward.47 Similarly, bank examiners will interpret the 
regulations narrowly, reinforcing the natural tendencies of depositories to tighten credit 
availability.  
And last but not least, politicians have already turned their focus toward the financial 
industry. If the regulation of financial institutions needs to be revisited, there are 
compelling arguments to pare the multitude of regulators of depository institutions and 
insurance companies and to restructure the supervision of rating agencies.48 But the 
outcome of hurried debate in the heat of the moment is more likely to be legislative 
overreach than informed policy making. It would be far better to get the job done right 
than get the job done quickly 
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How is the crisis unfolding? 
 
Monacelli: An extensive but benign crisis? 
31 August 2007 
The public is overreacting to the current turmoil in financial markets. The turmoil is most 
likely a situation where very specific problems are spread out extensively across 
investors and countries and thus the defaults are benign.  
The public and (especially) the press seem to have overreacted to the current turmoil in 
financial markets. It is often claimed that all we are witnessing is the global-liquidity‘s 
revenge on Bernanke. However, if it is a financial turmoil that we are facing, it is most 
likely to involve an “extensive/benign” scenario rather than an “intensive/malign” 
scenario. An extensive/benign scenario is one in which a specific and quantitatively 
limited type of risk (i.e., the one related to the subprime borrowers in the US) is spread 
out extensively across investors and countries for risk-sharing purposes (the benign 
phenomenon) via the instruments of financial diversification. An intensive/malign 
scenario, by contrast, is one associated with a large amount of risk concentrated with 
some investors (possibly geographically), whose deterioration usually leads to large 
default losses (the malign phenomenon). 
In the last twenty years, financial markets have changed dramatically throughout the 
world, and in the US in particular. This has been synonymous with increased ability of 
risk diversification. Put differently, the new financial system has become increasingly 
atomistic. The physical link between the primary borrower (the family seeking a 
mortgage) and the lender, via a plethora of instruments of financial diversification (and of 
subsequent borrowers/lenders along this chain), has weakened considerably.49 At the 
same time, technological improvements in the risk assessment process have substantially 
reduced monitoring costs for lenders. 
In this context, the fact that lenders (loosely speaking) have been assuming an increasing 
amount of risk (“the subprime loans”) is a natural implication of the deepening of 
financial diversification. In the specifics of mortgage markets, home-ownership projects 
that were turned down ten years ago have now become eligible for finance. With falling 
monitoring costs and increased ability of diversification, financing riskier categories of 
borrowers can be perfectly consistent with profit maximisation by lending institutions. 
On the other hand, for previously constrained families, this process of financial 
diversification has meant a loosening of their borrowing constraints. Overall, and from 
the viewpoint of economic theory, it is hard to identify this as a malign phenomenon. 
It is sometimes argued that, along the financial diversification chain, it may become 
increasingly difficult to identify where the risk exactly lies. Certainly true, yet isn’t this 
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role for price signals and competition among lenders (see IMF WEO, September 2006). 
exactly what financial diversification is all about? Making idiosyncratic (family-specific) 
risk negligible relative to the aggregate pool of financed (home-ownership) projects. 
From a different angle, many critics have pointed out the fallacy of this process arguing, 
somewhat loosely, about “excessive lending” or “excessive amount of risk” as necessary 
drawbacks of increased financial diversification. From the standpoint of economic theory, 
though, “excessive” is meaningful only if “inefficient”. In this case, one can formally 
identify an inefficiency if either of two phenomena arises: (i) an increased “adverse 
selection” and/or (ii) an increased “moral hazard” problem. Possibly, only the latter 
qualifies as concrete in this context. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard 
Isn’t it worrying that, simply allured by the rumour that “nowadays nobody is denied a 
mortgage”, virtually any family — including the most risky ones — decides to show up 
in a bank and ask for a loan? Not really, to the extent that the risk associated to this 
borrower is priced correctly (with this being more likely as monitoring costs fall) and is 
diversified through the system. After all, once again, this is what financial risk-sharing is 
all about. 
Isn’t it true that, tempted by the increased opportunities of insurance, financial 
institutions have been taking up an increasing amount of risk? Prime facie, this may 
qualify as a deepening of a moral hazard problem. “Lending institutions need to take 
risks by making loans, and usually the most risky loans have the potential for making the 
most money. A moral hazard arises if lending institutions believe that they can make 
risky loans that will pay handsomely if the investment turns out well but they will not 
have to fully pay for losses if the investment turns out badly”.50 
In the specifics of our example, the “insured” is financial institution “n-1” along the chain 
and the “insurer” is financial institution “n” buying a mortgage-backed security. What is 
crucial about moral hazard, though, is that the insured individual (better informed than 
the insurer about her own intentions) has the ability to affect the return distribution 
through her behaviour, and does that in a distorted way. Does this apply to our case? 
Possibly yes. Pushed by fierce competition to make it to the “funds-of-the week” top-ten 
list of pseudo-specialised financial reviews, with the comfortable belief that one will be 
handsomely compensated in the case of success and allured by the possibility of 
diversifying much of the risk away, many funds’ managers have probably taken up an 
increasingly inefficient amount of risk. A correct assessment of risk should instead 
consist in compensating funds managers just slightly less if the fund is listed, e.g., 
eleventh in the ranking (if only such an ideal ranking existed!).51 To be sure, this 
potential source of inefficiency does not lie in the funding of subprime loans per se, but 
in the excess funding of risky projects due to a perverse/distorted assessment of risk. 
A correct quantitative assessment of the proportion of these inefficiently risky loans is 
extremely hard. However, one should make sure that such an assessment be made relative 
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to the spectacular increase in financial investment experienced in the last ten years in 
both the US and global markets. In this vein, there is scope for cautious optimism. 
House prices, and aggregate vs. idiosyncratic risk 
In the turmoil of comments witnessed these days, many seem to have forgotten that, in 
the US, the initial cause of distress has been a fall in house prices. It is well-known that, 
via gains in home equity,52 the house price acceleration has considerably widened the 
access to borrowing for the average family - through a series of instruments: secondary 
loans, mortgage-equity withdrawal, mortgage refinancing, etc. Here, though, we would 
like to focus the attention on two partly neglected aspects: (i) the previous increase in 
house prices may not have necessarily been a bubble; (ii) a fall in house prices is the 
realisation of an aggregate risk. 
Are we really confident that the recent fall in house prices qualifies (as many have 
repeatedly suggested) as the pricking of a bubble? This is important; for it implies that 
the previous price inflation was somehow inefficient.53 However, serious models exist 
(the elaboration of which Governor Bernanke has eminently contributed to54) that can 
rationalise an acceleration in asset prices as the result of a so-called “credit cycle”: an 
initial increase in house prices (perfectly consistent with “fundamentals”) strengthens the 
demand for borrowing (via an equity valuation effect), which in turn validates and 
reinforces the initial increase in prices. Of course, one cannot rule out that part of the 
observed run-up in house prices may have been unjustified on the basis of 
“fundamentals”. Yet, once again, such an assessment should be made relative to the 
acceleration that can be rationalised on the basis of a coherent model of the type 
described above. Furthermore, the parallel strong acceleration in housing investment 
experienced in the US may have gradually led to a re-balancing of supply with demand in 
the housing market, finally leading to the recent fall in prices. 
A possible source of concern behind the fall in house prices is that it constitutes the 
realisation of an aggregate shock. As it hits all families simultaneously, this shock is by 
definition not diversifiable. Hence, there is nothing to blame the modern financial 
architecture here. This is definitely material for monetary policy. Fortunately nobody 
knows better than Bernanke about the connections between the financial and the real side 
of the economy. Despite the allegations of “rooky mistake” for defining the subprime 
problem as “contained”, Bernanke is the one that has spoken recently about a possibly 
forthcoming “negative financial acceleration” problem for US families: falling house 
prices leading to a worsening of balance sheets, to a rise in families’ finance premia and 
tightened borrowing conditions, with possible final effects on consumption.55 
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54 Bernanke and Gerler (1989), Kyotaki and Moore (1997). These papers differ in many 
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55 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2007/20070615/default.htm 
However, this concern may once again be worth a word of caution. In today’s 
increasingly integrated financial markets, national (usually the prototype of aggregate) 
shocks assume increasingly the form of idiosyncratic shocks: country risk can in fact be 
shared away internationally. This entails that both the US and Europe may end up 
experiencing a dampening in their growth rates of consumption/output in the near future, 
but of possibly contained magnitude exactly because of the benefits of international risk-
sharing. 
The stock market and Bernanke's two sides 
What to make, then, of the recent turmoil in financial markets? Here we obviously enter 
more risky territory. One interpretation is that the usual irrational exuberance of the 
market may have focused excessively on the “extensive” rather than on the “benign” part 
of the story. A spark originating from a somewhat limited niche of the US mortgage 
markets was after all spreading geographically with surprising pervasiveness. In this vein, 
the phenomenon was taking the form of a “new” crisis. 
But couldn’t it be that we are just facing a relative benign risk being spread out 
extensively (and therefore not likely to generate major losses and defaults) as opposed to 
a malign intensive risk concentrated geographically (as the bank crises of the past, see for 
instance the Massachusetts credit crunch of the 1980s?). 
<a name="fn7">7</a> See <a 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2007/20070615/default.htm" 
title="http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2007/20070615/default.htm">
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2007/20070615/default.h...</a> 
  
  
 
 
Calomiris: Not (Yet) a “Minsky Moment” 
23 November 2007 
The Subprime troubles caused a liquidity shock, but there is little reason to believe that a 
substantial decline in credit supply under the current circumstances will magnify the 
shocks and turn them into a recession. We have not (yet) arrived at a Minsky moment.  
The late Hyman Minsky developed theories of financial crises as macroeconomic events. 
The economic logic he focused on starts with unrealistically high asset prices and 
buildups of leverage based on momentum effects, myopic expectations and widespread 
overleveraging of consumers and firms. When asset prices collapse, the negative wealth 
effect on aggregate demand is amplified by a “financial accelerator”; that is, collapsing 
credit feeds and feeds on falling aggregate demand credit. A severe economic decline is 
the outcome. Many bloggers refer to this as a "Minsky moment" (see Minsky 1975 for 
the real thing.) 
I am sympathetic to the view that “Minsky moments” can happen (indeed, I have written 
numerous studies that give some support to that claim). But in my view, the correct 
application of the Minsky model to the current data indicates that we are not facing a 
Minsky moment – at least not yet. This column, which draws on a much longer that 
analysis I have posted at the AEI, summarises my reasoning. 
At the moment, it is not obvious that housing or other asset prices are collapsing, or that 
leverage is unsustainably large for most firms or consumers. That is not to say that the 
economy will avoid a slowdown, or possibly even a recession. My main focus is not on 
forecasting changes in housing prices or consumption, per se, which are very hard to 
predict. I am interested in assessing the likelihood that financial weakness will 
substantially magnify aggregate demand shocks through a “financial accelerator” 
(otherwise known as a credit crunch). 
The current liquidity shock 
We are currently experiencing a liquidity shock to the financial system, initiated by 
problems in the subprime mortgage market, which spread to securitisation products more 
generally - that is, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and asset-backed 
commercial paper. Banks are being asked to increase the amount of risk that they absorb 
(by moving off-balance sheet assets onto the balance sheet), but the related losses that the 
banks have suffered are limiting somewhat the capacity of banks to absorb those risky 
assets. The result is a reduction in aggregate risk capacity in the financial system as losses 
force those who are used to absorbing risk to sell off or close out their positions. 
The financing of many risky activities unrelated to the core mortgage market shock has 
been reduced relative to their pre-shock levels. There are, at least temporarily, lots of 
“innocent bystanders” that are affected due to the aggregate scarcity of equity capital in 
financial intermediaries relative to the risk that needs reallocating. 
The housing finance sector shock that started the current problems was small relative to 
the economy and financial system (estimated losses on subprime mortgages range from 
$200 billion to $400 billion). It was magnified because of the increased and imprudent 
use that has been made of subprime mortgage-backed securities in the creation of other 
securitisation conduits, and because of the connection of the instruments issued by those 
conduits to short-term asset-backed commercial paper. 
From 2000 to 2005, the percentage of non-conforming mortgages that became securitised 
increased from 35% to 60%, and the volume of non-conforming origination also rose 
dramatically. Subprime mortgage originations rose from $160 billion in 2001 to $600 
billion in 2006. And many of these securitised mortgages became re-securitised as 
backing for collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). As of October 2006, 39.5% of 
existing CDO pools covered by Moody’s consisted of MBS, of which 70% were 
subprime or second-lien mortgages. Why did subprime issuance boom from 2002 to 
2006? Foreclosure rates for subprime mortgages actually peaked in 2002, but remarkably, 
that experience led to a sharp acceleration in the volume of subprime originations 
because the 2002-2003 foreclosures did not produce large losses. Losses from foreclosure 
were low in the liquid and appreciating housing market, and ratings agencies wrongly 
concluded that the forward-looking risks associated with subprime foreclosure were low. 
Instead, ratings should have recognised that this was an unusual environment, and that 
there was substantial risk implied by high foreclosure rates. 
Despite CDOs’ increasing reliance on subprime mortgage-backed securities, and the 
observably low quality of these assets (i.e., high subprime foreclosure rates), CDO pools 
issued large amounts of highly rated debts backed by these assets. The CDO problem 
became magnified by the creation of additional layers of securitisation involving the 
leveraging of the “super-senior” tranches of CDOs (the AAA-rated tranches issued by 
CDO conduits). These so-called leveraged super-senior conduits, or “LSS trades,” were 
financed in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. Some banks structured 
securitisations that levered up their holdings of these super-senior tranches of CDOs by 
more than 10 times, so that the ABCP issued by the LSS conduits was based on 
underlying organiser equity of only one-tenth the amount of the ABCP borrowings, with 
additional credit and liquidity enhancements offered to assure ABCP holders and ratings 
agencies. When CDO super-senior tranches turned out not to be of AAA quality, the 
leveraging of the CDOs multiplied the consequences of the ratings error, which was a 
major concern to ABCP holders of LSS conduits. 
We have learned from the recent turmoil that mistakes in the pricing of fundamental risks 
in one market can have large consequences for the global financial system. In some ways, 
the global dimension of the shock is a sign of progress. Over the last two decades, 
securitisation had produced great progress in the sharing of risk and the reduction of the 
amount of financial system equity capital needed to absorb risk, by establishing 
mechanisms for transferring risk from banks’ and finance companies’ balance sheets to 
the market, and by establishing those mechanisms in creative ways that reduced adverse 
selection and moral hazard costs associated with more traditional securities markets. 
That progress was real and these technological innovations will persist. Mistakes were 
made as part of what could be called a process of ‘learning by losing’ (the history of the 
last two decades has seen many temporary disruptions to the process of financial 
innovation in securitisation, as discussed in Calomiris and Mason 2004, of which the 
current liquidity shock is clearly the most severe). Securitisations have had a bumpy ride 
for two decades, which is inherent in innovation, but overall the gains from reshaping 
risk, sharing risk, and creating mechanisms that reduce the amount of equity needed per 
unit of risk (through improved risk measurement and management) have been large and 
will remain large, even if there is a substantial permanent shrinkage in securitised assets. 
Risk reallocation has already produced a decline in the supply of available credit for 
some purposes, and this will not be fixed overnight. The financial system was devoting 
too little equity to intermediating risk in the mortgage securitisation market. There is 
likely to be a long-term reduction in the amount of credit that can be supplied per unit of 
equity capital in the financial system. 
Furthermore, the shock occurred at a time when credit spreads seemed unreasonably low 
to many of us, reflecting the unusually high level of liquidity in the marketplace and the 
willingness of investors consequently not to charge sufficiently for bearing risk. In this 
sense, it is quite possible that credit spreads, once disturbed from those unrealistically 
low levels, will remain somewhat elevated after the shock dissipates. 
But these adjustments, at least for now, do not a financial crisis make. It is possible that 
the financial system and economy could follow the patterns of 1970, 1987, and 1998 and 
recover from financial disturbances quickly without experiencing a recession, even 
without any further monetary policy stimulus by the Fed.56 
 
Reasons to be cheerful 
My view of the limited fallout rests on eight empirical observations: 
1. Housing prices may not be falling by as much as some economists say they are. 
Too much weight is being attached to the Case-Shiller index as a measure of the value of 
the US housing stock. Stanley Longhofer and I, along with many others, have noted 
(Calomiris and Longhofer 2007) that the Case-Shiller index has important flaws. Most 
obviously, it does not cover the entire US market, and the omitted parts of the US market 
seem to be doing better than the included parts. A comparison between the Case-Shiller 
and OFHEO housing price indexes shows that the Case-Shiller index provides a 
strikingly different, and less representative, picture of the US housing stock than 
OFHEO’s index. According to the OFHEO index, as shown in Figure 2, housing prices 
continued to rise on average through June 2007. 
2. Although the inventory of homes for sale has risen, housing construction activity has 
fallen substantially. 
                                                 
56 Recent Fed actions through the discount window and the fed funds rate (discussed 
below) are comparable to the Fed actions in 1970, 1987, and 1998 — episodes during 
which Fed loosening was confined to fed funds rate declines that averaged 1.1% over the 
three episodes. To be specific, in 1970 the fed funds rate fell from 7.80% on June 17 to 
6.34% on August 26; in 1987 it fell from 7.59% on October 14 to 6.43% on November 4; 
in 1998 it fell from 5.50% on September 29 to 4.75% on November 17. 
The reduced supply of new housing should be a positive influence on housing prices 
going forward. Single-family housing starts dropped 7.1% in August relative to July and 
are down 27.1% on a year-to-year basis. Building permits for single-family homes 
slumped 8.1% in August (the largest decline since March of 2002) and are down 27.9% 
on the year. This decline in residential investment responded to an apparent excess supply 
problem; homeowner vacancy rates, which had averaged 1.7% from 1985 to 2005, 
jumped to 2.8% in 2006. The decline thus far in residential investment by the household 
sector as a share of GDP has been comparable by historical standards to the declines in 
the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (most, but not all, of which preceded recessions), as 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Note: Recessions are shaded. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Table F.6 
(<a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.html">http://www.federalr
eserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm</a>l); National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions (<a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.nber.org/cycles.html/">http://www.nber.org/cycles.html/</a>) 
As Figure 9 shows, almost the entire decline in commercial paper in recent months has 
come from a contraction of asset-backed commercial paper, while financial commercial 
paper has contributed somewhat to the decline, and nonfinancial commercial paper has 
remained virtually unchanged. 
 
This shows that the fallout from the shock has mainly to do with the loss in confidence in 
the architecture of securitisation per se, and secondarily with rising adverse-selection 
costs for financial institutions, but has not produced a decline in credit availability 
generally. 
4. Aggregate financial market indicators improved substantially in September and 
subsequently. Stock prices have recovered, treasury yields rose in September as the flight 
to quality subsided, and bond credit spreads have fallen relative to their levels during the 
flight to quality (although Tbill yields remain low relative to other money market 
instruments). 
5. As Figure 15 shows, nonfinancial firms are highly liquid and not overleveraged. Thus, 
many firms have the capacity to invest using their own resources, even if bank credit 
supply were to contract. 
 
Note: Gross corporate leverage is defined as liabilities divided by assets. Net corporate 
leverage is defined as liabilities, less cash, divided by assets. Cash is defined as total 
financial assets, less trade receivables, consumer credit, and miscellaneous assets. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Table B.102 
(<a target="_blank" 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.html">http://www.federalr
eserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.html</a>) 
6. As David Malpass (2007) has emphasised, households’ wealth is at an all-time high 
and continues to grow.  So long as employment remains strong, consumption may 
continue to grow despite housing sector problems. 
7. Of central importance is the healthy condition of banks. As Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke noted from the outset of the recent difficulties, financial institutions’ balance 
sheets remain strong, for the most part, even under reasonable worst-case scenarios about 
financial sector losses associated with the subprime fallout. Bank lending has been 
growing rapidly, which is accommodating the transfer of securitised assets back onto 
bank balance sheets. The high capital ratios of banks at the onset of the turmoil is 
allowing substantial reintermediation to take place without posing a threat to the 
maintenance of sufficient minimum capital-to-asset ratios. 
8. Banks hold much more diversified portfolios today than they used to. They are less 
exposed to real estate risk than in the 1980s, and much less exposed to local real estate 
risk, although US banks’ exposure to residential real estate has been rising since 2000 
(Wheelock 2006). 
I conclude from this evidence that the consequences of the recent shocks for the supply of 
bank credit may turn out to be modest. 
Conclusion 
The current financial market turmoil resulted from a moderate shock to the housing and 
mortgage markets, which was magnified by the uses of subprime mortgages in a variety 
of securitisations vehicles, which produced a collapse of confidence in the architecture of 
securitisation and led to a sudden need to reallocate and reduce risk in the financial 
system. The liquidity risks inherent in maturity mismatched asset-backed commercial 
paper conduits substantially aggravated the short-term problem. Despite these 
disruptions, the fallout thus far in the financial system has been limited and appears to 
have been contained by a combination of market discipline and short-term central bank 
intervention. It is hard to know whether new financial shocks will occur (e.g., large 
housing price declines, or substantial increases in defaults on other consumer loans), or 
whether consumption demand will decline independent of financial system problems, but 
there is little reason to believe that a substantial decline in credit supply under the current 
circumstances will magnify the shocks and turn them into a recession. We have not (yet) 
arrived at a Minsky moment. 
Of course, if housing prices fell by 50% nationwide (as some have argued is “entirely 
possible”) there is no question that the impact on consumers would be severe, both 
directly (via the decline in wealth) and indirectly (through its effects on the financial 
system). Judging from previous episodes of real estate price collapses, it would take years 
to sort out the losses. Real estate in liquidation is notoriously illiquid and hard to value; in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, banks and Savings and Loans that were stuck with large 
inventories of real estate took years to liquidate it, and given the valuation challenges 
associated with that real estate, found it costly to raise equity capital in the meantime. A 
real estate collapse would not only cause a decline in consumption via a wealth effect, it 
could produce a major financial accelerator effect. 
References 
Calomiris, Charles W., and Joseph R. Mason (2004). “Credit Card Securitization and 
Regulatory Arbitrage,” Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 26, 5-27. 
Calomiris, Charles W., and Stanley D. Longhofer (2007). “Why the Housing Market 
Crisis Isn’t,”  Working Paper. 
Malpass, David (2007). “Running on Empty?” The American, September/October, 72-73. 
Minsky, Hyman P. (1975). John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press. 
Wheelock, David C. (2006). “What Happens to Banks When House Prices Fall? U.S. 
Regional Housing Busts of the 1980s and 1990s,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, September/October, 413-28. 
 
 
Buiter: A B & B future for subprime borrowers? 
3 September 2007 
A rate cut is unnecessary. Congress will swiftly augment the Bush bail-out, adding a 
fiscal stimulus worth, say, 0.5% of GDP. The anticipation of relief on both the fiscal and 
monetary side is likely to be enough to normalise credit conditions. 
Both addressed the crisis in the US subprime mortgage market, falling US house prices, 
the wider turmoil in credit markets and the liquidity problems encountered by a growing 
number of diverse financial institutions.  Bernanke listed the weapons in the Fed’s 
armoury and tried to outline the Fed’s contingent reaction function to new developments.  
Bush outlined a small bailout for financially distressed low and middle-income 
homeowners. 
Bernanke’s ‘wait and you shall see’ 
Chairman Bernanke first.  He succeeded completely in what he set out to do: he said 
nothing at all new, but said it very well indeed. Ignoring the scholarly/historical bits, 
what is relevant to future Fed policy can be captured by the following quotes and their 
translations. 
“…. if current conditions persist in mortgage markets, the demand for homes could 
weaken further, with possible implications for the broader economy. We are following 
these developments closely.” 
Translation: Even though the Fed is in Washington DC, we are not asleep at the wheel. 
“The Federal Reserve stands ready to take additional actions as needed to provide 
liquidity and promote the orderly functioning of markets”.   
Translation: We can inject additional liquidity through open market purchases or at the 
discount window; we can cut the discount rate or the Federal Funds target rate, and we 
can widen the range of eligible assets we will accept as collateral in repos or at the 
discount window.  
“… the further tightening of credit conditions, if sustained, would increase the risk that 
the current weakness in housing could be deeper or more prolonged than previously 
expected, with possible adverse effects on consumer spending and the economy more 
generally.”   
Translation: An increase in credit risk spreads represents a tightening of monetary 
conditions, even if the Federal Funds target is unchanged.  The Fed is aware of this.  
“… in light of recent financial developments, economic data bearing on past months or 
quarters may be less useful than usual for our forecasts of economic activity and 
inflation. Consequently, we will pay particularly close attention to the timeliest 
indicators, as well as information gleaned from our business and banking contacts 
around the country. Inevitably, the uncertainty surrounding the outlook will be greater 
than normal, presenting a challenge to policymakers to manage the risks to their growth 
and price stability objectives. The Committee continues to monitor the situation and will 
act as needed to limit the adverse effects on the broader economy that may arise from the 
disruptions in financial markets.” 
Translation: Never mind what we said following the August 7 FOMC meeting.  That was 
then.  This is now.  HOWEVER, financial kerfuffles influence the setting of the Federal 
Funds target if and only if (and to the extent that) they have a material impact on our 
fundamental objectives, employment and price stability, going forward. 
What does this mean for the future path of the Federal Funds rate? 
Most of the recent real economy data are robust, including the QII GDP growth rate of 
4.0% (annualised) and robust personal income and personal spending growth in July.  
However, they extend no later than July 2007, and therefore do not capture any negative 
effect on consumer and investment demand of the August financial turmoil.   
Core PCE rose 0.1% in July 2007, keeping the 12-month rate of core PCE inflation at 
1.9% for a second month.  Headline CPI also rose by 0.1% in July, and fell to 2.1% over 
a 12-month period, down from 2.3% in June.  While both are north of the centre of the 
Fed’s assumed comfort zone (which ranges from 1.0 to 2.0%), they are low enough not to 
be a cause for embarrassment were the Fed to decide to cut the Federal Funds target on 
September 6.   
Although if I were a voting member of the FOMC, I would vote to keep the Federal 
Funds rate constant, barring exceptional developments between now and September 6, I 
believe that the most likely outcome is a 25 bps ‘insurance cut’ in the Federal Funds rate.  
We shall see. 
Bush’s small bail-out 
By revealed preference, poverty in the USA is something this Republican Administration 
and Democratic Congress (like past Republican and Democratic Administrations and 
Congresses) can live with.  The prospect of a couple of million homeowners being 
foreclosed upon during the year before a presidential election is, however, more that the 
body politic can stand—these people might well be voters.  President Bush gave us the 
homeowners bailout ‘lite’ in his speech.  The Congress will no doubt up the ante and turn 
this into a homeowners bailout ‘premium’.   
Bush first gave a concise statement of the case against bailing out mortgage lenders, 
speculative investors in real estate and those who unwisely took on excessive mortgages 
and then outlined a plan for bailing out the last-mentioned category. 
“A federal bailout of lenders would only encourage a recurrence of the problem. It’s not 
the government’s job to bail out speculators, or those who made the decision to buy a 
home they knew they could never afford. Yet there are many American homeowners who 
could get through this difficult time with a little flexibility from their lenders, or a little 
help from their government. So I strongly urge lenders to work with homeowners to 
adjust their mortgages. I believe lenders have a responsibility to help these good people 
to renegotiate so they can stay in their home. And today I’m going to outline a variety of 
steps at the federal level to help American families keep their homes.” 
There are a number of aspects of these proposals that are interesting from an economic 
point of view. 
(1) It represents a cyclically appropriate, albeit small (especially in the President’s 
version — the only one formally on the table) fiscal stimulus. That’s what is meant by 
“…a little help from their government”. 
(2) The fiscal stimulus proposed by the President will be implement mainly through 
quasi-fiscal means.  That means that they will not come in the form of on-budget tax cuts 
or increases in subsidies or other public spending.  Instead they will be hidden in below-
market mortgage interest rates, supported by Federal Guarantees, through subsidised 
mortgage insurance and other off-budget measures that are functionally equivalent to tax 
cuts or subsidies.  The full budgetary impacts will be obscured and delayed.   
That is clear from the central role assigned to the Federal Housing Association (FHA), 
the cornerstone of socialised housing finance in the USA.  The FHA is a government 
agency that started operations in 1934 and provides mortgage insurance to borrowers 
through a network of private sector lenders. Bush proposes to expand a proposal he sent 
to the Congress 16 months ago that enables more homeowners to qualify for this 
insurance by lowering down-payment requirements, by increasing loan limits and 
providing more flexibility in pricing.  There are obvious elements of subsidy in this 
proposal. 
Already about to come online is a new FHA program (‘FHA-Secure’) that aims to allow 
American homeowners who have a good credit history but cannot afford their current 
mortgage payments to refinance into FHA-insured mortgages.  Again, the unaffordable 
can only be made affordable through a Federal subsidy. 
The President also proposes to change a feature of the US Federal income system that can 
hit homeowners who no longer can service their mortgages hard.  Debt forgiveness 
counts as taxable income.  Assume you have $100,000.00 worth of mortgage debt you 
cannot afford to service. Your house is worth $100,000.00 to the bank.  If the bank were 
to forgive you your mortgage debt and take your house in exchange, you would still be 
left with income tax liability on the $100,000.00 of forgiven debt.  That seems a bit 
rough.  Of course, you could instead sell the house to the bank for $100,000.00 and use 
the proceeds of the sale to pay off the loan.  No income tax would be due (there could, 
under certain conditions, be capital gains tax).   
The US Congress is likely to expand on these proposals by letting Fannie May (or 
Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (or Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation), two Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) created by the 
Congress that are at the heart of the US system of socialised housing finance, expand the 
scale of their operations, specifically by increasing the upper limit on the size of the 
mortgages they can extend or guarantee from its current level of $417,000.0057 
                                                 
57 Together, the three mortgage finance GSEs (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 12 
Federal Home Loan Banks) have about 4.4 trillion dollars of on-balance sheet assets. 
Fannie May had about $2.6 trillion, Freddie Mac has about $820bn and the 12 Federal 
Home Loan Banks just over $ 1.0 trillion. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac initiated the 
securitisation of home mortgages.  
(3) It represents a redistribution of income towards those low and middle-income 
Americans who had taken on excessive mortgage debt.  The bill is paid mainly by the 
shareholders of the mortgage lenders (that is what is meant by “… a little flexibility from 
their lenders,…” and by the American tax payer who will have to foot the bill of the 
increased subsidies attached to the loan guarantees and subsidised mortgage insurance 
offered by the FHA.  If the Congress manages to get Fannie May and Freddie Mac 
involved in the game, the cost to the tax payer could turn out to be significantly higher.  
(4) By subsidising excessive and imprudent borrowing, it reinforces the moral hazard 
faced in the future by low and middle income Americans pondering the size of the 
mortgage they can enforce (if the market-friendly President Bush is willing to bail us out 
today, would a more market-sceptical President Barack Obama or President Hilary 
Clinton not do so again tomorrow?) 
(5) By leaning on the lenders to show greater leniency towards delinquent mortgage 
borrowers than would be required by the mortgage contracts and the dictates of the 
competitive environment, it will discourage future subprime lending and other higher-risk 
mortgage lending by banks and other mortgage finance institutions.  This will further 
increase the role of the FHA, Fannie, Freddie, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, and 
will further strengthen the role of socialised housing finance in the USA. 
(6) There is a reasonable prospect that Federal legislation and Federal regulation and 
supervision of the housing finance industry will be changed in such a way as to reduce 
the likelihood of the excesses, the mis-selling and the misrepresentations that became 
rampant especially during the past 5 years or so.  There has been a serious failure by the 
regulators to stop the rogue mortgage lending practices that have proliferated, and not just 
in the subprime market.  The Fed, both under Chairman Greenspan and under Chairman 
Bernanke is one of the institutions that bears responsibility for this regulatory fiasco.   
It is, unfortunately, quite likely, that the legislative and regulatory changes we will get 
will amount to a Sarbanes-Oxley-style regulatory overshoot, that is, regulation of the ‘if it 
moves, stop it’ variety. This will discourage future lending to low-income or credit-
impaired would-be homeowners even when such lending is fundamentally sound. 
Parochialism in US economic policy 
Both sets of remarks were amazingly parochial.  The President clearly believes that, 
except for oil and Chinese imports, the US is a closed economy.   
Chairman Bernanke’s text contains a few rather generic references to global matters, but 
rather less than the topic deserved.  Surely the fact that so much of the subprime exposure 
ended up in European and Asian financial institutions must have made it easier for the 
US lending excesses to occur.  One also has to recognise the importance of international 
regulatory arbitrage as a factor limiting the ability of national regulators to impose even 
mild disclosure restrictions (let alone more serious regulatory constraints, whether for 
prudential or consumer protection reasons) on internationally mobile financial 
institutions.   
Even in a lecture on ‘Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy’, it is surprising 
not to find the word ‘exchange rate’ in a section of the lecture titled ‘le="font-weight: 
normal; font-family: Arial;">The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Since the Mid-
1980s’</strong>.  During the past 20 years, the US economy has become increasingly 
open, both as regards trade in real goods and services and trade in financial instruments.  
Transmission of monetary policy through the exchange rate undoubtedly has become 
more important, both for prices and for aggregate demand, during this period, and US 
real interest rates are increasingly influenced by global economic developments, as 
Governor Bernanke himself has pointed out in a <a 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/default.htm" 
target="_blank">lecture on the global saving glut</a>   
When all is said and done, the entire construction sector in the US is 5 percent of GDP.  
The bit that is hurting badly, residential construction is somewhere between 3 and 4% of 
GDP.  Exports are 12% of GDP and growing in volume terms at an annual rate of over 
11%.  Import competing industries are also doing well.  The combination of a sharp 
nominal and real depreciation of the US dollar and continued rapid growth outside the US 
accounts for the strength of the externally exposed sectors of the US economy.  It goes a 
long way towards offsetting the weakness of parts of the nontraded sectors, including 
housing.  While increased credit risk spreads represent a tightening of monetary 
conditions, the weaker dollar represents a loosening of monetary conditions.  There is no 
indication from Chairman Bernanke’s address that the Fed pays any attention to this in its 
actual policy deliberations.  This is especially surprising in view of Chairman Bernanke’s 
recognition of these issues ‘in the abstract’, in some <a 
href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2007/20070302/default.htm" 
target="_blank">recent lectures</a>. 
Of course, housing troubles are not limited to the construction sector.  Housing wealth is 
an important component of total net household financial wealth; real estate assets can be 
collateralised and thus are a ready source of consumer spending power.  Another Fed 
Governor, Frederic Mishkin argued at the same Jackson Hole conference that a fall in 
housing wealth could be a serious drag on consumer spending, assuming that the 
marginal propensity to spend out of housing wealth was 3.75% (a very precise number 
indeed).   
Bottom line 
A 25 bps cut in the Federal Funds rate on September 6 is unnecessary, likely, but my no 
means a foregone conclusion.  By the time Congress is done augmenting the Bush mini 
bail-out of financially stressed mortgage holders, there may be a fiscal stimulus worth 
about 0.5% of GDP.  With elections looming, this fiscal stimulus could be enacted rather 
swiftly.  The anticipation of relief on both the fiscal and monetary side is likely to be 
enough to normalise credit conditions (albeit at spreads closer to long-run historical 
levels rather than at the anomalously low levels of 2003-mid 2007) and to provide a boost 
to asset markets.  The US housing market is in structural trouble, with excess capacity in 
most categories that will take years to work off.  But that is a small enough part of the US 
economy not to be a serious drag on overall activity in the years to come. 
 
 
 
  
Buiter: Double counting 101: the useful distinction between inside and 
outside assets 
13 March 2008 
Loan defaults create financial losers and winners, but the losses are highly concentrated 
in highly visible financial institutions while the winners are dispersed among millions of 
mortgage-holders that have been written down or written off. Here is a discussion how 
the subprime crisis has created winners and what it means for analysis of this unfolding 
situation. 
The sky must surely be falling on the financial sector. Reported or estimated subprime 
related losses have, since last summer, gone from $50bn, to $100bn, $200bn, $400bn, 
even $800bn. Let's call it $1 trillion, or even $2 trillion, just to be sure we catch most of 
the likely eventual losses. What has not been reported is the matching subprime-related 
gains, which without a shadow of a doubt also follow the sequence $50bn, $100bn, 
$200bn, $400bn, $800bn, $1 trillion and $2 trillion. Why this failure to report the 
subprime-related gains? 
One reason, no doubt, is that there is a lot of ignorance and stupidity around - the 
distinction between inside and outside assets appears to be a difficult one for economists, 
especially financial specialists, brought up in a partial equilibrium tradition. I am lucky in 
having had Jim Tobin as my PhD adviser and mentor. Balance sheet constraints, budget 
constraints, Walras' Law, adding up constraints - it was the bread and butter of what he 
taught. A little general equilibrium does go a long way. 
The second reason is that the losses are highly concentrated among a few hundred 
commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds and similar shadow banking sector 
institutions, while the matching gains are widely dispersed among the many millions of 
homeowners who owed the mortgages that have been written down or written off. 
Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action strikes again. In addition, many of the 
winners may not wish to advertise the fact that, given the amount by which the value of 
their property fell, they are better off now because they were able to force the bank that 
held their mortgage to eat their negative equity. 
Inside and outside assets 
For every financial asset there is a matching financial liability. That is, financial assets 
are inside assets. Inside assets are assets owned by a natural or legal person that are the 
liability of some other natural or legal person(s). Outside assets are assets of a natural or 
legal person that are not a liability of some other natural or legal person(s). When you 
‘net out' all inside assets against the corresponding liabilities, you are left with just the 
outside assets, or the net wealth of the system. In a closed economy (foreign assets and 
liabilities present no conceptual problems but clutter up the argument), the outside assets 
are the stocks of natural resources (including land) and physical capital (residential 
housing, other structures, equipment, infrastructure), the human capital (the current and 
future labour endowments of the economy, that is, the resources embodied in current and 
future natural persons) and the productive resources (goodwill, synergy, monopoly 
power) embodied in legal persons such as incorporated firms. 
There is an interesting argument as to whether the labour endowments of the unborn 
should be included among a society's outside assets. In a society without hereditary 
slavery, future endowments of labour embodied in natural persons yet to be born are not 
owned by anyone alive today, and therefore don't constitute private wealth. They can, 
however, be viewed as part of the tax base, because the institution of the state (and the 
associated power to tax) is likely to endure as long as mankind. That issue will have to 
wait till some future occasion to be treated in earnest. 
So residential property is an outside asset and constitutes net wealth. A mortgage is a 
liability of the homeowner and an asset of the mortgage lender (bank). The mortgage held 
by the bank is an inside asset and does not constitute net wealth. 
Assume the bank securitises the mortgages by selling them to an SPV that pools them 
and issues mortgage-backed securities against them (RMBS). Securities backed by 
residential mortgages are a liability of the SPV that issued them and an (inside) asset of 
whoever holds them, say an SIV owned by another bank. The SPV has as (inside) assets 
the mortgages it bought from the originator. The mortgages are still liabilities of the 
homeowner borrower. All CDOs backed by subprime mortgages (or by Alt-A or prime 
mortgages), by credit card receivables or by car loans are inside assets for which there is 
a matching liability. They are not net wealth. The cars themselves are net wealth. 
Even a fall in outside residential housing wealth doesn't make you worse off 
The US residential housing stock at the beginning of 2007 was worth around $23bn. Let's 
assume that its value has declined by 10 percent. There has therefore been a reduction in 
the value of this outside asset, of $2.3 trillion. I have argued elsewhere (“<a 
href="http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/10/housing-wealth-html/" 
target="_blank">Housing wealth isn't wealth</a>“;”<a 
href="http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/10/ok-then-housinghtml/" 
target="_blank">OK then, housing wealth is wealth, but not NET wealth!</a>“; and “<a 
href="http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2008/01/the-coming-declhtml/" 
target="_blank">The coming decline in UK house prices: how large and how 
helpful?</a>“) that, because this outside asset yields its future income stream in kind, in 
the form of consumable housing services, and because on average, home owners expect 
to consume (over their life time) the housing services yielded by the stock of housing 
they own, a change in the value of residential property on average does not make anyone 
better off.  
A fall in house prices redistributes wealth from those long housing (for whom the value 
of the house they own - the present discounted value of the future actual or imputed rental 
income of the property - exceeds the present discounted value of the future housing 
services they plan to consume) to those short housing (for whom the value of the house 
they own is lower than the present discounted value of the future housing services they 
plan to consume). Simply put, a decline in house prices redistributes wealth from 
landlords to tenants. On average, an American household is a tenant in its own home. 
Changes in house prices do not make the average American better or worse off, unless 
there is a lot of ownership in US housing by non-resident foreigners, in which case a 
decline in house prices would make the average US resident better off.  The same point 
has been made by many others, including Mike Buchanan and Themistoklis Fiotakis.58  It 
is also a viewpoint that, subject to all the aforementioned qualifications and further 
qualifications to be mentioned below) is shared by Mervyn King, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, who first explained the issue to me in 1997. 
This argument is false if the decline is house prices reflects the bursting of a bubble rather 
than a reduction in its fundamental value (the present value of future rentals). In that case 
the homeowners lose the bubble value, without a corresponding gain for the tenants 
through lower present value of future rents.  Other necessary qualifications come from 
the fact that the average expected remaining lifetime of housing consumers is likely to be 
less than the remaining lifespan of the existing stock of residential property.  This is 
certainly true if the durability of the land is taken into account.  In that case a fall in house 
prices can hurt homeowners more than it helps renters.  But with reasonable discount 
rates, this effect is probably not very large. 
Even if there is no net wealth effect from a change in home prices, this does not mean it 
will not have any behavioural effect. Unlike human capital, housing wealth can be 
collateralised. A lower value of residential housing, even if it does not make you worse 
off, may lower the amount you can borrow against the security of your property. 
Mortgage equity withdrawal becomes more restricted. This means that, through this 
credit or liquidity channel, falling house prices will have a temporary depressing effect on 
consumer demand (approximately, the level of consumer spending goes up with the 
change in house prices). 
What banks lose on mortgages, mortgage borrowers gain 
What follows is independent of whether you buy the argument that a change in house 
prices does not make the average American household worse off or better off. Mortgages, 
like any other IOU, secured or unsecured, are inside assets. If the value of the asset goes 
down for the investor (the bank holding the mortgage), the value of the liability goes 
down for the borrower (the homeowner who took out the mortgage with the bank). There 
is no change in net wealth, no economy-wide net wealth effect. 
There has been $800bn worth of redistribution from banks and other mortgage lenders 
(and/or from those who invested in securities backed by the mortgages) to those who took 
out the mortgages (and/or from those who issued the mortgage-backed securities). The 
same is true for changes (up or down) in the value of any financial claim, bonds, options, 
CDS, complex financial structures like ABS, CDOs, CBOs or any of the other alphabet 
soup financial instruments. Changes in the value of inside assets, like RMBS, represents 
pure redistribution between those who hold them and those who issue them; the point is 
most easily seen for options and other derivatives. All financial claims can, of course, be 
viewed as derivatives that are in zero net supply. 
                                                 
58 M. Buchanan and T. Fiotakis, House Prices:A Threat to Global Recovery or Part of the 
Necessary Rebalancing?, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No 114, 15th July 
2004 
Redistribution can matter for aggregate demand. It will not, in general be neutral. But the 
non-neutralities have to be documented and substantiated carefully. The size of the losses 
on inside assets by themselves (multiple trillions no doubt before this crisis is over) bears 
no necessary relationship to the size of the aggregate demand effects. 
Asymmetries 
(1) The person owing a debt (a mortgage, in the subprime case) may not value it in the 
same way as the person owning it. In other areas there have been spectacular examples of 
this. Most workers enrolled in defined benefit company pension plans probably put a 
positive present discounted value on their expected future stream of pension benefits. For 
a long time, the companies that owed the matching liabilities kept them off-balance sheet. 
Out of sight, out of mind, and before long these future pension liabilities were not viewed 
as liabilities at all. The realisation that they were indeed unsecured liabilities has crippled 
much of the US domestic steel and automobile industry. 
(2) When default risk increases but default has not (yet) occurred, the marked-to-market 
value of the bank's asset (the mortgage) goes down, but the borrower is still servicing the 
debt in full. While the homeowner owing the mortgage should also mentally mark it to 
market, that is, allow for the prospect that (s)he will service the mortgage in full in the 
future, the continuing full debt service in the present may, because of liquidity and cash-
flow constraints, restrain household spending. 
(3) Consider a household that purchases a home worth $400,000 with $100,000 of its 
own money and a mortgage of $300,000 secured against the property. Assume the price 
of the home halves as soon as the purchase is completed. With negative equity of 
$100,000 the homeowner chooses to default. The mortgage now is worth nothing. The 
bank forecloses, repossesses the house and sells it for $200,000, spending $50,000 in the 
process. 
The loss of net wealth as a result of the price collapse and the subsequent default and 
repossession is $250,000: the $200,000 reduction in the value of the house and the 
$50,000 repossession costs (lawyers, bailiffs etc). The homeowner loses $100,000, his 
original, pre-price collapse equity in the house - the difference between what he paid for 
the house and the value of the mortgage he took out. The bank loses $150,000, the sum of 
the $100,000 excess of the value of the mortgage over the post-collapse low price of the 
house and the $50,000 real foreclosure costs. The $300,000 mortgage is an inside asset - 
an asset to the bank and a liability to the homeowner-borrower. When it gets wiped out, 
the borrower gains (by no longer having to service the debt) what the lender loses. 
The legal event of default and foreclosure, however, is certainly not neutral. In this case it 
triggers the repossession procedure that uses up $50,000 of real resources. This waste of 
real resources would, however, constitute aggregate demand in a Keynesian-digging-
holes-and-filling-them-again sense, a form of private provision of pointless public works. 
(4) Continuing the previous example, how does the redistribution, following the default, 
of $100,000 from the bank to the defaulting borrower - the write-off of the excess of the 
face value of the mortgage over the new low value of the house - affect aggregate 
demand? 
There is one transmission channel that suggests it is likely, had this redistribution not 
taken place, that demand would have fallen more than it does following the default. The 
homeowner-borrower is likely to have a higher marginal propensity to spend out of 
current resources than the owners of the bank - residential mortgage borrowers are more 
likely to be liquidity-constrained than the shareholders of the mortgage lender. 
(5) Finally, we have to allow for the effect of the mortgage default on the willingness and 
ability of the bank to make new loans and to roll over existing loans. Clearly, the write 
off or write-down of the mortgage will put pressure on the bank's capital adequacy. The 
bank can respond by reducing its dividends, by issuing additional equity or by curtailing 
lending. The greatest threat to economic activity presumably comes from new lending. 
The magnitude of the effect on demand of a cut in bank lending depends of course on 
who the banks are lending to and what the borrower uses the funds for. If they are lending 
to other financial intermediaries who are, directly or indirectly, lending back to our 
banks, then there can be a graceful contraction of the credit pyramid, a multi-layered de-
leveraging without much effect on the real economy. If bank A lends $1 trillion to bank 
B, which then lends the same $1 trillion back to bank A again, there could be a lot of 
gross de-leveraging without any substantive impact on anything that matters. 
With a few more non-bank intermediaries tossed in between banks A and B, such intra-
financial sector lending and borrowing (often involving complex structured products) has 
represented a growing share of bank and financial sector business this past decade. 
A group of people cannot get richer by shining each other's shoes/taking in each other's 
laundry. Similarly, financial institutions (‘intermediaries') cannot get richer by lending to 
each other. They can only get richer by intermediating, that is, by lending to the real 
economy. Of course, a more efficient structure of intermediation adds to the productive 
potential of the economy (by better matching savers with profitable investment 
opportunities), but the degree of efficiency of the structure of intermediation (markets 
and institutions) need bear no relation to the gross volumes of inside assets issued by the 
financial intermediaries. 
Somehow, the financial markets and those buying shares in financial intermediaries 
forgot about the Mutual Shining of Shoes Theorem. A bubble or Ponzi finance scheme 
developed that caused the gross value of intermediation and leverage in the financial 
sector to rise massively. When the bubble burst, there was a loss of net wealth equal to 
the bubble component in the valuation of the financial sector. The subsequent de-
leveraging and contraction of balance sheets does not, however, destroy net wealth. 
Some of the lending of the financial sector went to the real economy - households and 
non-financial corporations. There will undoubtedly be an increase in the cost and a 
reduction in the availability of such lending beyond what we have seen already. The 
effect of this on spending by households and non-financial firms (consumption and 
investment) is not, of course, equal to the reduction in bank lending to these sectors. 
There are other outside sources of funds for non-financial corporates, and both 
households and firms can maintain spending by reducing household saving and corporate 
retained profits respectively. So there is many a slip between the cup of the massive de-
leveraging and inside asset blow-out in the banking and non-bank financial sector on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, the lip of private consumption and investment. I 
consider the estimate of David Greenlaw, Jan Hatzius, Anil K Kashyap, Hyun Song Shin 
in their paper "Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown", that a 
one dollar loss in bank assets reduces spending on goods and services in the long run by 
just under 44 cents, to be an order of magnitude too large; it also is bound to be far from a 
‘structural' effect, that is, an effect invariant under plausible changes in the economic 
environment driving these two endogenous variables. 
A little statistical rant (don't read unless you are interested in identification, 
endogeneity & simultaneity) 
The authors calculate/calibrate a value for the ratio of total credit to end-users (either the 
non-leveraged sector or just households and non-financial corporates) to the total assets 
of the leveraged sector (banks, the brokerage sector, hedge funds, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and savings institutions and credit unions). They then treat this ratio as a 
constant, which means that once they have the change in the value of the total assets of 
the leveraged sector, they know the change in credit to the end-users. 
The next step is the empirical estimation of a correlation between the growth rate in (real) 
credit to end users and the growth rate of real GDP. 
There are just too many ways to poke holes in the empirical argument. To start with, as 
noted by the authors) the credit variable used domestic non-financial debt, includes 
financing from non-leveraged entities and therefore does not correspond to the credit 
variable of the theoretical story. 
More painfully, the authors seem blithely unaware of the difference between causation 
and correlation, or prediction and causation. What they perform is, effectively, half of 
what statistically minded economists call a Granger causality test but should be called a 
test of incremental predictive content. They run a regression of real GDP growth on its 
own past values and on past values of real credit growth and find that past real credit 
growth has some predictive power over future GDP growth, over and above the 
predictive power contained in the history of real GDP growth itself: past real credit 
growth helps predict, that is, Granger causes, real GDP growth. Lagged real credit growth 
is (barely) statistically significant at the usual significance level (5%). 
When you do this kind of regression for dividends or corporate earnings and stock values, 
you find that stock values Granger-cause (help predict) future dividends. Of course, 
anticipated future dividends determine (cause) equity prices, so causation is the opposite 
from Granger-causation. 
The authors are undeterred and treat the estimate of GPD growth on credit growth as a 
deep structural parameter. 
The authors recognise the issue but completely fail to address it. They use the TED 
spread (the price difference between three-month futures contracts for U.S. Treasuries 
and three-month contracts for Eurodollars having identical expiration months - an 
measure of bank default risk), and a survey-based measure of banks' willingness to lend 
as statistical instruments for credit growth. 
Instruments are variables that are highly correlated with the variable that you are trying to 
purge of endogeneity and simultaneity problems, but independent of the random 
disturbance in the equation you are estimating. 
It is a well-known but ruthlessly suppressed fact in the econometrics profession, that 
there are no instruments - there is just implicit theorising. The correlation between the 
instruments and the variable to be instrumented (credit growth in this case) can of course 
be tested and reported, but the second key assumption - independence of the instruments 
from the disturbance term in the GDP growth equation - is untestable and simply has to 
be maintained. 
Without boring the readers (if I still have any) with further details of why the empirical 
work is, at best, utterly unconvincing, let me report that the 3.0 percent contraction in 
credit growth ($ 910 billion) to the end-users the authors assume will result from the 
decline in the assets of the leveraged sector), will according to their instrumented 
equation, reduce real GDP growth by 1.3 percentage point over the following year - the 
44 cents mentioned earlier. 
The authors could be right about the effect of de-leveraging in the leveraged sector on 
real GDP growth, but the paper presents no evidence to support that view. 
How do we value the outside assets? 
In the case of residential property, house prices (the sum of the value of land and 
structures) provide all the relevant information. For physical capital, there is the problem 
that part of it (publicly owned infrastructure) is not priced anywhere. For privately owned 
capital, the asset should be valued at the present discounted value of its future earnings. 
Where the capital is held by unincorporated businesses or by unlisted companies, it is 
very hard to get an estimate of their value. When capital equipment is owned by listed 
corporations, it will contribute to the market value of the corporation, but only in 
conjunction with the goodwill and other going concern value of this legal person. The 
stock market value of the firm won't do either, unless the firm is 100% equity financed. 
Otherwise we have to add the value of the company's net financial debt to its equity. 
Valuing human capital (the present value of current and future labour earnings, either of 
those currently alive or of current and future generations) is a bit of a nightmare. 
There can be little doubt, however, that net wealth in the US (and to a lesser extent in the 
rest of the North Atlantic region) has taken a beating. The value of the residential housing 
stock and of commercial property is down. The value of corporate debt plus equity is 
down. With employment falling and subdued wage growth, the value of human capital is 
also likely to be down, unless the appropriate stochastic discount factors act very 
strangely. 
So let's quantify these net wealth effects of changes in the value of outside assets. Let's 
also study the distributional effects of the massive changes in the values of inside assets. 
But let's not forget that for every loser in the valuation game for inside assets there is a 
matching winner, and that the asymmetries don't all point to a stronger negative effect on 
demand. Defaulting mortgage borrowers, in particular, are likely to have high marginal 
propensities to spend out of current resources. Not having to service their mortgage debt 
any longer could give a major boost to consumer spending. 
Conclusion 
Things are tough enough without us exaggerating the problems through egregious double, 
triple, quadruple & higher multiple counting. Economic prospects for the US are poor, 
but nowhere near as bad as the growing crescendo of the moans emitted by the losers in 
the inside asset revaluation game would have us believe. 
 
 
 
 
Vives: Bagehot, central banking, and the financial crisis 
31 March 2008 
The current crisis is a modern form of a traditional banking crisis. The 125-year-old 
Bagehot's doctrine tells us how governments should react – lend to solvent but illiquid 
financial institutions. While easy to state, the doctrine is hard to apply. The key question 
to assess the future consequences of current central bank policy is whether the subprime 
mortgage crisis arises in the context of a moderate or a severe underlying moral hazard 
problem. 
The present financial crisis poses two main questions: whether it is similar to past crises 
and how central banks should intervene to preserve the stability of the system. 
The current financial turmoil seems extraordinary because it has unexpectedly affected 
the heart of the functioning of our sophisticated money markets. Despite the Northern 
Rock episode, the main contours of the current crisis seem very distant from scenes of 
crises past where newspapers were covered with photos of depositors queuing to 
withdraw their money during a panic. Yet this crisis is just a modern-market form of a 
traditional banking crisis. 
An old-fashioned bank run happened if enough people tried to withdraw their funds from 
a bank; even if the bank was solvent, it might not be able to meet all the withdrawals and 
thus the fear of bank failure could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the current crisis, 
participants in the interbank market take the place of long queues of withdrawers. They 
have stopped extending credit to other banks that they suspect to have been contaminated 
by the subprime loans and which therefore may face solvency problems. The commercial 
bond market and structured investment vehicles are facing similar trouble. 
Both the old and new forms of crisis have at their heart a coordination problem. In the 
current one, participants in the interbank market and in the commercial bond market do 
not renew their credit because of fear others will not either. Witness the demise of the 
investment bank Bear Stearns at the heart of the dealing on structured vehicles. 
In reaction, central banks have intervened massively, injecting liquidity and allowing 
banks to access fresh cash at the discount window in exchange for collateral that includes 
the illiquid packages of mortgage obligations. Have central banks done the right thing or 
are they provoking the next wave of excessive risk taking by bailing out banks and 
markets? Is monetary policy the only tool available for the central bank to address the 
market crisis? 
Bagehot’s wisdom 
Bagehot advocated in 1873 that a Lender of Last Resort in a crisis should lend at a 
penalty rate to solvent but illiquid banks that have adequate collateral. The doctrine has 
been criticised as having no place in our modern interbank market, but this is wrong. 
Bagehot’s prescription aims to eliminate the coordination problem of investors at the base 
of the crisis. It is still a useful guide for action when the interbank market stalls. 59 It 
makes clear that discount-window lending to entities in need may be necessary in a crisis. 
Bagehot's doctrine, however, is easy to state and hard to apply. It requires the central 
bank to distinguish between institutions that are insolvent and those that are merely 
illiquid. It also requires them to assess the collateral offered. Central banks, because of 
information limitations, are bound to make mistakes, losing face and money in the 
process. This doesn’t mean they should not try. 
Poor collateral versus massive liquidity 
The collateral should be valued under “normal circumstances”, that is, in a situation 
where the coordination failure of investors does not occur. This involves a judgment call 
in which the central bank values the illiquid assets. A central bank that only takes high 
quality collateral will be safe, but will have to inject much more liquidity and/or set lower 
interest rates to stabilise the market. This may fuel future speculative behavior. Some of 
this may have happened in the Greenspan era, in the aftermath of the crisis in Russia and 
LTCM, and after the crash of the technological bubble. The ECB and the Federal Reserve 
have accepted now partially illiquid collateral that the market would not. This seems 
appropriate and releases pressure to lower interest rates to solve the problem, something 
that should be done only if there are signs of deterioration in the real economy. The 
problem is that central banks are extending the lender of last resort facility outside the 
realm of traditional banks to entities, like Bear Stearns, that they do not supervise and, 
therefore, over which they do not have first hand information. How does the Fed know 
whether Bear Stearns or other similar institutions are solvent? It seems that the Fed is not 
following Bagehot’s doctrine here. 
Finally, if banks and investors are bailed out now, why should they be careful next time? 
This is the moral hazard problem: help to the market that is optimal once the crisis starts 
has perverse effects in the incentives of market players at the investment stage. The issue 
is that only when the moral hazard problem is moderate does it pay to eliminate 
completely the coordination failure of investors with central bank help. When the moral 
hazard problem is severe, a certain degree of coordination failure of investors - that is, 
allowing some crises - is optimal to maintain discipline when investing and, amending 
Bagehot, some barely solvent institutions should not be helped. 
                                                 
59 See X. Vives and J.C. Rochet (2004)”Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last 
Resort: Was Bagehot Right after all?” Journal of the European Economic Association (<a 
href="http://www.eeassoc.org/jeea/" 
title="www.eeassoc.org/jeea/">www.eeassoc.org/jeea/</a>) 
Therefore, a key question to assess the future consequences of current central bank policy 
is whether the subprime mortgage crisis arises in the context of a moderate or a severe 
underlying moral hazard problem. The important extent of asymmetric information in this 
market points to a severe problem. Be as it may, this issue will determine whether current 
help will plug the hole for good,or only temporarily to make a larger one in the future. 
The challenge for central banks is to find the right balance between preserving current 
stability and imposing discipline for the future. Bagehot’s doctrine is still a reference 
today. 
 
Ubide: Financial crisis: why it may last 
16 October 2007 
The subprime crisis was first characterised as a liquidity crisis, but a month and billions 
of dollars of liquidity injections later, the situation has not improved. Perhaps it was not 
about liquidity, after all.  
Since the month of August, economists have been trying to understand why something 
that was supposed to be positive for global growth, namely the diversification of risk 
through securitization, had turned out to be the source of the recent crisis. The first 
reaction was to characterize this as a liquidity crisis - some banks were having undue 
difficulties in securing funds in the interbank market, and thus central banks reacted by 
providing liquidity through open market operations. Many central bankers and academics 
started smiling with an "I told you so, there was so much excess liquidity, this was bound 
to happen", and adopted a tough anti-moral hazard stance. More than a month, and many 
billions of dollars of extra liquidity injections, later the situation in money and credit 
markets has not improved. Central banks have added liquidity to a situation of already 
"excess liquidity" to tackle an apparent liquidity crunch, and yet nothing has got better. 
Perhaps it was not about liquidity, after all. 
What we are experiencing is a combination of reduction in the value of global collateral, 
deleveraging, reintermediation, and risk aversion. Let's explain these four items in turn. 
The expansion of the US housing market followed the standard stages of a bubble: an 
initial surge based on some fundamental factors, such as low interest rates, immigration 
and a increased desire to invest in housing as a store of value. Technological 
improvements in mortgage markets, such as better assessment and management of risks 
due to massive computing improvements, facilitated this expansion. After a few years, 
the expansion took a life of its own, speculation increased and both activity and prices 
deviated heavily from fundamentals. The last stages become a bubble, with the 
phenomenon of subprime credit at the heart of the final acceleration. Many of the 
mortgages underpinning this housing expansion were resold. They were securitized - 
meaning a loan would become a tradable asset - and packaged - meaning many loans 
were put together to form a single asset. The resulting bundles, called credit derivatives, 
were then sold worldwide, most of them with high AAA ratings because the large 
number of loans that they included meant a very small risk on any single one of them. 
This was a smart idea, as long as many of these individual loans would not sour together. 
Which is exactly what happened - and was foreseen to happen - when the whole US 
housing market started to slowdown. Delinquencies started to rise and the value of many 
of these derivatives, especially those packaging the later vintages of subprime mortgages, 
had to be revised down. As a result, the holdings of assets of many financial market 
participants worldwide were marked down in value, and their value as collateral declined 
along the way. 
Many of these assets were held by banks. It was a seemingly easy way to bolster 
profitability, holding AAA rated assets that yielded more than government bonds and 
could be sold or used as collateral in money markets. In order to further enhance 
profitability, many of these assets were held by banks off balance sheet - so as to lower 
the capital cost of holding risky assets - in innovative forms (now well-known as 
"conduits" and vehicles"). The result was that banks were holding more risky assets for a 
given level of capital. When the value of these assets had to be marked down and the 
conduits brought into the balance sheets, the prudential ratios were not met anymore and 
banks had to sell some of these assets, whose prices decline. With deteriorated balance 
sheets, banks had to cut down on loans. 
The unexpected increase in delinquencies induced many market participants to think, all 
of a sudden, that the ratings of many of these instruments were suspect and that all banks 
in many countries were potentially at risk. As a result, risk aversion and volatility 
increased and the demand for risky assets declined. Finally, the reduced demand for risky 
assets led to banks being less able to sell their loans and mortgages - and thus to have to 
keep them in their balance sheets. The result is substantial reintermediation of credit, the 
outdoing of secutization, with three consequences: first, banks may run into regulatory 
limits as their balance sheet suddenly changes; second, banks need more cash to service 
all these "new" commitments and they become reluctant to lend just in case further 
surprises appear; third, banks become reluctant to lend to other banks because 
counterparty risk - the possibility that a fellow bank might be unable to pay back a loan - 
has increased. Instead of lending cash to each other as they normally do, banks hoard 
cash and liquidity dries up. As central banks inject liquidity, banks just accumulate more 
and more. The system is in a liquidity trap. 
What is the right response from a risk management standpoint to a sudden increase in 
balance sheet risk, volatility and uncertainty? Reduce positions dramatically - which in 
the case of banks implies curtailing lending - and, very slowly, start to rebuild leverage 
only when both uncertainty and volatility decline and the capital base has been restored. 
In other words, credit growth and the demand for risky assets are likely to decline for an 
extended period of time. 
What are the implications for policy of this episode? First, this crisis was not the result of 
interest rates being too low. For any given risk free rate, banks can always choose which 
level of risk to take on board, and it is now clear that banks chose, in some countries, to 
run hold a lot of risk. The way to stop this process would have been tighter supervisory 
control, not higher interest rates. In fact the problem has occurred in countries with very 
different monetary policy approaches to asset prices and different monetary policy 
stances. The phenomenon of subprime mortgages was the result of weak underwriting 
standards and excess demand for the asset class, not of low interest rates. Whether these 
exposures were on or off balance sheet is a critical determinant of where the surprises are. 
This shows that monetary policy should deal with two objectives, price stability and 
financial stability, but we know that tackling two objectives with one instrument is not an 
efficient arrangement. Monetary policy should ensure price stability, supervision should 
ensure that risk management is appropriate, and both should work together. Spain, a 
country with one of the most overvalued house markets by some metrics and one of the 
loosest monetary policy stances (it has enjoyed negative real interest rates for many years 
now), has little or no subprime problems and its financial sector has not engaged, as far as 
it is known, in the risk accumulation process that is at the heart of the current crisis. It 
probably had the right macro prudential settings. 
Second, the right monetary policy response to a sharp decline in the demand of risky 
assets may not be a liquidity injection, but a reduction in the price of risky assets that 
offsets, at least in part, the decline in its demand. Liquidity injections are trying to 
address the symptoms, not the underlying malaise - which can be summarized in an 
increase in the cost of capital as reintermediation becomes widespread. Central banks 
must assess whether the increase in the cost of capital needs to be offset in order to 
maintain price stability, and cut rates if needed. 
Third, moral hazard is better dealt with during the upside rather than during the 
downside. It is clear that, from a political standpoint and especially if the asset is housing, 
it is very difficult to adopt anti-moral hazard policies when asset prices are spiraling 
downwards - and even more if the poorer classes of the population are affected, as it is 
the case with the subprime problem in the US. It is also clear that in today's integrated 
capital markets, the system is more resilient to small shocks but more fragile to big 
shocks, and thus considerations of "too big or too many to fail" soon arise. And 
experience shows that, in general, moral hazard becomes secondary when the stakes are 
high. Two examples come to mind. The first one is the Asian crisis in 1997. At the time, 
the theory was that bank deposit guarantees should always be limited to avoid moral 
hazard. The IMF went to Indonesia and announced the closure of several banks - and a 
bank run ensued. From that moment, the orthodoxy changed: first declare a blanket 
deposit guarantee, then announce a bank restructuring process - one wonders why this 
lesson was not applied in the Northern Rock case in the United Kingdom. The second 
example is the saga of the Stability and Growth Pact in Europe. The attempts to 
implement the program of sanctions during a growth slowdown were highly critizised 
and, at the end, some forbearance was applied and the SGP was reformed by 
strengthening its preemptive arm - to deal with moral hazard during good times. The 
same applies to the financial sector, supervision and regulation has to work towards 
systems that control more effectively the building up of banks' leverage during good 
times. 
Note: This article appears in English and French on our Consortium partner's site 
http://www.telos-eu.com. 
 
 
 
 
Cristadoro and Veronese: €-coin and the euro area economic outlook: 
where do we stand? 
29 October 2007 
Real-time policy-making requires real-time monitoring. The recent turmoil in 
international financial markets, for example, raised concerns that it would dampen euro-
area growth prospects. Surveys of the euro-area in August and September revealed that 
business expectations had indeed deteriorated. Interpreting such data in real time is 
notoriously difficult. Statistical techniques provide a systematic and more reliable means 
of extracting real-time indicators from current data: “€-coin”, a monthly indicator 
published by the Banca d'Italia and CEPR, is a useful tool to monitor the evolution of the 
euro-area growth as the financial turmoil unfolds. 
Policy-makers, forecasters and market analysts all face the same problem: “given the 
latest news, should I change my current assessment of the economic outlook?” Answering 
this question is particularly difficult given all the uncertainty in the economy – 
uncertainty about the current state of the economy, uncertainty about its true structure, 
uncertainty about the accuracy of the models used, and uncertainty about the quality of 
the available data. 
These multiple sources of uncertainty have lead to one of the tenets of central banking. 
Assessments of the economic outlook must be backed with sound analysis of large 
amounts of data: “…like any other central bank, the ECB faces considerable uncertainty 
about the reliability of economic indicators, the structure of the economy and the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, among other things. A successful monetary 
policy therefore has to be broadly based, taking into account all relevant information in 
order to understand the factors driving economic developments…” (ECB, 2004, p.50). 
Forecasting at central banks is indeed a complex process involving a large suite of 
models, each with different goals and perspectives. While “structural models” are used 
for story telling and conditional forecasting of the main macro variables in the medium-
term, “reduced form” models are used to perform the conjunctural assessment on the 
current state of the economy. The interplay between the two is, however, very important 
as initial conditions are crucial for the accuracy of the medium-term forecasts. 
The obvious candidate to deliver a synthetic assessment of the current state of the 
economy would be GDP growth, but it is available only at a quarterly frequency and with 
a delay of about 70 days with respect to the reference period.60 GDP is also affected by 
revisions and short-term variations linked mainly to statistical reasons that require a 
careful assessment. As a result of the lack of a comprehensive and timely measure of 
economic activity, an effective and reliable conjunctural assessment of the economy 
entails processing of a wide range of data as it has long been acknowledged also by 
academics involved in the production of forecasts: “Econometricians who try to follow 
and project the overall economy as closely as possible (“Economy Watchers”) … base 
their main forecasts on macroeconomic models, supplemented by the frequent flow — 
almost daily — of indicative information“ (Klein and Sojo, 1989). 
                                                 
60 45 days if we consider the “flash” estimate. 
More recent advances in statistical and econometric techniques opened the ground to the 
systematic use of larger datasets. The factor-model literature proved that pooling 
information from a very wide number of variables and summarising it into a small set of 
synthetic indicators can turn out to be advantageous for forecasting purposes.61 
For the euro area, an application of these methods is illustrated by an index known as “€-
coin.” The basics of €-coin are straightforward. The starting point is a wide range of data, 
those normally used by euro-area watchers (such as, for example, surveys, bonds rates, 
stock market indices, and industrial production). €-coin is then constructed using 
statistical techniques designed to distil the relevant information contained in the large 
amount of data available in order to estimate the underlying growth rate in the euro 
area.62 In short, €-coin is a “smooth, noise-free“ indicator of GDP growth that: 
1. gives an early estimate of the euro-area growth in terms of quarter-on-quarter 
GDP growth; 
2. sheds light on the underlying growth rate of GDP (since the “temporary noise” is 
removed by the estimation procedure). In this respect, €-coin is not only a pure 
forecast of the official GDP, but also an indicator of the true “growth momentum” 
in the euro area. 
Before trying to assess the impact on growth of the recent tensions on financial markets, 
it is necessary to convince ourselves that €-coin is a reasonable guide to judge the 
economic prospects of the euro area. To do so we can start with the recent track record of 
the indicator (see <a href="http://eurocoin.cepr.org/index.php?q=node/16" 
target="_blank">monitoring the economy in real time: €-coin</a>). The real-time 
animation shows how €-coin accurately signalled the 2005 upturn, the peak reached in 
2006 and the slowdown in activity in the second quarter of 2007. 
Euro-area growth in the second quarter of 2007, though weakening, was still estimated to 
be around 0.7%, well above the GDP growth figures published by Eurostat (0.3%), 
suggesting that available official statistics may be underestimating the true growth 
momentum. 
Since August, new data releases, especially those concerning financial and survey data, 
triggered a worsening of the growth outlook both in the US and the euro area. 
Recent economic developments 
The financial distress that hit the markets last August has its roots in a small segment of 
the US housing market and took place in a context of robust global growth. Nonetheless, 
the spreading of the tensions on monetary markets and the appreciation of the euro 
                                                 
61 There is a growing literature that provides methods to synthesize the information 
content of large dataset, see Stock and Watson, 2002 and Forni, Hallin, Lippi and 
Reichlin, 2005, among others. 
62 In contrast to other popular indicators, €-coin is broadly based, focused on the euro 
area as a whole and available on a timely basis each month. More importantly, it is not 
just a “qualitative index”, but it is directly related to GDP growth and anticipates GDP 
releases by 2-3 months. For a comprehensive study of the properties of €-coin, see 
Altissimo et al. (2007). 
spurred fears of a global credit crunch and provoked a reassessment of the growth 
prospects in the main industrial countries.63  Most recent forecasts for the euro area by 
major public and private institutions show a clear downward revision of the growth 
projections. For example, between August 13th and October 8th, private analysts, 
surveyed by Consensus Forecasts, downgraded their expectations regarding euro area 
GDP growth in 2008 by 0.3 percentage points on average, from 2.3% to 2.0% (Figure 1 
reports the nonparametric estimate of the distribution of private analysts expectations). 
Figure 1: Shifting views: 2008 growth forecasts for the euro area (1) 
Note: (1) Non parametric kernel density of forecasts on GDP growth in 2008, as collected 
by Consensus Forecasts in the dates indicated. 
It is still too early to draw any definite conclusion on the effects of the financial turmoil. 
It is nonetheless interesting to have a way of assessing the evolution of euro area growth 
prospects as these effects unfold. Forecasts are constantly scrutinised and updated as new 
information becomes available, but, confronted with an almost constant flow of news, it 
is far from obvious which data are really relevant and how to weight them. 
What does €-coin say on the recent economic developments? 
                                                 
63 There have recently been a few Vox columns dealing with the impact of the financial 
crises (<a href="http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/516" target="_blank">Tommaso 
Monacelli</a>). For a thorough description of the events see (<a 
href="http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/99" target="_blank">Stephen Cecchetti)</a>. 
Here we show how €-coin — a synthetic index designed to capture the information 
contained in a large dataset to give an up-to-date assessment of current underlying euro-
area GDP growth — can help. 
This information — exploited by €-coin — resulted in a slight decline of the indicator in 
September. To identify the different impact of these news, we compared the actual 
estimate of €-coin in the month of August with the one we would have obtained if the 
“negative shock” in August’s financial and survey data had not occurred.  This 
counterfactual exercise can be implemented by substituting the actual data for August and 
September with their forecasts made in July, and obtaining an alternative estimate of €-
coin for the month of August. The two estimates are shown in Figure 2. The news content 
of August’s financial and survey data indeed worsened the growth prospects for the euro 
area, although its marginal impact was fairly modest. 
Figure 2: €-coin and the impact of the most recent data(1) 
 
Note: (1) The solid blue line provides the official €-coin indicator as estimated every 
month. The dashed red line represent the €-coin forecasts for August and September that 
would have been obtained on July 28th. The black diamond provides a preliminary 
estimate of €-coin for the month of October as of October 17th. 
The last figure relative to October is a preliminary estimate as of October 17th and points 
to a further weakening of the growth momentum. The underlying growth rate of the euro 
area economy is still estimated to be slightly higher than 0.6% at a quarterly rate, 
although it is still too early to draw definite conclusions. A better real-time picture of the 
impact on euro-area growth prospects will be given by future €-coin releases (to be 
released on October 29th, November 29th). 
In judging these results, it should always be remembered that €-coin, by making the best 
use of the available data, has proved to be a good starting point to gauge the euro area 
economic outlook, but it is not a substitute for sound economic analysis, as events, not 
accounted for in the available data, might well affect the economic performance of the 
euro area. As a famous physicist once pointed out, “Not everything that can be counted 
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted”. 
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Gros: House price bubbles made in Europe 
25 October 2007 
Euro-area housing prices have risen almost as much as those of the US. For decades, 
euro-area housing prices have followed those of the US quite closely. Are Euro-area 
housing prices headed for a slump?  
That house prices can have a profound effect on the economy is by now widely known. 
In the US, Professor Rober Shiller has for some time already argued that US houses were 
overvalued. By contrast, the OECD (2005) came to the conclusion that there was no 
clear-cut evidence of a bubble, at least on the basis of the prices observed then (i.e. 
2003/4). However, this discussion seems moot now. In the US, house prices are now 
clearly heading downwards. 
The downturn in the US housing market has attracted a lot of attention as it sparked the 
global subprime financial crisis.  But what about Europe? 
As the chart below illustrates, there are two strong reasons to be concerned about housing 
prices on this side of the Atlantic as well. 
1. The euro area average index of real housing prices has risen almost as much as 
that of the US and is now (as that of the US) about 40% above its 30-year 
average. This is similar to the overvaluation of Japanese real estate at the height 
of the Japanese bubble, which was then followed by over a decade of continuous 
decline. 
2. Over the last 30 years, the euro area index for real housing prices has tended to 
follow that of the US quite closely.  The lag is now much shorter than in the 
1970s or 1980s. The euro area market is thus likely to turn soon as well. 
 
How high is high? 
What measure should one use to judge house prices?  The level of real house prices might 
be the best indicator if one wants to judge the extent to which households feel richer 
because of high house prices.  However, there might be valid reasons for real house 
prices to increase permanently; e.g. if the demand for housing increases because of higher 
immigration or population growth.  It might thus be best to concentrate on the price/rent 
ratio as an indicator of overvaluation of housing since any change in demand factors 
should be reflected in both prices and rents.  However, over the last decade, the price/rent 
ratio has increased in parallel with the price of housing, as rents have in general not 
increased by more than the overall consumer price index.  This suggests that the current 
level of the house prices does not just reflect a higher demand for housing, but is likely to 
constitute an overvaluation (a bubble?) that is likely to be corrected soon. 
The table below shows the averages by decade for price-to-rent ratios in the US, Japan, 
the Eurozone and the OECD average. It is apparent that for all the major areas considered 
— the US, the Eurozone and the OECD average — the average value for all three 
decades up to 1999 was close to 1. The only exception is Japan, where the price/rent ratio 
went up to 1.2, only to fall back down to below its long-term average, as is shown in the 
last column below.  The numbers for the overall OECD average show clearly that the first 
years of this century have been an exception. Until 1999, the price/rent ratio was never 
more than 2 percentage points from its long-term average, but it has now, as of the end of 
2006, risen to 1.22.  However, the overvaluation is most pronounced with the US 
standing at 36%, and the euro area at 24%, above the longer-term average. 
Table . Housing price-to-rent ratios by decade (average levels) 
 
Average 
1970-1980 
Average 
1981-1990 
Average 
1991-1998 
End 2006/ 
30-year average 
US 1.06 0.98 0.94 1.36 
Japan 1.02 1.20 1.22 0.69 
Eurozone 1.06 1.07 1.00 1.24 
OECD 
average 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.22 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. Eurozone and global average are based 
on GDP weights. 
The stylised facts on housing prices can thus be summarised as follows: 
o There has been a tight correlation between US and euro area housing prices, with 
the latter following the former initially with a lag of about one to two years. More 
recently, the correlation has become close to contemporaneous. 
o On both sides of the Atlantic, prices (in real terms) have reached historical peaks, 
and on both sides the upward movement had, until recently, accelerated. 
o Since late 2006, prices seem to be declining in the US.  It is thus likely that in 
Europe prices will soon start to fall as well. 
 
Should European policy-makers worry? 
Should European policy-makers be concerned about the behaviour of house prices? There 
is little evidence in the euro area of large-scale ‘subprime’ lending. But the evidence 
shown above suggests that house prices seem to have an important impact on domestic 
demand, with wide variations among individual countries. Within the euro area average 
emphasised so far, there are large divergences – cases of ‘froth’ (Spain, for example) co-
exist alongside cases of declining prices (Germany). These divergences have persisted for 
over a decade, and have led to important macroeconomic disequilibria. 
Spain and Ireland constitute special cases. Here, construction investment has increased to 
levels (18-20 % of GDP) never seen before in any other OECD country except Japan.  In 
Spain and Ireland, lower housing prices are likely to be associated with a sharp and 
prolonged drop in domestic demand.  Germany provides the mirror image to these two 
cases in that construction activity in Germany shot up to very high levels during the post-
unification boom, was then depressed for a decade and might now be poised for a 
rebound.  All in all one can thus conclude that the coming downturn in housing prices 
should not have a strong impact on the Eurozone average, but it is likely to lead to serious 
tensions within the area. 
One important feature of housing price cycles tends to be forgotten — their extraordinary 
length. Many last for more than ten years. This persistence means that the downswing, 
which now seems to have started, is likely to last into the next decade — on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  The US is thus likely to enter a prolonged period of weaker consumption 
growth and the star performers in Europe, like Spain and Ireland, are likely to face their 
proverbial 7 years of meagre cows. 
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Snower: Fallout from the credit crunch 
28 September 2007 
Economists can’t say: “we told you so.” Economists don’t have perfect foresight. But like 
doctors after the outbreak of a contagious disease – economists can tell you how the 
disease might spread, so that you may be better prepared. Here are some of the possible 
dangers ahead. 
For years economists and policy makers have worried about the fragility of the US 
economy, and particularly about the un-sustainability of the US housing boom, but when 
the shock finally occurred, everyone – central banks, commercial banks, hedge funds, 
private investors - appears to have been unprepared. The big surprise was the nature of 
the shock. Suddenly banks stopped lending to one another, except on punitive terms. 
Liquidity dried up, threatening the existence of otherwise well-functioning banks and 
businesses. The crisis of confidence jumped across US borders with ease, as the recent 
run on Northern Rock has shown. How will this financial turbulence affect the world 
economy? 
Economists obviously don’t have perfect foresight; so I won’t try to anticipate the future. 
But economists can do what doctors do after the outbreak of a contagious disease. They 
can tell you how the disease might spread, so that you are prepared. This is my purpose – 
not to make a forecast, but to warn of possible dangers ahead. 
Expectations inertia 
Investors tend to imagine that the world will continue to be approximately like it is now. 
Before the US Federal Reserve reduced the benchmark interest rate by one-half 
percentage point on Tuesday, September 18, financial markets were in despair; 
afterwards they were euphoric. Such myopia is dangerous. So far, economic activity — 
production, employment, consumption, investment and trade — have remained largely 
unaffected by the credit crunch. Many seem to believe this will continue. Equally 
dangerous. 
If the credit crunch persists, there can be no doubt that economic activity will suffer. The 
Fed’s interest rate cut will not prevent US home foreclosures, nor will it eliminate the 
glut of unsold homes. If US house prices continue to fall and unemployment continues to 
rise, consumers will doubtlessly reduce their spending, and the fall in demand will 
aggravate the rise in unemployment, hurt the US stock market, and thus lead to a further 
fall in spending. 
Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind that the US is not the only country where house 
prices have risen much faster, on average, than national incomes. On the contrary, house 
prices in Australia, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden have all 
increased faster, over the past ten years, than in the US. Of course the US is a special case 
on account of its subprime mortgage lending towards the end of its housing boom. There, 
mortgage lenders with poor credit records could buy houses at virtually interest-free for a 
few years, before the rates were adjusted steeply upwards. But the danger of international 
contagion remains. The US housing slump may well lead investors in Europe to reassess 
the value of their properties. If that happens, then consumption spending is likely to fall 
in the countries listed above, leading to weaker labour markets. 
This could happen at a time when the Chinese economy has overheated and will need to 
slow down, and when the Japanese economy is stagnating. There are no other countries to 
take-up the slack, to serve as a “motor” for the world economy, as the US has done for so 
long. 
Germany 
In short, a recession in the US is possible and this recession could spread to other 
countries, primarily through loss of confidence within financial markets and house price 
contagion. Germany, needless to say, need not worry about a housing slump, since its 
housing market has already been in a state of slump for over a decade. But that does not 
mean that Germany is immune from the dangers of the current financial turbulence. The 
German economy is heavily dependent on its exports, and these would clearly suffer if 
world economic activity declined. Furthermore, as we have seen, the fallout from the US 
credit crunch can affect the balance sheets of German banks. 
Of course these dangers may not materialise, just as contagious diseases need not spread. 
It is useful, however, to know where the dangers lie. 
Even if times ahead are troubled, the long run is likely to look much more settled. In the 
short run, a housing slump could well make private investors and central banks outside 
the US less eager to hold dollars. A survey by the US Treasury Department last year 
indicates that about third foreign-held US corporate debt consisted by asset-backed 
securities and about half of that was mortgage-related. Petro-dollars held in the Middle 
East and Russia are particularly mobile. Once foreign money leaves the US, the dollar 
would fall. In the longer run, US exports would rise, shrinking the huge US trade deficit. 
Moreover, recession in the US would lead to lower imports, further reducing the trade 
deficit. At the same time, China may well let the yuan rise against the dollar, leading to a 
rise in its domestic spending relative to its exports. Once US consumers spend less and 
Chinese consumers spend more, the large global imbalances, which have cast a shadow 
on the world economy for the past decade, would begin to disappear. 
 
 
Snower: Four mega-dangers international financial markets face 
30 April 2008 
The financial turmoil has been worsening as lagged adjustment processes play out. This 
column outlines economic dangers that may arise as they unwind, including a scenario in 
which the United States suffers extended stagflation. 
Day after day new, alarming news emerges from the world’s financial markets, and day 
after day the public is surprised by how bad it is. But instead of wringing our hands, let’s 
ask ourselves an important, unconventional question: What is more surprising: that 
financial markets have turned from bad to worse, or that we continue to be surprised by 
each successive piece of adverse news? 
I suggest that our repeated surprise should be more surprising. This issue is important, 
because if we were better at recognising the financial risks we face, we could do more to 
avoid them. If banks, investment houses, and American homeowners had done a better 
job in recognising the risks in the subprime mortgage market, we could have spared 
ourselves the current crisis. 
Why does the public repeatedly underestimate the repercussions of the present financial 
crisis? The answer is simple: most of us are short-sighted; we can’t imagine a future that 
is radically different from the present. In particular, most of us don’t understand that 
economic events often unfold gradually due to the operation of important lagged 
adjustment processes embedded in the economy. The public, the media and politicians 
would do well to give them close attention. Lagged adjustment processes. After the 
Titanic’s hull was punctured, it took hours for its hull to fill with water; thus the 
passengers couldn’t imagine that it would sink. 
In my judgment, there are currently four major dangers facing the world economy, and all 
of them are currently obscured by the fact they play themselves out slowly. 
Four dangers 
The first danger we have witnessed since August 2007: The subprime mortgage crisis 
gave rise to a liquidity crisis in the international banking system, due to uncertainty about 
who holds the losses. This is leading to reduced lending to firms and households. But that 
is not the end of the story, because the reduced lending will lead to reduced consumption 
and investment. With a lag, reduced sales of goods and services will reduce stock market 
valuations. And, with another lag, the lower stock market prices will – in the absence of 
any favourable fortuitous events – intensify the banks’ liquidity crisis. 
The second danger lies in the dynamics of U.S. house prices. As more and more U.S. 
households find themselves unable to repay their mortgages, foreclosures are on the rise, 
more houses are put on the market, the price of houses falls further – with further lags – 
this leads to more foreclosures and declines in housing wealth. This dynamic process 
plays itself out only gradually, as households face progressively more stringent credit 
conditions and house sales gradually lead to lower house prices. 
The third danger results from the interaction between wealth, spending and employment. 
As U.S. households’ wealth – in the housing market and the stock market – falls, their 
consumption is beginning to fall and will continue to do so, again with a lag. This decline 
in consumption is leading to a decline in profits, of which more is on the way, which in 
turn will lead to a decline in investment. The combined decline in consumption and 
investment spending will eventually lead to a decline in employment, as firms begin to 
recognise that their labour is insufficiently utilised. The decline in employment, in turn, 
means a drop in labour income, which, with a lag, leads to a further drop in consumption. 
And that leaves the fourth (and possibly the nastiest) of the dangers, one that concerns the 
latitude for monetary policy intervention. As the Fed reduces interest rates to combat the 
crisis, the dollar is falling. This is leading to higher import prices and oil prices in the 
United States, putting upward pressure on inflation. The greater this inflationary pressure 
– which is currently in excess of 4 percent – the more difficult it will be for the Fed to 
reduce interest rates in the future, without running a serious risk of inflaming inflationary 
expectations and starting a wage-price spiral. U.S. firms and households will gradually 
recognise this dilemma and the bleak prospect of little future interest rate relief will 
further dampen consumption and investment spending. 
Eventually, of course, the decline in spending will lead to a decline in inflation, but this 
will only happen with a lag. The longer the lag turns out to be, the longer the period over 
which the U.S. economy will endure stagflation, that is, a cruel combination of rising 
prices and falling aggregate demand. Much hinges on how persistent U.S. inflation is. 
More persistent inflation will inevitably give rise to higher inflationary expectations, 
leading gradually to higher inflation, and so on. It took central banks over a decade, in the 
1980s and early 1990s, to get inflationary expectations under control, and the fruits of 
this battle are now in danger of being lost. 
Global implications 
The international financial crisis and the decline in the U.S. economy will inevitably have 
an adverse effect on the growth of the world economy. Europe and the emerging markets 
of Latin America and the Far East cannot fill the gap that the U.S. economy leaves. There 
exists no economic mechanism whereby a drop in the U.S. aggregate demand will be 
matched by a correspondingly large increase in aggregate demand elsewhere. Germany 
and other European economies highly exposed to the vagaries of international trade will 
certainly feel the pinch. 
In the longer run, the prospects for the world economy look much brighter. Eventually 
U.S. house prices will stabilise, rising exports will help the U.S. economy recover, the 
fall in world demand for goods and services will reduce the price of raw materials, U.S. 
households will learn the importance of saving, and global imbalances will correct 
themselves. These rosy prospects lie in the mists of the future. Meanwhile, however, we 
are well advised to stay focused on the four dangers. 
  
 
 
Cecchetti: Federal Reserve policy responses to the crisis of 2007-08: A 
summary 
10 April 2008 
The nature of the ongoing financial turmoil that began in August 2007 has rendered 
traditional monetary policy responses ineffective. This column summarises the US 
Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis. 
Central bankers are conservative people. They take great care in implementing policy; 
they speak precisely; they explain changes completely; and they study the environment 
trying to pinpoint where the next disaster looms. Good monetary policy is marked by its 
predictability, but when the world changes, policymakers change with it. If a crisis hits 
and the tools at hand are not up to the job, then central bank officials can and will 
improvise. In August 2007, the world changed and the traditional instruments of 
monetary policy were not up to the task. 
For some time now, there has been a consensus among monetary economists on the 
fundamentals of policy design. These agreed upon principles of best practice extend from 
central bank design to operational policy: central banks should be independent but have 
clearly defined policy objectives for which they are held accountable; policymakers’ 
operational instrument should be an interest rate; and officials need to be transparent and 
clear in communicating what they are doing and why they are doing it. Furthermore, 
there is agreement that the central bank is the right institution to monitor and protect the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. 
An important part of the consensus has been that central banks should provide short-term 
liquidity to solvent financial institutions that are in need. But, as events in 2007 and 2008 
have shown, not all liquidity is created equal. And critically, the consensus model used 
by monetary economists to understand central bank policy offers no immediate way to 
organise thinking about this sort of problem. 
The crisis 
By the beginning of 2007, the stage was set for a crisis: Prices of homes in the U.S. were 
at unprecedented levels and borrowing by the owners (as a fraction of the inflation 
adjusted value) was higher than ever before. The quality of newly originated mortgages 
was declining substantially. And, most importantly, the securitisation of these mortgages 
– where they were put into large pools that formed the collateral for what are known as 
mortgage-backed securities – had spread well beyond the government-sponsored 
enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that traditionally engaged in this task. 
On 9 August 2007, the crisis hit and central banks swung into action, supplying large 
quantities of reserves in response to stresses in the interbank lending market. The spread 
on 3-month versus overnight interbank loans exploded. And, as problems worsened into 
the winter, the spread between U.S. government agency securities – those issued by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the like – and U.S. Treasury securities of equivalent 
maturity rose as well. Investors shunned anything but U.S. Treasury securities 
themselves. 
As the crisis deepened, it became painfully clear that traditional central bank tools were 
of limited use. Reductions in the target federal funds rate, the objective of Federal 
Reserve policy in normal times, had little impact on interbank lending markets. And 
while the purchase of securities through open market operations enabled policymakers to 
inject liquidity into the financial system, they could not insure that it went to the 
institutions that needed it most. 
The policy response 
In response to intensifying financial sector problems, Fed officials created new lending 
procedures in the form of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF), and changed their securities lending program creating the Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The TAF offers commercial banks funds through an 
anonymous auction facility that seeks to eliminate the stigma attached to normal discount 
borrowing. The PDCF extends lending rights from commercial banks to investment 
banks (technically to the 19 so-called primary dealers with whom the Fed does its daily 
open market operations). And the TSLF allows investment banks to borrow Treasury 
bills, notes and bonds using mortgage-backed securities as collateral. All of these 
programs offered funding for terms of roughly one month at relatively favourable interest 
rates. 
Beyond creating these new facilities, the Fed made adjustments to existing procedures. 
First, they extended the term of their normally temporary repurchase agreements to 28 
days and accepted mortgage-backed securities rather than the normal Treasury securities. 
Second, the Fed extended swap lines to the European Central Bank and the Swiss 
National Bank that allowed them to offer dollars to commercial banks in their currency 
areas. And third, they provided a loan that allowed the investment bank Bear Stearns to 
remain in operation and then be taken over by JP Morgan Chase. 
These new programs are very different from the ones that had been in place prior to the 
crisis. To understand the difference, it is important to realise that a central bank’s contact 
with the financial system is through its balance sheet, and there are two general principles 
associated with managing these assets and liabilities. First, policymakers control the size 
of their balance sheet – that is the quantity of what is commonly known as the monetary 
base. By changing the level of the monetary base (really commercial bank reserve 
deposits at the central bank) Fed officials keep the market-determined federal funds rate 
near their target. 
Second, the central bank controls the composition of the assets it holds. Given the 
quantity of assets it owns, the Fed can decide whether it wants to hold Treasury 
securities, foreign exchange reserves, or a variety of other things. Each of the new 
programs implemented by the Fed involved changes in the assets the Fed holds. And in 
nearly every case, officials provided either reserves (cash) or Treasury securities in 
exchange for low quality collateral. By the end of March 2008, the Fed had committed 
more than half of their nearly $1 trillion balance sheet to these new programs: 
o $100 billion to the Term Auction Facility, 
o $100 billion to 28-day repo of mortgage-backed securities, 
o $200 billion to the Term Securities Lending Facility, 
o $36 billion to foreign exchange swaps, 
o $29 billion to a loan to support the sale of Bear Stearns, 
o $30 billion so far to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. 
Changes in the composition of central bank assets are intended to influence the relative 
price a financial assets — that is, interest rate spreads.  So, by changing its lending 
procedures, Fed officials hoped that they would be able to reduce the cost of 3-month 
interbank loans and the spread between U.S. agency securities and the equivalent 
maturity Treasury rate. At this writing, these programs have met with only modest 
success. 
 
 
 
 
Monacelli: A decision that lacks transparency 
14 December 2007 
The ECB’s decision to leave interest rates unchanged lacks transparency and appears 
inconsistent with the specific policy framework that the ECB itself has decided to 
embrace. In the current period of great uncertainty, transparency would pay large 
dividends. 
The ECB has decided to leave interest rates unchanged. In a phase of great uncertainty 
such as the current one, it is a decision that lacks transparency, as it appears inconsistent 
with the specific policy framework that the ECB itself has decided to embrace. 
The ECB statement is clear: inflationary pressures are mounting. In November, the 
growth rate of the HICP index (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) has been around 
3 percent, the highest in the last few years. The staff projections indicate an inflation rate 
between 2 and 2.2 percent in 2007, but between 2 and 3 percent in 2008. This is hardly 
surprising. With real oil prices as high as in the seventies, it would have been difficult to 
avoid any inflationary effect, despite the fact that we live in a world with lower oil 
intensity. 
Can the ECB publish inflation forecasts between 2 and 3 percent and decide not to raise 
interest rates? Given that its explicit mandate is to keep inflation below but close to 2 
percent, what type of signal is the Bank sending to the markets, especially as regards its 
own credibility? 
The second pillar of the ECB policy strategy, the so-called monetary analysis (an unicum 
among the Central Banks in the world) is even more compelling. It points to a vigorous 
expansion in the monetary base and in the credit aggregates in the Euro Area. Not quite a 
credit-crunch scenario, as many currently fear in the US In light of the ECB orthodoxy on 
the fundamental role that monetary aggregates exert for inflation, there would be plenty 
of reasons to be worried: more specifically, plenty of reasons to raise inflation 
expectations. 
Rarely in the recent ECB history has the monetary pillar sent a more contradictory 
message than the one in the current situation. If there were a reason for the markets to 
anticipate constant interest rates it lies essentially in the fear of a forthcoming credit 
crunch extending from the US to the Euro Area. Yet there seems to be no trace of that, at 
least according to the ECB data. In its statement, in fact, the Bank limits itself to vaguely 
refer “to uncertainty in financial markets” as a background for its decision. 
In this mounting inflation context, more than ever, the lack of transparency in the ECB 
policy points to the need of a more rigorous (arguably “scientific”) framework in which 
its policy decisions can be rationalized. Much of the recent literature describes the 
optimal conduct of monetary policy in terms of ‘inflation forecast targeting’. Two are the 
basic ingredients. First, a numerical target for inflation (as it is well-known from the 
experience of many countries in the world that have adopted inflation targeting, including 
emerging-market economies). Second, and more importantly, a management of the path 
of interest rates such that in each period the inflation forecast at some horizon, and 
conditional on that same instrument path, are in line with the inflation target. 
This second “pillar” is necessary because the effects of monetary policy variations take 
time to materialize (on average, a rise in the short term rate displays its peak effects on 
inflation after 18 months). Hence it is not feasible to require a Central Bank to be on 
target in each instant of time. What matters is that the projected interest rate path is such 
that that today’s inflation forecast looks close to the target. Two basic principles follow. 
First, it is not the short term variation in interest rates that matters, but their expected 
future path. Second, transparency in Central Banks’ actions is critical. 
The recent ECB decision is a prototypical example of the usefulness of inflation forecast 
targeting. Suppose the ECB had adopted it. Then, it would have certainly published its 
two/three year inflation forecasts in its official statement, making that the central focus of 
its message. Most importantly, however, the ECB would have tried to convince the 
markets that unchanged interest rates today belong to a projected future interest rate path 
which is totally compatible with inflation forecasts (as of today) in line with the 
numerical target. Even better: the ECB would have published the expected future interest 
rate path, with reasonable, and well-explained, confidence intervals. In such a context of 
transparency, the decision of leaving interest rate unchanged could have comfortably co-
existed with the mounting inflationary outlook described by the ECB itself. 
On the website announcing the decision of December 6 there is a short document 
reporting the staff inflation forecast: in 2008, they lie between two and three percent. 
How should we interpret those forecasts in light of the ECB mandate? What should 
prevent agents to raise inflation expectations based on such forecasts? Most importantly: 
conditional on what path of future interest rates have those forecasts been computed? 
Reading carefully through the technical notes in small print (not really an example of 
transparency), one observes that the staff projections are based on the markets’ 
expectations of future interest rates. Hence they are conditional not on the future interest 
rate path that the Bank itself foresees as most likely, but on the interest rate path that the 
markets foresee as most likely. 
Why would the ECB publish inflation forecasts (at least for 2008) that: (i) are not in line 
with their mandate, and (ii) are conditional on what the agents expect that the Bank will 
do, and not on what the Bank wishes that the agents expect that the Bank will do 
(although with a margin of uncertainty)? Is this the best way to manage inflation 
expectations, especially in this phase of great uncertainty? Some observers have pointed 
out that, since Euribor rates are currently on the rise in the inter-bank market, monetary 
conditions are anyhow turning tight, and this would justify the ECB decision of leaving 
interest rate unchanged. This concept is misleading. A rise in Inter-bank rates today does 
not (and cannot) provide any useful information regarding the future path of interest 
rates. Only the Central Bank can meaningfully and effectively manipulate those 
expectations, and this is what essentially matters for inflation. 
One cannot rule out that one consequence of the recent financial turbulence will be to 
reignite the debate on the optimality of the ECB monetary policy framework. After all, a 
correct move taken in the wrong framework can sometimes be as detrimental as a 
incorrect move taken in the right framework. 
This column first appeared in Italian on our Consortium partner’s site www.lavoce.info. 
 
 
 
Widgrén: No relief for ECB’s status quo headache from rotation 
25 February 2008 
The Fed’s policy changes seem nimble compared to the ECB’s. Here one of Europe’s 
leading analysts of voting mechanisms argues that the ECB’s institutional design 
accounts for the difference. Forthcoming ECB reforms are unlikely to alleviate the 
problem. 
The most recent ECB Governing Council (GC) meeting on 7 February left the key ECB 
interest rates unchanged. The meeting took place in the aftermath of the Federal Open 
Market Committee’s (FOMC) hyperactive moves to reduce the target for the federal 
funds rate 75 basis points to 3.5% at an unscheduled FOMC meeting on 21 January and 
then another 50 basis points to 3.0% on 30 January.64 
In the follow-up press conference to the Governing Council’s decision, ECB President 
Jean-Claude Trichet described the newly-made decision as a mixture resulting from 
careful consideration of existing upside risks to price stability confirmed by monetary 
analysis and downside risks surrounding the outlook for economic activity. Despite the 
                                                 
64 Frederic S. Mishkin was absent from the 21 January meeting. William Poole voted 
against the action of 21 January, and Richard W. Fisher voted against the action of 30 
January. 
dramatic decrease in US rates, the unanimously agreed ECB decision emphasised the 
GC’s commitment to preventing second round effects of upside risks to price stability 
and aim to anchor inflation expectations in line with price stability. 
Is this stark contrast due to policy judgements or it is institutional difference in decision-
making procedures? 
How do European and American monetary policy differ? 
The roots of the Fed’s monetary policy decisions in the latter half of January lie in the 
FOMC’s focus on high uncertainty and currently exceptional high probability of extreme 
outcomes. Consequently, monetary policy calls for policymakers to be anticipatory in 
responding to macroeconomic implications of incoming information from financial 
markets and, moreover, in reducing the likelihood of vicious circle stemming from 
financial markets’ reaction to negative macroeconomic information that further increase 
the downside risks to economic activity.2 The key elements of monetary policy are 
flexibility, decisiveness and low inertia. Fed’s policy actions during the latter half of 
January, indeed, demonstrate these, at least to one direction. 
What would have been the ECB’s reaction under exactly the same circumstances as Fed 
is facing? The question is relevant since it is most likely that the economic effects of 
financial disruption in the US will spill over to Europe and the global economy. Without 
even attempting to assess the economic effects of the Fed’s decisions in January, a 
comparison of the ECB decision-making system to that of the Fed makes one conclusion 
easy to draw: due to its institutional design, the ECB is likely to suffer from inflexibility, 
inertia and indecisiveness.3 
The Governing Council, the key decision-making body of the ECB, consists of the 
Executive Board (EB) of six members who do not represent interests or views of any 
particular EMU country or group of countries and the Governors of EMU countries’ 
national central banks (NCBs). In today’s EMU15 that means the Governing Council has 
21 voting members. Formally, decisions require a simple majority, though in practice the 
GC arrives at consensus decisions and does not vote. Nonetheless, NCBs form a majority 
in the Governing Council, and their local information advantage, preferences, and views 
influence what policy finally wins the consensus approval. The NCBs’ equal 
representation and the simple majority requirement constrain the set of feasible decisions 
that can be “shadow-voted” and approved by common consent. 
The US Federal Open Market Committee consists of twelve members - the seven 
members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank 
presidents, who serve as voting members in one-year terms on rotating basis.4 If united, 
the members of the Board of Governors always have a majority.5 
 
In the Governing Council, the one-national-central-bank-one-vote principle was intended 
to ensure that governors of national central banks would participate as independent 
actors, not as national stake-holders. Nothing guarantees that, though. Moreover, 
expanding EMU membership increases the voting share of the Central Bank Governors 
and makes the consequent numbers or inefficiency problem more severe. Indeed, in 
earlier studies (see footnote 3), co-authors and I argued that in an expanding Euroland it 
would become highly unlikely that Governing Council could pass optimal policies 
correspond to Euroland’s aggregated preferences. Moreover, there would be substantial 
risk of sticking to status quo when facing asymmetric shocks. In sum, Governing Council 
decisions might be too conservative and biased towards the status quo. 
The soon materialising Governing Council reform… 
In 2002, the foreseeable EMU enlargement caused EU leaders to reform their voting rules 
to avoid ECB decision-making paralysis. In 2004, they adopted a rotating arrangement in 
which the number of voting Central Bank Governors is fixed at 15 while the membership 
of Euroland expands to 16 and beyond. 
In the rotation model, EMU countries will be divided into three groups of 1) five biggest 
countries, 2) 14 medium sized countries and 3) eight small countries, with each group 
respectively having four, eight and three voting national Central Bank Governors 
(NCBers) at a time. The model fixes the distribution of representation between the 
Executive Board and NCBers after the entry of the 16th member, which, in terms of 
power, benefits the EB in the long-run as EMU membership expands,6 but the reform 
does not affect the primacy of NCBers in the system. 
The desired division of labour of the EB members and NCBers would give the former the 
role of contributing their knowledge about the state of financial markets and the latter the 
role of contributing local knowledge about the real economy. The rotation model, which 
will maintain the NCBers’ majority and unequal representation and introduce inequality 
of member states’ representation at any given phase of the rotation,7 might then 
undermine the idea that the interests of the entire Euro-zone, not local concerns, should 
matter. 
… does not offer a proper solution either 
In sum, the rotation model does not solve ECB’s status quo bias. 
 
To make the argument more properly, consider a simple example. Suppose that the 
Governing Council has three alternatives: (1) to increase or (2) decrease interest rates or 
(3) keep them as they are at status quo. Call these ‘+’, ‘-‘ and ‘0’ respectively. Suppose 
that the Executive Board acts in unison representing Euroland’s general interest (having 6 
votes), while NCBers have preferences based on their economic situation at home. And 
suppose that there is an even mix of higher than average inflation countries and lower 
than average growth countries.8 In the illustrative example, suppose that the Executive 
Board and NCBers rank the alternatives according to the table 1. 
 
Table 1 An example of the EB’s and NCBs’ preference orderings in EMU15 or under 
agreed rotation system The number of NCBs having the preference ordering 
 
The number of NCBs having the preference ordering 
+ - + - 0 0 
- + 0 0 + - 
0 0 - + - + 
0 0 4 4+6 3 4 
 
Now, there is a majority of eight NCBers that prefer a decrease to an increase. It is thus 
natural to assume that the Euroland average would be ‘decrease’, which is also the first 
preference of the Executive Board in this example, In pair-wise comparison between 
decrease and increase, the former would get a clear majority. However, in a pair-wise 
comparison of ‘decrease’ and the status quo, ‘decrease’ is defeated by the status quo, 
which would get 11 NCB votes and defeat the 4 NCB votes plus 6 EB votes in favour of 
‘decrease’. In this case, the status quo also beats ‘increase’ in a pair-wise comparison but 
only seven of 15 NCBs support that as their first preference. 
The key point of the example is that in this hypothetical case (and there are many more), 
the Governing Council is not able to agree on socially optimal policy. 
As a follow-up, consider the EMU of 27 countries and suppose that a majority of 12 non-
voting NCBs prefer ‘decrease’ over ‘increase’. That would mean that in pair-wise 
comparison ‘decrease’ would defeat ‘increase’ among the EMU countries by an even 
clearer margin but it would be defeated by the status quo in the GC. This would make the 
social losses even more severe. More examples of such preference orderings can be easily 
constructed. In sum, the Governing Council suffers from a potentially great status quo 
bias and is unable to guarantee socially optimal policies based on Eurozone-wide 
interests. 
A solution? 
A solution for all this is, following the logic of 1972 Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem, to delegate monetary policy decisions to a benevolent and 
accountable dictator. That makes me wonder if the Executive Board could take the job. 
2 See Governor Fredric S. Mishkin’s speech Monetary policy flexibility, risk 
management and financial disruptions at Federal Reserve Bank of New York January 11, 
or The Federal Reserve's Tools for Responding to Financial Disruptions at the Tuck 
Global Capital Markets Conference, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, 
Hanover, New Hampshire February 15, 2008 
3 See e.g. Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2001): Nice Try – Should the Treaty 
of Nice be Ratified, Monitoring European Integration 11, CEPR, London, Baldwin, 
Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2001): Preparing the ECB for Enlargement, CEPR 
Policy Paper No. 6 or Baldwin, R., Berglöf, E., Giavazzi, F. & Widgrén, M. (2001): 
Eastern enlargement and ECB reform, Swedish Economic Policy Review Vol. 8, 17-49. 
4 The rotating seats are filled from the following groups of Banks, one Bank president 
from each group: Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond; Cleveland and Chicago; Atlanta, 
St. Louis, and Dallas; and Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San Francisco. Non-voting 
Reserve Bank presidents attend the meetings of the Committee and participate in the 
discussions. 
5 In Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, monetary policy committees consist of executive 
members only; in the UK and Australia committee includes independent experts who 
form a minority in the former and majority in the latter. 
6 For the evaluation of the distribution of power among EB and NCB governors see e.g. 
Anskar and Belke (2006): The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governiong 
Counciul: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 44, 865-897. 
7 See e.g. Gros (2003): Reforming the Composition of the ECB Council in View of 
Enlargement: an Opportunity Missed! Intereconomics: Review of European Economic 
Policy, 38, 124-129 or Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2001): Preparing the 
ECB for Enlargement, CEPR Policy Paper No. 6 for general critique against the agreed 
rotation model. 
8 This division corresponds roughly with the current situation. Note that higher than 
average growth and inflation countries are small with an exception of Spain. Note, 
however, that the main point of the example is to demonstrate the vulnerability of the 
rotation system in terms of GC’s capacity to act. 
 
Wyplosz: While the ECB ponders, the Fed moves, and cleverly at that 
17 August 2007 
The Fed move, to cut the discount rate while keeping the Fed Funds rate unchanged, is 
both innovative and shrewd. It allows banks to liquefy discredited mortgage assets at low 
cost while leaving open the decision on monetary policy. It also leaves in the Fed’s hands 
the more powerful tool of cutting the Fed Funds rate if its action does not succeed in 
quieting market fears.  
The Fed has moved smartly and ahead of the crowd. While markets and analysts have 
debated whether the Fed — and the ECB and the Bank of Japan — should change their 
policy orientation, the Fed has invented a new response — lower interest rate costs while 
keeping the policy stance unchanged.  
First, what did the Fed do? The Fed provides liquidity to the banking system mostly 
through its regular sales on the open market. These sales, in effect renewable very short-
term loans, are designed to keep the open market rate — the so-called Fed Funds rate — 
at the Fed’s pre-announced target level. The Fed did not change this target level so it 
remains at 5.25% -- just where it has been for more than a year. The Fed Funds rate, 
however, is not the only game in town. While the open market is where normally banks 
and other eligible financial institutions go to find the cash they need, or to download 
temporarily excess cash, the Fed stands ready to lend cash on an emergency basis through 
its ‘discount window.’  The rate at which it does this emergency lending is called the 
‘discount rate.’ 
To make sure that the discount window is not used to by-pass the open market, the 
interest rate charged at the discount window is higher than the open-market Fed Funds 
rates — normally by a full percentage point. Also, the list of collateral assets that must be 
deposited with the Fed as a guarantee is more restrictive than those commonly required in 
the open market.  
On August 17, the Fed lowered the discount rate from 6.25% to 5.75%. But it did not 
change its target for the Fed Funds rate; that remained at 5.25%. In essence, it made 
recourse to the emergency lending discount window less expensive without changing its 
target for what the market interest rate should be. It also announced that it would accept 
as collateral a wider range of assets, including the troubled mortgages, and that it would 
lend for longer periods, up to 30 days. 
What is smart about this is that the Fed has — in one stroke — relieved pressure on the 
credit market without changing the Fed Funds rate and, simultaneously, kept its options 
open for its next decision due September 18. The Fed has had its cake and ate it too.  
The thing to fear is fear itself 
Whether the current crisis is a temporary hiccup or the beginning of a serious financial 
meltdown remains very much an open question. In my recent <a 
href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/471">Vox column</a>, I argue that the 
subprime crisis is perfectly digestible without wider trouble, but that panicky market 
reactions could well drive financial markets down worldwide. We are now in one of these 
delicate moments when potentially irrational market expectations drive outcomes, which 
then make expectations look rational ex post. Breaking this vicious circle is a necessary 
step in stopping the stampede. Only central banks can do this; the Fed is first in line do 
so. 
The Fed, however, faces a delicate balancing act. It has been worried about a resurgence 
of inflation and this is why it has kept the fed Fund rate at 5.25% (a rather high level) for 
more than a year. Before the crisis picked up speed, it obviously intended to wait and see 
before embarking on a path of declining rate. Most observers thought that this caution 
made a lot of sense. If the crisis now subsides, such a stance still makes sense. This is 
why the Fed does not want to rush in and cut the Fed Funds target rate. On the other 
hand, if the crisis persists and or, deepens, the Fed can shift its concerns away from 
inflation and toward a possible recession. It is of the essence, then, to still wait and see.  
It is also essential to do everything that is humanly possible to significantly reduce the 
very real possibility that the crisis deepens. By reducing the discount rate, and accepting 
the infamous mortgage-linked assets as collateral, the Fed is offering markets a very 
strong reassurance. They can now find cash, and use the hot potato as collateral, in 
virtually unlimited amounts, at a cost, of course, but a very moderate one. The odds of a 
meltdown have now decreased.  
The ECB’s next move 
Attention will now move to the ECB. The debate on whether the ECB should give up its 
long held plan to raise its interest rate at its September 6 meeting is swelling. Some argue 
that changing its mind would be a loss of face, a very silly view since the situation has 
radically changed, but silliness is part of life. Others call for a pause before the next step 
— basically a wait-and-see stance. Yet others want to see the ECB completely reverse 
tack and lower the interest rate to deal with the crisis. For the ECB, too, this is a catch-22 
situation. An innovative reaction is required. It might be difficult to do better than follow 
what the Fed did today.  
Central bank legend has it that governors earn — or destroy — their reputations in times 
of crisis. For months, Fed watchers had tried to gauge Ben Bernanke. All they had to 
chew upon was what he was saying and not saying, not what he was doing because there 
was nothing particularly challenging in his actions. The elegant solution just adopted will 
undoubtedly kick-start the Bernankemania that was becoming overdue and dispel the 
long shadow of the Maestro, his larger than life predecessor. A good omen for these 
troubled times.  
  
 
 
 
 
Corsetti: The anatomy of dollar depreciation 
6 November 2007 
Classic analysis by Obstfeld and Rogoff says that the dollar still has a long way to fall. 
Some new theory and recent simulations suggests that US trade response may be bigger 
than expected and so the dollar may have fallen enough.  
The big questions are: How much real dollar depreciation should be expected, and, most 
important, to what extent the dollar fall will be accompanied by a global realignment of 
Asian currencies, supposedly lifting the pressure on the euro? These are important 
questions, yet the strong interest in exchange rate forecasts (by the way, perhaps a 
hopeless quest) should not overshadow the need to understand the specific mechanisms 
by which real dollar depreciation is an essential step towards global adjustment. After all, 
it is these mechanisms that will shape the macroeconomic outlook in the next few years. 
The ABCs of USD depreciation: terms of trade vs. domestic price adjustment 
Now, closing the US current account deficit may require both types of relative prices to 
change. US goods which are exported overseas must get cheaper than their foreign rivals 
to boost US exports — this is a terms of trade adjustment. But also inside the US, the 
price of goods which are typically not exported (nontradables) may need to fall relative to 
the price of tradables in order to induce US consumers to shift their demand away from 
imports — this would be an adjustment in domestic relative prices. 
In their well-known work, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007) propose the following 
scenario. Closing the US external deficit to within 5% of the US GDP will require the US 
terms of trade to fall between 5% and 15% — a surprisingly contained movement. By 
contrast, the fall in the internal relative price should be 3 to 5 times larger, namely the 
relative price of nontradeables inside the US must get between 20% and 30% cheaper. 
To translate these figures into the current macroeconomic stance, keep in mind that, over 
time, productivity growth is faster in manufacturing (producing most tradables) than in 
services (mostly nontradables). These productivity differentials across sectors mean that 
the price of manufacturing decline steadily in terms of services. Now, relative to these 
long-run trends, we should see the price of US services drop by about one third in terms 
of US manufacturing, as the US eliminates their current account deficit. While there are 
other possible scenarios for adjustment (for instance, the nontraded goods prices could 
adjust substantially in the rest of the world, rather than in the US), these considerations 
raise an interesting issue. 
Is a sizeable change in internal prices likely to happen in the US? 
Let’s consider some evidence. An episode of major dollar depreciation and current 
account adjustment occurred in the 1980s. The dollar started to depreciate in 1985, 
followed with some delay by a moderate improvement in the US current account. The 
evidence during this year is surprisingly at odds with the calculations above: movements 
in the internal relative price of nontraded goods were actually quite small. The relative 
price did not fall significantly and certainly less than the terms of trade. 
To wit: in 3-year period from 1985 to 1988, the dollar depreciated by about 35% , as 
opposed to a cumulative appreciation as high as 20 percent in the previous three years. 
Over the whole period, the internal relative price of tradables to nontradeables (as proxied 
by the ratio of the producer price index, PPI, to the consumer price index, CPI, services) 
fell steadily. Actually the fall is faster after 1985 than before, when the dollar was 
appreciating (9% vs. 7%, respectively). Obviously, cyclical considerations may have 
heavily influenced these numbers. Yet, one may safely conclude that there is no strong 
evidence of a sizeable internal depreciation of nontradables. 
In this respect, another way to make the same point is to stress that the real exchange rate 
remained strongly correlated with the US terms of trade over the adjustment period. In 
the period 1985-1987, the US terms of trade (based on export deflators) deteriorated by 
about 40% against OECD partners. 
So, the evidence of the 1980s suggests that closing the US current account imbalance 
could take place without strong movements in internal prices. I should stress here that 
this evidence is still consistent with the theory underlying Obstfeld and Rogoff 
calculations, although it requires a modification of the specific features of their model. 
But discussing this point will take us away from the main message. 
It is possible that in the next few years we will witness some effects of dollar depreciation 
on the relative rate of inflation in services and manufacturing, with the former falling 
somewhat behind the latter. Yet it would be highly surprising that these sectoral inflation 
differentials would change drastically relative to current trends. 
The US terms of trade in the medium run 
Without strong internal relative prices changes, the adjustment will fall on US export 
prices, hence directly affecting European and world firms (the US exports will become 
more competitive), but also European and world consumers (US goods will become 
cheaper). By how much? Ultimately (i.e. after short-run business cycle fluctuations or 
any more worrisome yet possible deterioration of the credit market are settled down), the 
fall in these prices could be sizeable, but not necessarily as large as 50 percent. 
Results from numerical exercises developed in joint work with Martin, and Pesenti, 
suggests that closing the US current account deficit (from 5% of GDP to zero) could lead 
to a combination of lower US consumption (-6%), and higher US employment (+3%), 
relative to trend. This would then correspond to a rate of real dollar depreciation of the 
order of 20% — close to what we have experienced so far. Moreover, because of entry 
and exit of new firms and product varieties in the export market over time, the rate of 
dollar real depreciation could actually be smaller than 20% (even substantially smaller, 
see Corsetti Martin and Pesenti 2007), although the adjustment in consumption and 
employment is likely to remain of the same magnitude as above (-6% and +3% 
respectively). 
I should stress here that these figures are clearly not a forecast. In the next few months, 
the world is likely to witness substantial swings in the currency market. Over time, 
however, what matters for the US is to achieve a sustainable external balance. A drop in 
relative prices of about 20% may well be all is needed. 
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Baldwin: Is the United States headed for double bubble trouble? 
2 October 2007 
As the dollar has started to slide, the question is: how far, how fast? This column, which 
is based on Paul Krugman’s recent Economic Policy article suggests the answers are: 
pretty far and pretty fast. 
In the minds of most mainstream international economists, there is never much doubt that 
the dollar must eventually decline significantly.65 A trade deficit this big cannot persist 
indefinitely. Many analysts hope that the necessary real depreciation of the dollar might 
be gradual. After all, isn’t the avoidance of such jumps one of the reasons we abandoned  
                                                 
65 Krugman present the first draft of the paper on which I have based this column in 
February 2007 at the Economic Policy panel held in New York. 
the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange system for a floating regime? So why are there 
modern fears of a sudden discrete drop in the dollar? 
Standard asset-price logic, however, argues against this sort of anticipated sudden 
depreciation. Investors should see it coming, and this will dampen their shift into dollars. 
Under the ‘gradual scenario’, the adjustment process is smoothed as dollar assets become 
more attractive while the greenback drops towards its sustainable level. 
The asset-pricing logic is impeccable. The only reason to predict a sudden dollar plunge 
is if we believe today's capital flows are driven by investor myopia. That the markets are 
due for what Krugman calls a 'Wile E. Coyote' moment — a reference to the Warner 
Brothers’ cartoon where a greedy, shortsighted coyote chases a roadrunner off a cliff but 
doesn’t start falling until he looks down and realizes he’s left solid ground. Up until this 
'Wile E. Coyote' moment, his belief that he’s on solid ground prevents him from falling. 
For investors in dollars, the 'Wile E. Coyote' moment comes when they realise that their 
expectations are inconsistent with any feasible adjustment path.66 
What constitutes a feasible adjustment path? The key criterion is that the dollar must fall 
quickly enough to avoid US external debt reaching an unsustainable level. A simple 
model of the relationship between the path of the exchange rate and the path of external 
debt can assist in assessing the likelihood that investors are naively chasing the Road 
Runner off the cliff. Glossing over many details, a 'generic' portfolio balance model of 
the exchange rate lets us evaluate investor expectations. See Krugman (2007) for a 
mathematical exposition. 
In this simple model, the real exchange rate is a function of external debt and expected 
appreciation. External debt affects the portfolio balance — a larger net external debt 
requires foreigners to hold a larger share of US assets or Americans to hold a smaller 
share of foreign assets, so the dollar must be lower. Expected appreciation affects the 
portfolio composition — investors prefer a currency that is expected to appreciate in 
value. 
Given the current debt level and the depreciation required, consider whether there is any 
rate of convergence that is consistent with both present market expectations and plausible 
long-run net external debt levels. A 5% convergence rate implies an initial rate of 
depreciation of 1.75% per year — 0.05 times the long-run depreciation of 35%. This 
results in an eventual net debt-GDP ratio of 118%, which would generally be considered 
excessive. A 10% rate of convergence implies an initial 3.5% real rate of depreciation 
and an eventual debt-GDP ratio of 58%, which would be high by historical standards but 
perhaps plausible given financial globalisation. 
What all this means is that a realistic long-run adjustment path requires real depreciation 
at more than 2% annually, perhaps as high as 4%. Those are plausible rates — provided 
that investors are being compensated for the future depreciation by higher real returns on 
dollar investments. They are not. That’s the catch. 
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As of April 2007, there was essentially no real interest rate differential between the dollar 
and euro, and only a 0.9% real differential against the yen. As interest rates dropped 
worldwide in reaction to the Subprime mess, the gaps will not change much and may 
even move in the wrong direction. Future real depreciation of 2-4% annually implies that 
foreign investors are buying US bonds offering low or even negative real rates of return. 
This strongly suggests investor myopia. If markets are not taking the dollar’s future 
decline into account, then the world economy is not on a smooth adjustment path. There’s 
a reasonable case that markets are headed for a Wile E. Coyote moment. 
Moreover, the plunge may be larger than suggested thus far. The 35% depreciation target 
is a conservative estimate. Indeed, the significant secular downward trend in the real 
dollar — the fact that since 1975 the real dollar associated with any given level of trade 
deficit seems to have declined —suggests that the dollar has even further to fall.67 
Darkish reasoning: how the Coyote can hover 
While mainstream thinking asserts that that the US’ big trade gap suggests that the dollar 
must fall, the dollar itself seemed impervious to such suggestions for years. The strong 
dollar lasted so long that economists started inventing logics to challenge the mainstream 
thinking. Four novel arguments are especially noteworthy as they posit structural reasons 
for why the US current account deficit, and hence the strong dollar, may be more 
sustainable than previously thought. They are: 1) a global savings glut, 2) privileged rates 
of return enjoyed by US investors, 3) a ‘Bretton Woods II’ regime, and 4) ‘dark matter’ 
in trade flow statistics. Let’s address each in turn. 
First, many economists, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2005), have 
argued that there is a global savings glut that helps to explain the US current account 
deficit. While high savings abroad could make a large, prolonged deficit economically 
sensible, the net indebtedness of the United States must eventually stabilise, necessitating 
an inevitable real decline in the dollar. If investors anticipate this, then there ought to be a 
real interest differential between the United States and other countries to compensate 
them for the eventual real depreciation. There is not. 
A second objection might rely on the fact that US investors earn substantially higher rates 
of return abroad than foreign investors in the United States. If this return differential is 
real and permanent, then it reflects what Gourinchas and Rey (2005) call – following De 
Gaulle’s oratorical flourish – an ‘exorbitant privilege.’ But such a privilege is easily 
incorporated into the thought experiment above. First, it might cause GDP growth to 
exceed the marginal rate of return on foreign debt, dampening the impact of debt build-up 
on the adjusted current account. Second, it would modify the estimate of the debt-GDP 
ratio’s initial rate of change, as the rate of debt accumulation would be further below the 
deficit on goods and services. Nonetheless, investor expectations remain far from a 
feasible path. The third novel argument, put forth by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber (2003), says the international monetary order has entered a ‘Bretton Woods II’ 
era, in which many central banks, mostly Asian, buy dollars to maintain nearly fixed 
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the US Trade Deficit”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1987, p. 1-43. 
exchange rates. Thus, despite a low rate of return, dollars will flow into the United States 
so long as central banks believe they need dollar assets. However, if this bank activity ran 
contrary to private expectations of real depreciation, we would see private capital 
outflows at least partly offsetting official capital inflows. But there is significant private 
inflow, so Bretton Woods II cannot explain the puzzling fact that private investors seem 
happy to buy dollar assets, despite a very modest real return differential that is 
overwhelmed by reasonable estimates of the rate at which the dollar must fall. 
Finally, Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2007) explain the sustainability of substantial 
international imbalances with ‘dark matter.’ It’s all down to Mark Twain’s third-type of 
lie – statistics. Official statistics, the story goes, drastically understate the assets US 
investors hold overseas by omitting US-based multinationals' exports of hidden assets 
such as expertise and reputation. However, the puzzling combination of a roughly zero 
US investment income balance and a negative US net investment position seems to 
reflect low returns on foreign investment in the United States rather than high returns 
abroad. This implies that the ‘dark matter’ is foreign firms bringing bad reputations to US 
markets, which seems unlikely. Moreover, dark matter could only alleviate the need for 
dollar depreciation if it were rapidly increasing, as its level does not counterbalance the 
large current account deficit. While it is easy to imagine that many US foreign assets are 
undercounted, it is much more difficult to argue that such ‘dark matter’ is growing. 
Therefore we still have reason to believe that a Wile E. Coyote moment is in the offing. 
Though it's always dangerous to second-guess markets, the data do seem to suggest 
myopia, and none of the various explanations of the US current account deficit advanced 
in recent years ease the difficulty of reconciling the willingness of investors to hold dollar 
assets enjoying only a tiny real interest differential with the size of the apparently 
inevitable dollar decline. 
In February 2007, Krugman wrote that we seem due for a discrete drop in the dollar. That 
is looking pretty good at the moment. How much the fall will hurt depends on other 
things. He wrote in February that a dollar plunge is potentially frightening if it is coupled 
with a collapse of the housing bubble, but it is unlikely to be disastrous. In the medium-
run, a contraction exacerbated by dollar depreciation will be offset by greater net exports. 
Still, a dollar plunge, by heading off what might otherwise be a substantial fall in long-
term interest rates, may extend and deepen a housing-induced slump, as well as reduce 
the Fed’s leverage over the economy. That would be ‘double bubble trouble’ and it 
probably won’t be much fun.  
POSTSCRIPT ADDED 9 November 2007 
Flashback to 1985: Krugman’s view on the dollar 
Rummaging around the web last night I came across a Paul Krugman paper on the how 
far and how fast the dollar needs to fall. What’s noteworthy is the date.  
<a href=”http://nber15.nber.org/papers/w1644”>Paul wrote it in August 1985</a> for the 
Jackson Hole conference when the US trade deficit seemed huge and the dollar had just 
started its 3-year slide. The 1985 abstract could be the abstract for his February 2007 
article on the same subject. 
This paper presents evidence strongly suggesting that the current strength of the dollar 
reflects myopic behavior by international investors; that is, that part of the dollar's 
strength can be viewed as a speculative bubble. At some point this bubble will burst, 
leading to a sharp fall in the dollar's value. The essential argument is that given the 
modest real interest differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners, the 
dollar’s strength amounts to an implicit forecast on the part of the market that with 
high probability the dollar will remain very strong for an extended period. The 
paper shows that such sustained dollar strength would lead the U.S. to Latin 
American levels of debt relative to GNP, which is presumably not feasible. Allowing 
for the possibility that something will be done to bring the dollar down before this 
happens actually reinforces the argument that the current value of the dollar is 
unreasonable. 
Of course, Paul has become a much better writer since then, so the “bubble will burst, 
leading to a sharp fall in the dollar's value” is now the “Wiley E. Coyote moment,” but 
the economic logic has not changed.  
Paul’s thesis adviser was Mr. Overshooting, Rudi Dornbusch. You could not complete 
Rudi’s course at MIT, 14.582, without having the link between current interest rates and 
market expectations of depreciation tattooed inside your brain. Paul’s prediction in 1985 
and this year simply adds a rough calculation as to whether the US trade deficit would 
become unsustainably large if the dollar fell as slowly as the interest rate gap would 
suggest.  
Here are a couple of quick charts that provide historical perspective. Both are flawed 
since they are in nominal terms, but they illustrate the point. 
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What can be done? 
Onado: Subprime "crisis": Who pays and what needs fixing 
19 August 2007 
The market participants who profited from creating the faltering debt instruments are not 
the ones who will pay most of the cost of the crisis; the losses will fall on the shoulders of 
final investors. Three things need fixing: credit ratings, evaluations of asset 
marketability, and transparency in the retail market for financial assets.  
The roller-coaster swings of the financial markets that are sending shivers down the 
investors’ spines since February are much more than the unavoidable correction after a 5-
year bull period. 
The Economist wrote that this is a good time for a credit squeeze and praised the benefits 
of tighter conditions, following the conventional wisdom that downfalls are helpful 
because they lead to a more correct pricing of goods and financial assets. There is 
however a peculiar feature of the last crises (and particularly of this one) that makes this 
position less acceptable, at least from the point of view of who bears the losses and who 
pocketed the gains during the boom. 
There are four characteristics of the present financial system that are worth remembering. 
o The dramatic rise of financial assets and derivatives all over the world. At the end 
of 2005 (IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007), total financial 
assets stood at an astonishing level of 3.7 times the world gdp. The notional 
amount of total derivatives was double than the volume of total financial assets, 
which means 11 times global gdp. Remember that financial derivatives did not 
exist only thirty years ago. 
o The historical low level of interest rates over the last years, since the mid-90s (as 
an effect of the Greenspan monetary policy and his attempt to feed the growth of 
the stock market). As a consequence of favourable monetary conditions, the price 
for risk required by the market also stood at very low levels. The two following 
graphs give clear evidence of the abnormal situation prevailing in the last years. 
 
 
o The growing weight of stocks and bonds as a percentage of total financial assets 
(therefore the decrease of loans by banks and other financial intermediaries). At 
the world level (and in the European Union), bank loans account for 50% of total 
financial assets, but in the US and Japan the ratio is much lower. In the US, only 1 
dollar out of five is borrowed from a bank. 
o The decrease of government bonds (i.e. risk-free assets) on total debt securities. 
While the average ratio at the world level is 50%, in Europe is 35% and in North 
America 26%, with a downward trend. The last two points mean that households' 
portfolios are more and more made of securities bearing both market and credit 
risk. 
 
These are the ingredients of the magic of financial innovation of the last decades: in a 
nutshell, banks created an astonishing volume of debt, packaged it into various kinds of 
securities, with different degrees of guarantees. These securities have been purchased by 
a wide range of smaller banks, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, other 
funds and even individuals, who have been encouraged to invest by the generally high 
ratings given to these instruments. According to an important school of thought, this 
“arm-length” financing is the most efficient to allocate resources. Others can recall 
Dickens who many years ago defined credit as a system “whereby a person who cannot 
pay gets another person who cannot pay to guarantee that he can pay”. 
As a matter of fact, the global financial systems proved to be very resilient to real and 
financial shocks in the last two decades, but what mostly worries central banks is that — 
unlike the old bank-based times - they simply do not know where the risk is. Witness this 
statement in the June 2007 Report of the Bank for International Settlements (p. 145): 
“Assuming that the big banks have managed to distribute more widely the risks inherent 
in the loans they have made, who now holds these risks, and can they manage them 
adequately? The honest answer is that we do not know”. Honest, but frightening. 
The only thing we know is that the losses will fall on the shoulders of final investors, and 
will not be shared with banks as it happened in more intermediated forms of finance. The 
point is that banks’ profits in the last 20 years stood at historical high levels. Returns on 
equity have been normally at two-digit levels (the first being preferably two) and 
probably will only be dented by the forthcoming market correction. In other words, the 
credit madness is over, a diet was overdue, but those that will have to follow a rigid diet 
are not those who put on weight in the past years. The allocative efficiency of the arm-
length financing deserves at least a second judgement. 
The policy implications of what is under our eyes are at least threefold. 
First, once again, a rating problem has emerged. Credit risk assessments have been made 
on too optimistic assumptions, using data not always statistically significant and 
systematically ignoring tail events. When banks do not take risks on their books, but only 
sell them, the fragmentation of responsibilities leads to what The Economist has defined 
as “too much money [being] lent too cheaply and too easily to too many people”. Banks 
should not skip risks so easily: a portion of the risk (for instance using capital 
requirements) should remain on banks’ balance sheets. 
Second, the securities issued were much less marketable than banks pretended. Most 
sophisticated bonds were infrequently traded; some were tailored&thinsp;by investment 
banks for specific clients and were never traded. Mark-to-market was therefore only a 
subjective valuation involving complex computer models and assumptions. Both directly 
made by the investment bank itself. The price discovery by the market, the very heart of a 
securitised world was simply an illusion. Final investors are barely protected when their 
securities are traded in such over-the-counter (unregulated) thin markets. 
Third, there is a problem of transparency in the retail market for financial assets. As 
financial products are becoming more and more sophisticated, a great majority of 
investors are not aware of the risks that they are actually taking. There are two 
hypocritical reactions that are emerging: to ask for more disclosure and/or for more 
financial literacy. The first one should lead only to an increase of sophisticated 
prospectuses, which can be read only by those holding a PhD in finance (possibly of a 
very recent vintage). The second one is even more absurd (not surprisingly was 
immediately backed by President Bush) as it is simply impossible to fill the gap between 
the current level of financial education and the current level of rocket-science finance 
involved in current financial products. The only solution is to use regulation (and 
particularly the conduct of business rules) to make more convenient for retailers to sell 
simple financial products. A wide body of research (particularly in the United Kingdom, 
sponsored by the Treasury and the FSA, the financial supervisor) proves that the present 
regulatory philosophy creates a strong bias towards sophistication and opacity. Time has 
come to change course and to create incentives for financial intermediaries to sell easier 
products to the final investors. Only at that point will a higher level of financial education 
be effective. Time has also come for finance economists to look more closely and in a 
more Dickensian way at what happens at the last step of the magic of credit creation. 
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Giovannini & Spaventa: Filling the information gap 
5 November 2007 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Basel II framework were intended 
to mitigate or prevent crises like the subprime mess. The valuation practices and market 
transparency recommended by the Committee fall short of what is needed.  
The mid-summer blues are not quite over yet: with subprime default rates still on the rise, 
3-months interbank rates stay abnormally high, credit conditions remain tight, gross 
issues of mortgage-backed bonds and commercial paper are all but dried up, and banks 
lick their wounds and attempt to set up emergency vehicles to dispose of the backlog of 
illiquid assets left in their books. The system remains vulnerable. Still, as the worst fears 
for financial stability have subsided, the debate now shifts from the central banks’ ex post 
emergency reactions to the preventative reforms needed for the future. Unfortunately, 
given the nature of this crisis, there is no quick fix this time. 
The textbook paradigm 
In its unfolding, this crisis conforms to the textbook paradigm. In a financial system 
where intermediaries hold illiquid assets against liquid liabilities, there are two possible 
equilibria. When only those agents subject to liquidity shocks require the service from 
intermediaries, the latter are able to carry out maturity transformation and allow society 
to earn superior returns. When instead, as a result of a shock, all agents, simultaneously 
but independently, seek liquidity, the intermediaries’ balance sheets go under stress, there 
is no demand for less liquid assets and disruptive liquidations may threaten financial 
stability: a succinct description of what has happened between July and September. 
As noted by Mervyn King,68 the “most unusual nature” of this crisis was the 
disproportion between the shock (“a relatively small size of…bad loans compared with 
the total assets of the banks”) and its widespread systemic consequences. Echoing 
Mervyn King, Ben Bernanke wondered how the impact could be so large, comparing the 
US subprime mortgage market with “the enormous scale of global financial markets”.69 
True, also in the textbook model, “crisis“ equilibria may be triggered by potentially 
insignificant events. But according to the textbook prescriptions, undesirable outcomes 
can be avoided through informed supervisory action: supervisors possessing the relevant 
information regarding potential exposures to shocks are better able to prevent a crisis, 
thereby reassuring all market participants that threats to financial instabilities can be 
contained. When, on the other hand, market participants not only do not know how 
serious and widespread the impact of a dislocation is, but also become aware that the 
supervisory authorities are no less ignorant, they rationally cut their risk positions by 
more than would be warranted if they possessed greater information and could rely on the 
presence of a better-informed coordinating agent. The surge in volatility and the drying-
up of liquidity make the worst scenario self-fulfilling. 
This is, in our view, what has happened this time. A generalised lack of information 
multiplied the effects of the initial shock. 
                                                 
68 Speech at the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Belfast, 9 October 
2007. 
69 “The Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy Consequences”, 
Economic Club of New York, October 15, 2007.  
The information gap 
The information gap was wide and deep. Mortgage brokers had an incentive to provide 
the raw material by quantity, regardless of quality. The valuation of the structured and 
complicated financial instruments pooling credit risks rested on rating agencies’ models, 
biased by observations limited to a relatively short span of very benign history. Those 
products were issued and (rarely) traded over the counter: marked to model, as there was 
no proper market assessing their liquidity. By the very nature of the CRT, nobody had a 
clue as to where the credit risks had ended up. 
This would have mattered less if the ultimate risk recipients had been only the usual 
suspects: hedge funds, pension funds and insurance and re-insurance companies. The 
systemic consequences of the collapse of a few of those would be confined to the 
counterparty risks assumed by some intermediaries in their lending or broker-dealer 
activities. But it turned out that there were many banks amongst those more heavily 
exposed to the direct risk of credit products, through off-balance sheet liquidity 
commitments granted to vehicles investing in those illiquid assets, equity tranches in the 
CDOs, own portfolio investment, and reputational commitment to proprietary mutual 
funds engaged in ABSs. The authorities in charge of stability supervision were seemingly 
unaware of this exposure: certainly they appeared to be caught by surprise by the 
consequences of the subprime insolvencies on the banking system, ignorant as to where 
the losses were located and therefore unable to deal selectively with the problem. The 
consequence was widespread mutual mistrust causing the hoarding of banks’ liquidity 
and the hike of interbank rates. 
Filling the multi-dimensional information gap that was responsible for transforming a 
spate of subprime defaults into a full-fledged crisis should be a priority of any reform 
effort. Unlike in earlier crises, however, there are no obvious solutions to this problem. 
We confine ourselves to drawing a list, in order of importance, of what we believe to be 
the more relevant issues. 
Filling some gaps 
At the origin there is a purely American problem: a crowd of unlicensed non-bank 
brokers, governed by wrong incentives, offering mortgage loans to all and sundry, 
irrespective of any assessment of the debtor’s potential solvency. Though the party is 
over by now, the problem remains and will have to be addressed by Congress. 
Next, when credit risks are pooled and re-packaged, comes the role of the rating agencies 
whose decisions affect the allocation of risks in different investors’ portfolios. Apart from 
their conflicts of interest from their semi-monopolistic, officially sanctioned status,70 a 
major information problem arises from the suitability of the statistical models used to 
provide the ratings on which many investors rely blindly. The spate of downgradings 
affecting them in recent months is evidence of serious flaws. Some propose that the 
rating agencies should be treated as underwriters, with the attendant responsibilities; at 
                                                 
70 On the role and the shortcomings of rating agencies see J.R. Mason and J. Rossner, 
“Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed  
Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions”, mimeo, May 2007. 
the very least their models should be subjected to an independent enquiry and, as it were, 
be themselves rated.71 
A deep and wide secondary market insuring at least post-trade transparency is an 
essential provider of information; over-the-counter transactions instead remain opaque 
and known only to the parties concerned. The heterogeneity of structured products (each 
with idiosyncratic features) is an obstacle to the supply of a public good. An agreement 
prompted by industry associations in consultation with the supervisors to standardise the 
most diffuse classes of instruments, as was done for some derivative contracts, would be 
a step towards the creation of a market. 
There is then the question of the bank-sponsored investment vehicles (SIVs) and of the 
treatment of the liquidity facilities provided to them by banks, which under Basel I are 
exempt from capital requirements (and hence from disclosure) as long as the commitment 
is for less than 365 days. The somewhat more stringent prescriptions of Basel II are still 
short of achieving adequate transparency. This however is only a part of a more general 
issue: that of designing an efficient structure of information flows in order to fill those 
gaps that are prejudicial to stability. 
A wider problem: Basel II? 
Ideally the authorities in charge of stability should be empowered to acquire all the 
information needed to assess the system's (and not only an individual agent’s) 
vulnerabilities from all financial entities whose actions may have systemic effects. They 
would thus be better equipped to prevent the eruption of dislocations as well as to provide 
guidance to market participants on the risks present in the system. In the view of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the implementation of the Basel II capital 
framework, by improving “the robustness of valuation practices and market transparency 
for complex and less liquid products”, “would have gone some distance” to alleviate the 
present crisis. We believe that the distance would have been very short, as the Basel II 
framework represents only a small approximation to a satisfactory solution. 
First, disclosure belongs to the third pillar of the accord (market discipline), which is 
recognised as by far the weakest, in terms of both prescriptions and enforcement.72 
Second, Basel II disclosure is required in order to assess an individual bank’s capital 
adequacy. That is not enough: a strong bank capital base, while essential to avoid the 
collapse of any major financial institution, was not sufficient to prevent the systemic 
effects of the subprime crisis. Third, any disclosure obligation imposed by the accord 
only concerns banks. But all the entities having liquidity mismatches between assets and 
liabilities may produce systemic effects, either directly with counterparties or through the 
                                                 
71 Credit rating agencies have themselves “acknowledged the need to review the 
information they receive from originators and they provide to investors in structured 
credit products” (Financial Stability Forum, Working Group on Market and Institutional 
Resilience, 15 October 2007), 
72 It has been alleged that Basel II has a “bias in favor of nondisclosure”, strengthened by 
the opposition of the banks (Institutional Risk Analytics, Comments to the proposals, 
October 2006). 
structure of their balance sheets: not only traditional intermediaries, but also broker-
dealers, non-thrift financial institutions borrowing wholesale in the market, any kind of 
vehicle with the same characteristics, as well as hedge funds. 
Finally, designing an efficient structure of information flows meets with institutional 
obstacles. In a closely connected financial world, where cross-border entities prevail, 
information on global stability is the more valuable the less its gathering and processing 
are fragmented. There are natural limits to this and cooperation between bank supervisors 
helps. But there are obvious steps to be be taken to improve the situation. At the national 
level, the single regulator model, whereby banking supervision is not a responsibility of 
the lender of last resort, has shown important flaws, at least in Germany and the UK. 
More importantly, similar faults are present in the euro area, where the ECB, which, 
though not a lender of last resort, is responsible for providing liquidity, has no 
supervisory competence and must rely on the information voluntarily provided by the 
national central banks. 
Adequate, reliable and timely information is essential to ensure financial stability. Filling 
the information gap however has so far been a slow and hesitant process. Do we need 
more crises to move forward at a faster pace? 
 
 
 
Buiter: Lessons from the North Atlantic financial crisis 
19 December 2007 
What caused the current North Atlantic financial crisis, how can it be fixed and how can 
the likelihood of future crises be reduced? This column introduces a new CEPR Policy 
Insight, 'Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis', which addresses these issues at length.  
The crisis is the product of a ‘perfect storm’ bringing together a number of 
microeconomic and macroeconomic pathologies. Among the microeconomic systemic 
failures were: wanton securitisation, fundamental flaws in the rating agencies’ business 
model, the procyclical behaviour both of leverage in much of the financial system and of 
the Basel II capital adequacy requirements, privately rational but socially inefficient 
disintermediation, and competitive international de-regulation. Reduced incentives for 
collecting and disseminating information about counterparty risk were a pervasive feature 
of the new financial world of securitisation and off-balance sheet vehicles – what Paul 
Tucker of the Bank of England has called ‘vehicular finance’. So was lack of 
transparency about who owned what and about who owed what and to whom. 
Proximate local drivers of the specific way in which these problems manifested 
themselves were regulatory and supervisory failure in the US home loan market. 
Solutions to the microeconomic pathologies will be partly market-driven, partly imposed 
by regulators.  They include the following nice ‘do’s’: 
o Insists on simpler financial structures and products, instead of financial 
engineering masterpieces that cannot be priced even by their designers, let alone 
by buyers and sellers in the secondary markets. 
o Require the retention of the equity tranche (or first-loss tranche) by the originator 
of loans, to mitigate the adverse impact of Principal-Agent chains on the incentive 
for information-collecting and monitoring of ultimate borrowers. 
o Eliminate the quasi-regulatory role of the rating agencies in Basel II. 
o Require rating agencies to sell nothing but ratings, to reduce conflict of interest. 
o End the payment of individual rating agencies by the individual issuers of 
securities they rate. 
o Subject all off-balance sheet vehicles that act like banks to the same regulatory 
requirements and fiscal regime as banks (a principles-based ‘duck test’ for banks). 
o Encourage greater international cooperation between regulators. 
o Create a single EU-wide regulatory regime for banks, other financial 
intermediaries and financial markets.  Have one European regulator for all 
European financial institutions and markets in a given class/category. 
o Have an international crackdown on ‘regulators of convenience’ and ‘regulatory 
havens’ (alongside a long-overdue crackdown on tax havens). 
Among the macroeconomic pathologies that contributed to the crisis were, first, 
excessive global liquidity creation by key central banks and, second, an ex-ante global 
saving glut, brought about by the entry of a number of high-saving countries (notably 
China) into the global economy and by the global redistribution of wealth and income 
towards commodity exporters that also had, at least in the short run, high propensities to 
save. 
Neither the Fed, nor the ECB, nor the Bank of England exactly covered themselves with 
glory in addressing the global shut-down of the financial wholesale markets and the 
continuing crunch and illiquidity in the interbank markets.  The ECB probably did best, 
followed by the Fed, with the Bank of England coming in a well-beaten third. 
All three central banks are now injecting fair amounts of liquidity not just in the 
overnight interbank markets, but also at longer maturities, especially at 1 and 3 months.  
The Bank of England was most reluctant to tackle the very large spreads between, say, 3-
month Libor and the market’s expectation of the official policy rate over a three month 
horizon (as measured by the fixed leg of the overnight indexed rate swap or OIS). It 
believed (against the evidence and the odds) that this reflected largely market perceptions 
of counterparty default risk, rather than liquidity risk.  The Bank also only recently 
widened its list of eligible collateral in 3-month repos (sale and repurchase operations) to 
assets beyond than the high-grade sovereign debt instruments it had insisted on before.  
For the December 2007 and January 2008 auctions it announced, it is also, for the first 
time, willing to do repos against this wider range of collateral at market-determined rates, 
rather than insisting on a penalty floor for the rate, as it did in September. 
The ECB immediately threw very large amounts of liquidity at the longer-maturity 
interbank markets and the Fed pumped in moderate amounts.  Interestingly, except in the 
very short-run, the effect on the interbank spread over the OIS rate did not respond very 
differently for sterling, the euro and the US dollar.  Before one concludes from this that 
open market operations at these longer maturities have no influence on the spreads, one 
has to recognise that the need for liquidity may not have been the same in the three 
interbank markets.  For starters, many UK banks with subsidiaries in the Eurozone (and 
some with subsidiaries in the US) obtained liquidity through these subsidiaries.  Other 
indicators of liquidity of the interbank market, such as the volume of private transactions, 
suggest that, even with comparable spreads, UK banks continue to face especially tight 
liquidity conditions. 
In the UK, failures of the Tripartite financial stability arrangement between the Treasury, 
the Bank of England and the FSA, weaknesses in the Bank of England’s liquidity 
management, regulatory failure of the FSA, an inadequate deposit insurance arrangement 
and deficient insolvency laws for the banking sector all contributed to the financial 
disarray. 
Despite this, it may well be possible to contain the spillovers from the crisis beyond the 
financial sectors of the industrial countries and the housing sectors of the US and a few 
European countries.  The reason is that the credit boom that came to an end in 2007 did 
not give rise to major excesses in physical capital formation (fixed investment), except in 
the financial sectors just about everywhere and in the residential construction sectors of a 
few countries, including the US, Spain, Ireland, the Baltic states and Bulgaria.  The 
saving-investment balances and balance sheets of non-financial corporates remain 
healthy.  The financial imbalances are mainly in the financial sector (excessive leverage, 
deficient liquidity, insufficient capital and the need for massive write-downs of assets — 
specialty CDOs and other complex securitised structures) and to a lesser extent in the 
household sector (financial deficits, excessive mortgage debt, unsecured consumer debt 
and the need to take large hits on the valuation of key assets, especially residential 
property).  While a slowdown is unavoidable — and, in the case of the US, necessary and 
desirable because for the restauration of external balance — a recession is not. 
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Buiter: Lessons from Northern Rock: Banking and shadow banking 
4 March 2008 
The UK Treasury Committee recently released a report on the lessons from the plight of 
Northern Rock. In the first of a two-column series, Willem Buiter analyses the 
shortcomings of the report’s recommendations for reducing problems in the banking and 
‘shadow banking’ sectors. 
Two highly readable reports on the lessons learnt from the Northern Rock debacle have 
been published recently. The first is the Treasury Committee Report The Run on the Rock 
< http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/5602.htm> 
published on January 26. The second is Financial stability and depositor protection: 
strengthening the framework, < http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/3/5/banking_stability_pu477.pdf> published jointly by HM 
Treasury, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England (BoE) on 
January 30. The publication of the latter document launches a consultation on the 
proposals contained in it for domestic and international action to enhance financial 
stability. The Treasury Report covers five areas: (1) Strengthening the financial system 
through domestic and international actions; (2) Reducing the likelihood of banks failing; 
(3) Reducing the impact of failing banks; (4) Deposit insurance: and (5) Strengthening 
the Bank of England and improving the operation of the Tripartite Arrangement. This 
column analyses the first two parts. 
Strengthening the financial system 
There is nothing substantive regarding unilateral or coordinated international action to 
strengthen the financial system, just some pious platitudes about the need to strengthen 
risk management by banks and to improve the functioning of securitisation markets by <a 
target="_blank" href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/887">beefing up 
valuation methods and the performance of credit rating agencies</a>.  This is a missed 
opportunity, as the current financial crisis has reminded us that when finance is global 
and regulation is national, accidents are much more likely to happen.  Regulatory 
arbitrage and competitive deregulation to gain or retain footloose financial businesses 
within national jurisdictions have been important contributors to the excesses committed 
by financial institutions and to the mis-pricing and misallocation of risk by credit markets 
and other financial markets since (at least) 2003.  The proliferation of opaque complex 
financial instruments traded by opaque off-balance sheet financial vehicles calls for 
global action.  Coordination between multiple institutions, especially in a crisis, is always 
problematic: panic moves at the speed of light and even well-intentioned, cooperatively 
minded parties will find it hard to engage in synchronised swimming while piranhas and 
sharks lurch at their tender extremities. 
The UK’s ‘light -touch’ regulatory approach has been found wanting and exposed as little 
more than soft-touch regulation.  No doubt it has been successful in attracting financial 
sector activity to London — that is, it has been an effective competitor in the socially 
negative-sum global deregulation game.  It has made a material contribution to the 
regulatory race to the bottom, which has left much of the shadow banking sector outside 
the regulatory net altogether, and has reduced both the information available to the 
regulator and the power of the regulator to prescribe or proscribe behaviour in those 
market segments that remain regulated.73 
                                                 
73 The shadow banking sector consists of the many highly leveraged non-deposit-taking 
institutions that lend long and illiquid and borrow short in markets that are liquid during 
normal or orderly times but can become illiquid when markets become disorderly. They 
are functionally very similar to banks but are barely supervised or regulated. They hold 
very little capital, are not subject to any meaningful prudential requirements as regards 
liquidity, leverage or any other feature of their assets and liabilities. They also have very 
few reporting obligations and have to meet few governance standards, as many are 
At the European level, the need for the creation of a single EU regulator for any given 
market segment, responsible for all financial institutions engaged in significant cross-
border activity (including foreign subsidiaries and branches) is now paramount. At the 
global level, a greater sense of urgency as regards the activities of the Financial Stability 
Forum is key. The IMF is waved around briefly in the Treasury Report, but what role it 
would play in the prevention of crises (‘enhanced multilateral surveillance’ anyone?) or 
in their mitigation is not developed. 
It is also clear that Basel II has to go back to the drawing board.  While some of the 
excesses of the recent past would not have been possible had Basel II been in effect 
(especially the ability of banks to make economic exposure disappear for reporting 
purposes through the creation of off-balance-sheet vehicles), Pillars I and 2 of Basel II 
have three flaws which are, I believe, collectively fatal.  One is the procyclicality of the 
capital requirements directive.  The second is the reliance on internal models of banks to 
mark-to-model (i.e. mark-to-myth and mark-to-the-short-term-requirements-of-the-
banks’-profit-centres) illiquid and often complex financial instruments and structures.  
The third is the reliance of the risk-weightings on the ratings provided by discredited 
rating agencies. 
The Report also mentions the need to improve the functioning of securitisation markets, 
including improvements in valuation and credit rating agencies, but it offers very little 
beef in these areas.  It is clear that the credit rating agencies will have to be ‘unbundled’ 
and that the same legal entity should not be able to sell both ratings and advice on how to 
structure instruments to get a good rating.  The conflict of interest is just too naked.  
Rating agencies will have to become single-product firms, selling just ratings. 
The only two proposals for improving the operation of the securitisation markets I have 
seen are not discussed in the Report.  The first is for the originator of the assets (home 
loans, say) underlying the securitisation process to be required to retain the equity or first 
loss tranche of the securities issued against the underlying assets.  This strengthens the 
incentives for delegated monitoring and reduces the severity of the principal-agent 
problem in the securitisation process.  The second prescribes a ‘gold standard’ for simple 
and transparent securitisation, as proposed recently by the UK Treasury, but — unlike the 
Treasury proposal — one with teeth.  In a revised collateral framework, the Bank of 
England would only accept as collateral at the standard lending facility (discount 
window) or in open market operations through repos, asset-backed-securities conforming 
to the ‘gold standard’. 
One of the key drivers of the excesses of the most recent (and earlier) financial booms 
has been the myopic and asymmetric reward structure in many financial institutions, 
including banks and commercial banks.  Clearly not all is well when the CEO of 
Citigroup, after marching his institution to the edge of the abyss, is let go with a golden 
handshake worth in excess of $130 million.  If that is the punishment for failure, what 
could be the reward for success?  And this is just an extreme example of poorly 
structured reward systems that encourage excessive risk-taking and the pursuit of short-
                                                                                                                                                 
privately or closely held. Examples are hedge funds, private equity funds, money market 
funds, monolines, conduits, SIVs and other special-purpose, off-balance-sheet vehicles. 
term profits. Where action to prevent such outrages in the future should be focused is not 
clear.  It is fundamentally a problem of general corporate governance, not restricted to the 
financial sector: where were the shareholders of Citigroup?  But there clearly is an urgent 
need for intelligent design here. 
Reducing the likelihood of banks failing 
As regards proposals for reducing the likelihood of banks failing, there are some sensible 
proposals for enhancing the ability of the FSA to demand information at short notice. 
Provision and disclosure of liquidity assistance 
This part of the Report is hamstrung by a failure to distinguish clearly between funding 
liquidity and market liquidity.  Funding liquidity, which refers to the cost and availability 
of external finance (including the speed with which it can be accessed) is a property of 
economic agents and institutions.  Market liquidity, which refers to the speed and ease 
with which an asset can be sold at a price close to its fair value and with low transaction 
costs, is a property of assets or financial instruments and of the markets in which they are 
traded.  Funding liquidity and market liquidity are not independent; the funding liquidity 
of a market maker or trader will influence the liquidity of the market he makes; the 
funding liquidity of a trader will depend on the market liquidity of the assets he holds or 
the liquidity of the markets in which he intends to borrow, secured or unsecured.  There 
are private and public sources of both funding and market liquidity.  When push comes to 
shove, only the public sector can provide instruments with unquestioned liquidity.  
Funding liquidity is provided by the authorities at the discount window (on demand 
against suitable collateral) and, in extreme circumstances, through lender of last resort 
(LoLR) facilities.  Market liquidity is provided by the authorities through open market 
operations (OMOs), both repos/reverse repos and outright purchases/sales, and, when 
markets become illiquid, by the authorities acting as market maker of last resort 
(MMLR), buying normally liquid but temporarily illiquid instruments at punitive prices 
and discounts. 
Funding liquidity and market liquidity need not be provided by the same agency of the 
government, both in normal times and in extraordinary times.  Only the central bank can 
realistically provide market liquidity, but the central bank need not be the active party 
deciding on the provision of funding liquidity, even if it is likely to be the (passive) 
source of such liquidity. 
Covert operations: James Bond at the Central Bank 
Quite a lot is made of proposals to allow the authorities (specifically the Bank of 
England), to provide covert liquidity assistance or other ‘good offices’.  There are three 
sets of conditions under which covert assistance may be desirable. 
First, there may be a use for secrecy surrounding assistance provided by the authorities 
during short-term windows of extreme vulnerability, say, just after a major fraud has 
been discovered.  Of course, with the sophisticated control systems in place since, at 
least, Nick Leeson’s destruction of Barings, a major-institution-threatening fraud is surely 
a thing of the past… 
Second, there may be a use for secrecy surrounding the authorities’ involvement in 
attempts to find a ‘private sector solution’ for troubled/failing bank.  Under the current 
UK Take-over code, such covert assistance is problematic. 
Third, there could be a need for secret lender of last resort assistance.  Although the Bank 
of England’s belief that covert LoLR assistance would fall foul of the UK’s transposition 
of the EU Market Abuse Directive, this turns out to have been a chimera.  In any case, 
with effective deposit insurance and an effective ‘special resolution regime’ for troubled 
or failing banks, the need for both the second and the third kind of covert operation 
would vanish. 
When safeguards fail 
My recommended policies would likely strengthen the banking and financial sectors, 
reducing the risk of failure. But such a likelihood is impossible to eliminate. In my next 
column, I will address how the UK government could best prepare for a non-trivial bank 
failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Buiter: Lessons from Northern Rock: How to handle failure 
5 March 2008 
This second column on the Treasury Committee’s report on lessons from Northern Rock 
discusses the institutional arrangements needed to cope should a bank of non-trivial size 
fail. 
In my previous column, I examined proposals for preventing financial crises in the UK 
Treasury Committee Report The Run on the Rock < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/5602.htm≥. 
Here, I look at mechanisms that might reduce the impact of failing banks, provide 
appropriate deposit insurance, and coordinate the three institutions responsible for 
financial stability. 
Dealing effectively with failing banks 
The authorities are effectively proposing to put in place the kind of legal and regulatory 
arrangements currently found in the United States and a number of other countries. A 
special resolution regime (SRR) would be created, led by a new authority (I shall call it 
the special resolution regime authority or SRRA, not to be confused with SSRI, lest we 
get some very depressed bankers), who could take control of a troubled bank before it hit 
the normal insolvency buffers – inability to service its debt. The assets of the pre-failing 
bank, or any of its activities and business, could be transferred to one or more healthy 
banks or some other third party; a ‘bridge bank’ could be created to allow the SRRA to 
take control of all or part of a bank or of its assets and liabilities; a ‘restructuring officer’ 
could be appointed by the SSRA to carry out the resolution; and finally, if the judgement 
is reached that pre-insolvency resolution is not feasible, a special bank insolvency 
procedure could be invoked to facilitate swift and efficient payment of insured 
depositors. Public ownership of all or part of a bank as a last resort is also part of the 
package. The Treasury document refers to it as temporary public ownership, but unless 
this means that a fixed time table has to be provided, the word ‘temporary’ only indicates 
hope or intent and is not operational. 
The government proposes that the FSA would be the SRRA, and I agree with that.  It 
should not be the Bank of England (because the job of the SRRA is too political) or the 
Treasury (because the Treasury is too political for the job of the SRRA).  A new separate 
entity would be possible, but further balkanisation of the responsibility for financial 
stability in the UK would seem undesirable (anyone really wants a Quadripartite 
Arrangement?). 
The key issue is the specification of the circumstances under which the SRRA would be 
able to impose the SRR on a bank.  What will be the threshold conditions or triggers 
(quantitative or qualitative) that would cause the SSRA to compel a bank to enter the 
SRR?  If the threshold is set too low, competition is distorted.  If the threshold is set too 
high, there may be risk of systemic instability.  Of course, with adequate deposit 
insurance and an appropriate bank insolvency procedure, contagion effects and other 
systemically destabilising manifestations of panic ought not to happen.  Even the failure 
of a large bank should not be of greater public interest than the failure of a ball-bearings 
manufacturer in Coventry with equal value added. 
The Treasury believes the decision on whether and when a bank should be ordered into 
the SRR should be based on a regulatory judgment exercised by the FSA after 
consultation with the Bank of England and the Treasury.  Provided it is clear that the 
ultimate decision lies with the FSA, I would agree with this proposal. 
Deposit insurance 
I believe that the new deposit insurance arrangements should be located in the same 
institution that has the SRRA, that is, with the FSA.  The existing Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme should either be moved into the FSA or wound up.  In its current 
form, it is useless. 
As regards the limits of the insured amount, the current UK figure of &pound;35,000 
(since October 1, 2007, the idiotic run-inducing 10% deductible after the first 
&pound;2000 has been abolished) appears to be in the middle of the 19-country pack 
reported in the Treasury document.  Eyeballing the charts, it looks as though about 97% 
of all retail deposit accounts hold less than &pound;35,000.  At the same time, the top 3% 
of deposit accounts hold about 50% of total deposits in the UK.  This means that an 
increase in the limit would raise the value of the deposits covered by significantly more 
than it would raise the number of depositors covered.  I cannot see a strong case for 
raising the limit, and no case for raising it above &pound;50,000.  What matters is the 
speed with which insured deposits can be paid out should a bank get into trouble. 
Strengthening the Bank of England 
It is apparent that the Bank of England, since it became operationally independent for 
monetary policy, and lost banking supervision in 1997, has done a much better job as 
regards its monetary policy mandate of price stability than it has as regards its financial 
stability mandate.  There has been really only one serious test of the UK’s Tripartite 
Arrangement for financial stability between the Bank, the FSA and the Treasury.  It failed 
the test.  Much of the blame lies with current and past Treasuries and with the FSA, but 
the Bank contributed to the problems through its mismanagement of market liquidity.  
The Treasury Report does not address this issue at all. 
It is key that the Bank of England should follow the example of the ECB and extend its 
list of eligible collateral at the standing lending facility and in open market operations to 
include routinely private securities, including asset-backed securities.  It should also 
extend the maturity of its standing lending facility loans from overnight to up to one 
month, taking a leaf from the Fed this time.  Finally, it should extend the list of eligible 
counterparties at the standing lending facility and in its repo operations to include not just 
banks and similar deposit-taking institutions.  Currently, open market operations are open 
to non-Cash Ratio Deposit-paying banks, building societies and securities dealers that are 
active intermediaries in the sterling markets.  Access to the standing facilities is restricted 
to participants in the Bank of England’s Reserves scheme and a few others.  Both OMOs 
and standing facilities should be accessible to all financial institutions regulated in a 
manner approved of by the Bank. 
While in a first-best world, the Bank would not be the active player in LoLR operations, 
it will always be involved in funding liquidity matters through its standing facilities.  It is 
therefore key that the use of the standard lending facility be de-stigmatised.  This can be 
achieved by abolishing the unbelievably complex operational procedures for setting the 
Official Policy Rate or Bank Rate (official policy sets the target for the overnight 
unsecured sterling interbank rate) and managing short-term liquidity. 
The current framework has three main elements: rather plain-vanilla standing facilities 
and OMOs and a mysterious and pointless reserves-averaging scheme (from the Bank’s 
Redbook): 
‘Reserves-averaging scheme. UK banks and building societies that are 
members of the scheme undertake to hold target balances (reserves) at the 
Bank on average over maintenance periods running from one MPC 
decision date until the next. If a member’s average balance is within a 
range around their target, the balance is remunerated at the official Bank 
Rate.’ 
The reserves-averaging scheme should go.  There should be no reserve requirement at all.  
The Bank should stand ready to repo (against eligible collateral) or reverse repo any 
amount at any time at the Official Policy Rate.  That, after all, is what it means to set the 
Official Policy Rate.  Anything else is an attempt to set both price and quantity — and is 
doomed to failure. 
Commercial banks would therefore be borrowing from the Bank of England all the time, 
as a matter of routine, and no stigma would be attached to such operations.  This would 
also keep the overnight interbank rate closer to the Official Policy Rate than it is under 
current procedures, decoupling the Monetary Policy Committee’s interest rate decision 
from the liquidity policy not managed by the MPC but by the Bank’s Executive.The 
Bank still could retain its standing lending facility by accepting a wider range of assets as 
collateral at the standing lending facility than it accepts in repos to peg the Official Policy 
Rate. 
In its open market operations, the Bank should act as market maker of last resort, by 
standing ready to purchase, at a properly conservative/punitive price, normally liquid 
assets that have become illiquid through a systemic flight to quality and liquidity caused 
by fear, panic and other contagion effects.  As for the securities acceptable for 
rediscounting at the standing lending facility, there should be a positive list of securities 
(including private securities and indeed private ABS) that are acceptable as collateral by 
the Bank.  This would help concentrate the minds of (the supervisors of) those maniacal 
financial engineers generating ever more complex and opaque financial structures, which 
would be unlikely to figure on the list of eligigble collateral. 
What becomes of the Tripartite Arrangement? 
It is obvious that, whenever taxpayers’ money is put at risk, the Treasury must be 
consulted and should have a veto over the operation.  The Treasury document makes this 
clear.  The Treasury is also ‘in charge of’ the whole arrangement, although it appears 
obvious that there are certain things it cannot instruct the two other parties to do without 
risking damaging resignations.  I doubt whether it could give the Bank instructions on its 
collateral policy, OMOs and standing facilities operations.  In my view it ought not to be 
able to do so. It is also unclear as to whether the Treasury expects to be in a position to 
instruct the SRRA (that is, the FSA) to invoke or not to invoke the SRR for a particular 
bank.  I would hope it would not be able to do so.  What the role of the Treasury would 
be in the decision to invoke the new bank insolvency procedure remains unclear.  
Obviously, nationalisation could only be authorised by the Treasury. 
In the proposals of the Treasury, the FSA continues to be the regulator and supervisor of 
the banking sector (and of most other financial institutions).  It remains responsible for 
the default risk (solvency), the funding liquidity of the institutions it supervises and other 
risks, including operational and reputational risk.  It will lead the SRR and act as the 
SRRA.  I assume it would also be responsible for the management of the deposit 
insurance scheme, although the Treasury document is not clear on this.  The Bank of 
England does get its nose into the tent for most of these activities and responsibilities, 
however.  To my mind this further troubles the allocation of responsibility and authority. 
The financial cost of the deposit insurance scheme can only be borne by the participating 
institutions (either through pre-funding or ex-post funding) if the banking sector trouble 
causing the scheme to be called upon for a pay-out is a ‘local’ problem affecting only a 
minority of the banks.  When there is a systemic bank run (or bank default), only the 
Treasury can credibly meet the insurance claims.  This should be recognised.  Any 
serious deposit insurance scheme represents a contingent claim on the Treasury. 
The Bank of England remains responsible for market liquidity, both in normal times and, 
under disorderly market conditions, by acting as market maker of last resort.  It is 
involved in funding liquidity through the (on demand against the proper collateral) 
standing lending facility.  The Treasury Report (and even more strongly the Treasury 
Committee Report) favours an enhanced role of the Bank of England in the LoLR 
process.  The Treasury Report wants the Bank to spend time and resources becoming and 
remaining informed of the liquidity situations of the individual UK banks.  This clearly 
would also require it to be aware of the solvency-related aspects of the balance sheet and 
operations of individual banks.  The Bank and the FSA would effectively become joint 
supervisors with shared responsibility for funding liquidity and solvency.  I doubt 
whether such an arrangement would work well. 
As far as I can tell, the Treasury Committee wants all of banking supervision and 
regulation to be returned to the Bank of England, with the FSA taken completely out of 
the game.  A new Deputy Governor and Head of Financial Stability would take the lead 
in all financial stability matters, and could even order the FSA around. 
It is clear that the Treasury Committee’s proposal would put strains on the Bank of 
England’s independence in monetary policy.  The Committee therefore raises the 
possibility that the new Deputy Governor/Financial Stability Czar might not be a member 
of the MPC.  I still cannot see it.  What would be the authority relationship between the 
new Deputy Governor/Financial Stability Czar and his/her notional boss, the Governor?  
If the Bank of England is to be put in charge of (the operational end of) Financial 
Stability, better not to appoint a new Deputy Governor but to give the job to the Governor 
and to take MPC out of the Bank of England.  The Governor of the Bank would, under 
this model, not necessarily be the Chair of the MPC or even a member of it. 
A different solution 
Rather than putting money and individual bank-specific information together in the same 
institution by making the Bank of England responsible for banking supervision again, I 
would move in the opposite direction.  The lender of last resort (which would not be the 
Bank of England although the lender of last resort, if it is not the Bank of England should 
have an open-ended uncapped credit line or overdraft facility with the Bank of England, 
guaranteed by the Treasury), should be the SRRA, that is, the FSA.  It would make 
liquidity available to a troubled bank that could no longer fund itself in the interbank 
markets, the repo markets or at the standing lending facility.  The collateral that would be 
accepted, the terms on which it would be accepted, and the other terms and conditions 
attached to LoLR funds would be decided by the SRRA (the FSA) on a case-by-case 
basis. 
The current Tripartite arrangement is sketched in Figure 1.  The Treasury Committee’s 
proposal is in Figure 2, the Treasury’s proposal in Figure 3 and my own proposal (for a 
minimalist central bank) in Figure 4.  Finally, Figure 5 shows how, under my proposed 
arrangement, a potentially troubled bank would be handled. 
With effective deposit insurance and a sensible insolvency regime for banks, all 
proposals share the feature that it could, at last, become conceivable that a non-trivially 
small bank in the UK might fail.  That would be the best guarantor of greater future 
financial stability. 
Figure 1 
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Portes: Sovereign wealth funds 
17 October 2007 
Sovereign wealth funds are politically so hot that they competed with the summer's 
financial crisis for media attention - both politicians and the press have expressed 
concern about their activities. Not many corporates have complained, however, and some 
like Barclays and Blackstone have welcomed sovereign wealth fund investment. How are 
sovereign wealth funds apt to respond? 
Sovereign wealth funds are politically so hot now that they have competed successfully 
with the financial crisis for media attention during July and August. American 
Congressmen and the German Chancellor propose heightened surveillance, and possibly 
restrictions on capital inflows from this particular source. Even advocates of financial 
openness like the Financial Times are seriously concerned about the activities of these 
behemoths. Not many corporates have complained, however, and some like Barclays and 
Blackstone have welcomed sovereign wealth fund investment. 
Are private-sector firms simply greedy or gullible to accept major sovereign wealth fund 
stakes? Perhaps. Are the polticians just exploiting xenophobic public reactions? 
Undoubtedly — but their concerns may not be entirely unfounded. Is this issue 
overblown and ephemeral? Certainly not. 
Sovereign wealth funds are already a major force in international capital markets. They 
will become increasingly important, as long as financial globalisation is not reversed and 
emerging market countries and oil producers continue to run large balance-of-payments 
surpluses. One need not accept the Morgan Stanley forecast of $12 trillion in sovereign 
wealth funds by 2015 — just look at the enormous buildup over the past five years of 
investible funds under the control of these countries’ governments. The chart shows only 
the amounts identified as foreign exchange reserves of the top reserve holders. By the end 
of 2007, the non-industrial countries will hold about $3.5 trillion in foreign exchange 
reserves and a further $1.5-2.5 trillion in other forms, including sovereign wealth funds. 
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Source: E. Papaioannou and R. Portes, ‘The euro as an international currency vis-à-vis 
the dollar’, paper for Euro50 Group meeting, Rome, 3 July 2007. 
The reserves have for some time exceeded what these countries need as precautionary 
liquidity (insurance against sudden capital outflows). Some of the reserve accumulation 
has already been set aside in sovereign wealth funds. There will be much more, as the 
balance-of-payments surpluses continue. China has announced intentions to put $300 
billion of its $1.3 trillion of reserves into the China Investment Corporation. But those 
reserves are currently growing at the rate of $400 billion a year! The Chinese authorities 
are unlikely to see much point in further purchases of low-yielding, short-term dollar, 
euro or yen government securities, so this sovereign wealth fund will grow very rapidly 
indeed. The Table shows the countries with major sovereign wealth funds and recent 
estimates of their assets. 
Large sovereign wealth funds 
 
Country Name Date established 
Current sizs 
(US$ bn) 
United Arab 
Emirates Adu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976 500 to 875 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 1981 100 to 330 
Norway Goverment Pension Fund-Global 1990 308 
Kuwait Future Generations Fund 1976 174 
Russia Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation 2004 122 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 1974 108 
China Central Huijin Investment Company 2003 66 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2005 50 
Source: E. Truman, 'Sovereign wealth funds: the need for greater transparency and 
accountability', Peterson Institute Policy Brief PB 07-6, August 2007. 
 
Protection against competition from foreign goods and workers was a major force in 
reversing the first globalisation of 1870-1913. Financial protectionism now poses a clear 
threat of backlash against the globalisation of the past twenty years. It is not confined to 
sovereign wealth funds — recall France classifying yoghurt as a strategic industry when 
Pepsi was interested in acquiring Danone. Only somewhat more plausible were the 
American reactions against incursions from Dubai Ports and China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation. But even if British reservations about a Qatari bid for Sainsbury are purely 
sentimental, it is clear that a sovereign wealth fund’s entry as a controlling shareholder of 
a major company is not quite the same as, say, EDF supplying my electricity in London. 
From the corporate viewpoint, the key issue is potential control by a state-run entity. 
European countries have gone through a wave of privatisations since the early 1980s. 
Managers, shareholders and governments are not likely to sit by passively in the face of 
cross-border renationalisation. Foreign government interference in business decisions is 
much less palatable than domestic government intervention. And even the Norwegian 
sovereign wealth fund is pulling out of its Wal-Mart investment because of its 
disapproval of some of that company’s non-commercial policies. 
Private investors might behave similarly, but the implications are clearly different, and 
the scale of sovereign wealth funds could give them unprecedented scope for foreign 
political influence over private corporate behaviour. It is not sufficient to reply that these 
investors will not behave ‘irrationally’. They may behave very rationally but with some 
very different motivations from private investors. 
Those motivations may raise legitimate political as well as business concerns. Suppose a 
major firm were controlled by the sovereign wealth fund of a geopolitically important 
ally, and this firm seemed headed for a collapse. Would a European or American 
government give in to pressure to override ‘state aid’ prohibitions and bail out the failing 
firm? 
Even those of us who oppose protectionism and believe strongly in open financial 
markets can see reasons why host-country firms and governments might want to develop 
explicit policies towards foreign sovereign wealth funds. But it is hard to think of realistic 
measures that might alleviate the concerns. The United States needs foreign investment 
of $2 billion per day to finance its current account deficit. The financiers — increasingly 
foreign governments with their central banks and sovereign wealth funds — will not 
continue to accumulate US Treasuries. Is the US likely to enforce policies that will drive 
them away and require a painful current account adjustment? Of course, reciprocity is 
desirable, in the sense that openness to Chinese sovereign wealth fund investment should 
require equivalent Chinese openness to foreign investment. But that is not on offer, and 
the US cannot compel it through the WTO. So will the US treat all Chinese investment as 
it did China National Offshore Oil Corporation? Unlikely. 
One proposal is to limit sovereign wealth fund acquisitions to non-voting shares, in order 
to avoid political interference in business decisions or strategies. Another possible 
restriction would put a cap – say 15-20 % - on their share in any company. But this kind 
of discrimination against one category of foreign investors probably would not get broad 
support among potential host countries. Without such agreement, it is not enforceable – 
host countries will not want to see all the investment go to others. There might, however, 
be broad agreement on a ‘code of conduct’ for sovereign wealth funds, perhaps 
negotiated through the OECD or IMF. This would require transparency: annual or more 
frequent sovereign wealth fund reports on portfolio composition and investment 
strategies. 
We might like to see the sovereign wealth funds behave like institutional investors, or 
better still, do their investment through intermediaries (our asset management firms!). 
But they are more likely to offer good money to their own nationals now working on 
Wall Street or in the City to come back so they can do it well themselves. And they will 
often want not just to take stakes in private equity firms, but to behave like private equity 
firms. The prospects for easy resolution of the foreseeable conflicts are not good. 
This article first appeared in <a href="http://www.realir.net" target="_blank">Real 
IR</a> on 18 September 2007. 
 
 
Portes: Regulating the international financial system: towards a more 
balanced, market-based model 
15 November 2007 
The global financial system shows signs of stress – turmoil, not a systemic financial 
crisis. Risk is being repriced and the unwinding will take some time. Now is the time to 
think carefully about longer-term reforms needed to improve the stability of the 
international financial system.  
The global financial system shows signs of stress, but why should policy-makers care? 
After all, this is financial turmoil, not a systemic financial crisis. There has been no 
failure of a large complex financial institution, nor a widespread decline of asset prices. 
True, many investors lost money and the problems are not over. Risk is being repriced, 
funding vehicles unwound, and liquidity restricted in some markets. But this turmoil 
follows three years of unusually low volatility of short-term interest rates, long-term 
bonds, stocks, exchange rates and corporate spreads (Panetta et al 2006). Financial crisis 
had become less frequent and international financial markets seem quiescent. Markets are 
more complete and market information is more generally available. 
Policy-makers should be concerned precisely because financial markets have been such a 
success. As the complexity and scale of the international finance system grows, so too 
does the downsize risk for the real economy.74  The value of traded assets rose form 1.6 
times to 2.5 times GDP  in the major industrial nations in 15 years. A major bank failure 
or asset price drop now can cause much more disruption than when the financial sector 
was smaller. Moreover, systemic risk in banking has increased in the US and euro area 
(Hartman et al, 2005). 
Whether the subprime problems dwindle away or get fanned into a full-blown crisis, they 
are a wake-up call. We should think carefully about longer-term reforms needed to 
improve the stability of the international financial system. 
New research 
A new Report from CEPR outlines an ambitious agenda for reform that would design 
stability, moving the international financial system towards a more balanced, market-
based model.75 
In many respects, financial markets are better regulated and more stable today than 20 
years ago. For example, the volume of derivatives outstanding and the scale of hedge 
fund activity are at levels unimaginable then, yet the frequency of derivatives disasters 
and large hedge fund failures is no greater. Still, the risks are there: global imbalances, 
                                                 
74 R. Rajan (2005), ‘Has financial development made the world riskier?’, Jackson Hole 
Symposium. 
75 'International Financial Stability', the ninth Geneva Report on the World Economy, 
published on 12 November by CEPR and the International Centre on Money and Banking 
Studies in Geneva. The material is joint work by the authors of the Report: Roger 
Ferguson, Jr., Phillip Hartmann, Fabio Panetta, and Richard Portes. 
the carry trade, asset price bubbles, the rise in household indebtedness, financial 
consolidation and the rise of systemically important financial institutions with extensive 
cross-border reach, and a proliferation of new and often opaque financial instruments 
(associated with the banks’ shift from ‘buy and hold’ to ‘originate to distribute’). Many 
of these risks arise from the rapid pace of financial innovation over the past decade. 
These changes cannot now be reversed, and regulators should not attempt such reversal. 
Instead, the right approach is to make them work properly, by pushing the system 
towards a well-behaved market-based model. 
First, consider some of the much-discussed issues that we believe should not be the focus 
of reform: volatility, hedge funds and the carry trade. 
Recent volatility spikes have not been especially large 
From 2004 until very recently, volatility was exceptionally low across all asset classes 
and markets, and risk premia (yield spreads, premia on credit default swaps) were also 
very low. The Report identifies several structural factors underlying what seems to be a 
secular downward shift in volatility. Some of these factors may, however, tend to 
undermine financial stability. Market liquidity may be higher on average but more 
vulnerable to sudden shifts. Low volatility and low interest rates have led to a search for 
yield that may have encouraged excessive risk-taking. If market prices and portfolio 
choices rest on expectations of low volatility, investors may be vulnerable to volatility 
spikes. Nevertheless, the spikes of May 2006, February/March 2007, and summer 2007 
were not especially large and do not appear to have been a source of financial instability. 
Hedge funds do not seem to have played a significant role 
Many regulators in the US and other major markets believe that the best way to monitor 
hedge fund activity is indirectly, through their sources of funds. Banks must regularly 
assess the creditworthiness of their hedge fund borrowers and counterparties, and brokers 
must actively monitor the positions of hedge funds and manage their exposure to them. 
Regulators have reached no international consensus on the need for further oversight. 
We see no clear benefit from additional regulation. Hedge funds do not seem to have 
played a significant role in setting off the current financial turmoil. Some have suffered 
from it and others have profited, but their problems have had little systemic impact. 
Banks and brokers should share more information about their counterparty exposures to 
hedge funds. Regulators should insist that prime brokers and investors know better the 
positions and strategies of the hedge funds with which they transact. Market participants 
would also benefit from greater emphasis on “tail risk”, which is of particular systemic 
relevance. And a ‘Capital Markets Safety Board’ that investigates, reports and archives 
information on hedge fund (and other financial sector) debacles may likewise offer 
valuable benefits in combating systemic risk. 
Carry trade is unlikely to pose a systemic risk 
Cross-border financial integration has accelerated dramatically over the past fifteen years, 
mainly among industrial countries. That has not, in our view, raised the probability of a 
systemic event. For the particular case of China and India, we find that a domestic 
financial crisis is unlikely to induce strong financial contagion in other major countries. 
The carry trade is another potential source of instability. Its profitability is very sensitive 
to changes in the level and volatility of exchange rates, so it could unwind abruptly, 
especially in a large volatility spike. It seems unlikely, however, that this would pose a 
systemic risk. 
The reform agenda should focus on three issues: 
o large complex financial institutions 
o new financial instruments 
o the consequences of banks’ shifting from a ‘buy and hold’ to ‘originate-to-
distribute’ business model. 
Regulating large complex financial institutions: more central bank cooperation 
needed 
The growing role of large complex financial institutions may have made them ‘too big to 
fail’ — or conversely, ‘too big to rescue’. It also raises the issue of regulatory capture. 
When financial institutions become very large and local markets very concentrated, their 
lobbying power increases significantly. This suggests a potential weakening of market 
discipline, which calls for greater disclosure. Cross-border financial consolidation also 
raises coordination problems for supervisors, regulators, and lenders of last resort. 
Moreover, liquidity pools are more likely now to be international: the evaporation of 
liquidity may quickly extend across borders, while large complex financial institutions 
may access liquidity wherever it may be. This suggests that not only regulators, but also 
the major central banks must cooperate more closely in dealing with liquidity shocks. 
Coping with new financial instruments: some useful lessons from the derivatives 
market 
Given all the benefits from innovative financial instruments, the appropriate question is 
how to make these instruments safer. First, market-driven, but regulatory- and 
supervisory-authority-guided, approaches are necessary for successful financial risk 
management. As new instruments are designed, regulation must keep pace. Second, 
financial risk-management solutions must be global. 
The derivatives market may offer some useful lessons for regulators. During 1993-5, 
there were several major derivatives disasters. But the derivatives market appears safer 
today than it was in the 1990s, even as it has expanded from an already remarkable $12 
trillion by a factor of 30 over the past 15 years. This spectacular growth suggests that 
derivatives are meeting the market test of fulfilling a genuine purpose. Meanwhile, the 
lower frequency of major disasters despite this rapid growth suggests that market 
participants are using derivatives more responsibly. The Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group exemplifies these principles. In the wake of the Long Term Capital 
Management failure, this group of 12 global financial firms examined how to improve 
risk management procedures. Because of its recommendations, firms can now better 
measure their aggregate counterparty risk exposures, documentation standards have 
improved, the use of collateral to mitigate risk has increased, and stress testing 
procedures are commonplace. Also, much progress has been made on documenting the 
backlog of unconfirmed credit derivative trades, increasing the use of electronic trade 
documentation, and improving the settlement protocol. The reforms in the derivatives 
market in the 1990s may offer useful lessons for regulators today. 
Transactions that do not transfer risk should not be treated by regulators as if they 
do 
The business model of banks is evolving from the traditional 'buy and hold' model, in 
which banks are funded with short-term deposits and invest in loans held until maturity, 
to the 'originate to distribute' model, in which banks originate loans and then repackage 
and sell them to other investors, distributing risks throughout the economy. Most of these 
risks are passed to other banks, insurance companies and leveraged investors, who are the 
main buyers of structured finance and credit derivative products. 
The wider distribution of risks within the global financial system offers many potential 
benefits. It makes many assets more liquid, frees additional resources for investment and 
reduces the volatility of asset prices. Because it distributes risk across a diverse universe 
of investors, it should in principle reduce the likelihood of systemic events. Recent 
developments in the US subprime market suggest, however, that the 'originate to 
distribute' model also has weaknesses that might create new forms of risk or magnify 
existing ones. Banks have less incentive to monitor borrowers ex post, although in 
principle they have more incentive to screen them ex ante. They have switched from 
relying on ‘soft information’ and long-term relationships with borrowers to model-based 
pricing. Many of the new instruments are illiquid, and the role of ratings firms in 
evaluating them is highly controversial. There has been a transfer of activity from 
regulated to unregulated investors. To sum up, this model may be more efficient, but 
more complex, with more tail risk, operational risk, and legal risk. This is the area on 
which reforms should focus over the medium-term. 
The shift from 'buy and hold' to the 'originate to distribute' model should not (and 
probably cannot) be reversed. Policy-makers and industry bodies can try to make it work 
better, to push it towards a more balanced, market-based model through reforms that 
include: 
o Regulators and market participants should pay particular attention to “tail risk” 
o New regulations could require originators to retain equity pieces of their 
structured finance products. 
o Regulators need aggregate information on structured finance instrument holdings 
and on the concentration of risk to assist in the regulatory process. 
o Industry bodies should promote product standardisation and accurate pricing in 
the structured finance market. 
o Credit market transactions that do not definitively transfer risk should not be 
treated by regulators or risk managers as if they do. 
o Ratings firms should provide a range for the risk of each instrument rather than a 
point estimate, or should develop a distinct rating scale for structured finance 
products. 
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Portes: Ratings agency reform 
22 January 2008 
Recent financial market troubles highlight a number of problems with the credit ratings 
agencies. This column argues only a few of the proposed policy solutions are likely to be 
both feasible and helpful. 
The recent financial market turbulence has brought credit ratings agencies under fire. 
Finance ministers from Britain, France, Germany and Italy met last Thursday to discuss 
the financial turmoil and strengthening government regulation. There are indeed 
problems with the agencies, but many suggested policy remedies are equally problematic. 
The agencies 
Ratings agencies exist to deal with principal-agent problems and asymmetric 
information.76 Company managers or sovereign finance ministers may seek to mislead 
investors. Requiring a minimum rating can limit the risk for asset owners and guarantors 
if an asset manager would otherwise invest principals’ funds in high-risk assets. The 
agencies help investors overcome their lack of information about the variables that will 
determine whether a borrower will service debt. The agencies are ‘gatekeepers’, like 
auditors, investment analysts, and journalists. But they are more profitable and have 
higher price to earnings ratios and more acute conflicts of interest. 
There are so few ratings agencies77 partly because of network effects, insofar as investors 
want consistency of ratings across issuers. But the natural monopoly characteristics are 
enhanced by the dependence of regulators on ratings, as (for example) formalised in the 
National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations status created in the US in the mid-
1970s and in the Basle 2 regulations. A wide range of investors are required not to hold 
securities whose ratings are below ‘investment grade’, and ratings affect the risk 
weightings of banks’ assets in calculating capital adequacy ratios. The regulators 
determine whether an agency holds this ‘regulatory license’, and this is a barrier to 
entry.78 
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Sophisticated investors, it is said, should have recognized the dangers in the new, 
complex financial instruments, and others should not have invested in them. But the 
regulatory license exists precisely because the regulators do not accept these arguments. 
The problems 
There are several problems associated with the agencies, in terms of both the incentives 
they face and the performance of their roles. There is an apparent conflict of interest most 
acute with structured finance instruments, insofar as an agency may first advise on how 
the construction of a security would affect its rating and then issue a rating that confirms 
its advice — earning two separate fees in the process. This problem has grown hugely: 
44% of Moody’s revenues in 2006 came from its structured finance activities. Moreover, 
there is an apparent incentive (in)compatibility issue: the issuer pays for the rating and 
may shop around for the best deal (a favourable rating), while the agency may be inclined 
to reward an issuer that chooses it over the other agencies. 
The agencies’ performance is also problematic. They are blamed for reacting ex post 
rather than anticipating – the ratings are lagging indicators. Ratings changes may be 
procyclical (an effect that might be accentuated by Basle 2) and may create herd effects, 
magnifying instability. Both were strong criticisms during and after the Asian crisis, and 
Fitch, for example, accepted their validity in their mea culpa of February 1998.79 
The agencies’ data and their models are suspect. In rating residential mortgage-backed 
securities involving subprime mortgages, for example, the agencies used data from an 
extended period of rapidly rising house prices, during which doubtful mortgages had 
been validated as householders’ equity grew. And rating complex structured finance 
instruments on the basis of model simulations may not be helpful when markets become 
disorderly, tail risk materializes, actual correlation risk far exceeds the models’ 
parameters, and the models blow up. Moreover, it may be inappropriate to use the same 
metric to evaluate sovereign risk, corporate bond risk, and complex instruments like 
collateralized debt obligations. In each context, the rating reflects the agency’s estimate 
of the probability of default over a given period — nothing more. It ignores, for example, 
the possibility that the market for the security may become illiquid; and it ignores the 
likely recovery rate if the security defaults. 
Most importantly, a significant literature finds that the agencies simply do not add value 
— the quality of information they provide is often no better than that which a good 
analyst could extract from publicly available data. Detailed studies cast doubt on their 
ability to assess credit quality better than measures based on market spreads or to predict 
major changes.80 
Market characteristics 
There are a number of identifiable sources of these problems. They suggest some 
directions for policy and some constraints on policy. There is a clear public good aspect 
of the information that the agencies provide. Hence there is a free rider problem, and 
payment by the user of the information will be either suboptimal or unenforceable. 
(Nevertheless, until the early 1970s, it was in fact the users of the ratings who paid, by 
subscription.) This aspect gives an efficiency argument for market concentration, which 
eliminates duplication of effort in generating information that will be available to all. 
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The agencies do not take full responsibility for their ratings. In fact, they have 
successfully (so far) maintained legal immunity from malfeasance claims on the ground 
that they are only financial journalists publishing their opinions, which are protected free 
speech. That Moody’s is much more profitable than the Financial Times or the Wall 
Street Journal may suggest, however, that they are in fact earning some rents. In addition 
to a return on their reputational capital, which is what they claim to sell,81  they are also 
selling the ‘regulatory license’ conferred by their roles in the regulatory regime. Doesn’t 
this status make their ‘speech’ rather different from that of a securities analyst or an FT 
columnist? One might also infer rents attributable to the regulatory license from the 
profitability of collateralized debt obligations. After all, these just repackage existing 
securities — the apparent source of ‘value’ is the rating gain. 
Potential policy solutions 
Academics and policy-makers have considered numerous proposals, from nationalising 
the agencies to abolishing official recognition of their ratings. The underlying incentive 
difficulties create a classic ‘mechanism design’ problem, but there is so far no formal 
analysis that could inform policy. And there are no easy answers. 
Officials often support a voluntary code of conduct, since the market participants will 
lobby heavily against anything stronger. But the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions already promulgated a code of conduct at the end of 2004. According to the 
French Autorité des Marchés Financiers, by early 2007 it had been implemented in a 
‘globally satisfactory’ manner. But the AMF still expressed concerns at that time about 
the roles and performance of the agencies in the structured finance markets — and rightly 
so, because the code has no teeth. Voluntary codes cannot solve the incentive problems. 
Some have argued that public goods should have public funding. But there are obvious 
dangers in effectively nationalizing the agencies. A feasible alternative may be reviving 
subscription: a levy on users (investors).82  Some observers suggest that standardization 
of ratings across agencies would be helpful. If that just means using the same notation for 
a given probability of default, it is trivial. Anyone can convert a Moody’s rating into an 
S&P rating. If it means standardizing valuation models, it would eliminate competition 
— not entirely, because the agencies might feed different data into the same model, but 
one would then like to know why the data differ. 
Regulators could require the agencies to provide more information than just a specific 
rating: an assessment of the liquidity characteristics of the instrument, of the likely 
volatility of its market price, etc. But the agencies do not seem well equipped for this — 
‘As a result of unprecedented price volatility, Moody’s has adapted its methodology [for 
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rating structured investment vehicles].’83  That does not say much for Moody’s data 
analysis: in fact, by all measures, volatilities during August 2007 were not significantly 
higher than in May 2006 (for example) and much lower than in autumn 1998. But the 
analytical problems here are formidable. The extensive academic literature on liquidity 
risk and market risk gives little guidance on how to estimate them quantitatively. And the 
underlying conditions change more rapidly than the fundamentals governing default risk, 
so the corresponding ratings would have to adjust frequently. That might confuse 
investors and add to market volatility. 
The agencies should at least, however, provide a range for the risk of each instrument 
rather than a point estimate; or they should develop a distinct rating scale for structured 
finance products.84 
Some propose introducing explicit legal liability for negligence or malfeasance. But this 
is likely to lead to the demise of the agencies — they would get sued out of business. 
Separating rating from consultancy and advisory functions seems obviously desirable, 
and Chinese walls will not do. But forcing the agencies to give up the highly 
remunerative advisory work will be extremely difficult politically. Resistance might 
weaken if the structured finance business disappears, as some suggest it will — but then 
the problem disappears too. 
There should be more competition among agencies: new entrants. Of course we all 
believe in competition, or at least market contestability, but as noted, there are aspects of 
the industry that suggest natural monopoly. And with more agencies, we might see a race 
to the bottom as issuers seek the agency that will rate them most favourably. Some 
observers report that investment banks shopped around for higher ratings in securitising 
subprime mortgages. 
Could not the regulators substitute market valuations (spreads, say) for ratings? The 
agencies maintain that these are too volatile, but one could use a smoothed moving 
average. More important is that many securities effectively have no market — they are 
bought by ‘buy-and-hold’ investors. And many others are fairly illiquid — the average 
number of trades per day for a UK corporate bond is two (three for a euro-denominated 
bond).85 Credit default swap prices might deal with that problem, but that will not help in 
the primary market, which is where the impact of the ratings has been so pronounced in 
the recent period. 
Some suggest eliminating the ‘regulatory license’ by abolishing recognition — that is, 
removing the NRSRO designation and merely requiring agencies to register with the 
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regulators. This would confer no official status on the ratings. It would also vastly 
increase the burden on the regulators — but with increased budgets, they could hire 
people from the agencies (Moody’s has just announced layoffs). This proposal would 
also suppress the role of the ratings in Basle 2. After all the effort put into Basle 2, 
however, the regulators as well as the agencies have strong vested interests in it. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps recent experience will give enough support to the critics to override the political 
and lobbying obstacles to some of the more promising proposals. Without policy 
changes, the structural problems will surely persist. 
 
 
Hildebrand: The challenge of sovereign wealth funds 
21 January 2008 
The rapid growth of sovereign wealth funds risks provoking a protectionist response by 
industrialised countries. Here is the argument that a voluntary code of conduct could 
help avert the problem. 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are not a new phenomenon. With its Caisse des Dépots 
et Consignations, France essentially set up a SWF in 1816!86 But such funds have 
recently grown both in number and size and now exceed the combined assets of hedge 
funds and private equity. Their rapid growth is closely linked to the prevailing global 
macroeconomic imbalances, and that means that SWFs will be around for some time to 
come. Even under the assumption that global imbalances unwind over the next ten years 
and commodity and oil prices revert to long-term averages, these funds will continue to 
deploy substantial financial assets in the global market place. 
The rise in SWFs has undoubtedly brought a number of benefits. One of these has 
become particularly evident recently. Against the backdrop of the current market turmoil, 
SWFs have been a welcome source of capital, strengthening the vulnerable balance 
sheets of some of the world’s largest financial institutions. But they have also given rise 
to considerable political controversy, as their rapid ascent challenges some long-held 
assumptions about how the global economy works.  
Challenges to conventional views 
First, since the early 1980s, we have witnessed broad-based and sustained political 
momentum to deregulate and liberalise economic structures, enhance the role of market 
forces and attempt to reduce the role of governments in the global economy. In this 
context, sovereign wealth funds’ increasing number of sizeable state-sponsored foreign 
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investments in mature economies can be perceived as a challenge to free market forces.87 
Moreover, such investments run the risk of triggering protectionist reactions in the 
recipient countries. 
Second, one of the basic premises of open global capital markets is the idea that capital 
flows freely worldwide in search of investment opportunities that yield optimal risk-
adjusted rates of return. The fact that large and government-controlled investment 
companies make substantial foreign investments in privately owned companies raises 
concerns about the validity of this hypothesis. Specifically, could a government be 
tempted to use its SWF as a financial instrument in pursuit of a particular political 
objective? The mere fact that such questions arise could trigger protectionist policies in 
recipient countries, thus again undermining the proper functioning of free markets. 
Third, as a general rule, capital has historically tended to flow from the core of an 
economic system to its periphery.88 But global capital flows from the periphery to the 
core are clearly on the rise, and sovereign wealth funds play a potentially important role 
in this apparent reversal. The sense that capital is increasingly flowing from the periphery 
to the core is raising a variety of political sensitivities in the core countries. I fear that 
many of these sensitivities will likely be protectionist in nature. 
In my view, the single most important challenge associated with the rise of sovereign 
wealth funds is therefore to ensure that the policy reactions in the recipient countries of 
potential and actual SWF investments do not degenerate into what ultimately amounts to 
financial protectionism. 
Potential policy responses 
How should policy respond to the challenge of SWFs? Proposals and actual policy 
initiatives have varied widely, from calls for increased transparency of funds’ investment 
positions to calls for reciprocity in market access. But there is now considerable political 
momentum behind the idea of a voluntary code of conduct or a set of guidelines for 
SWFs. The effort by the authorities of the largest industrialised countries and the leading 
sovereign wealth funds to jointly develop such guidelines is timely and clearly sensible. 
There is a risk, however, that the efforts will prove counterproductive if the demands 
from the industrialised countries are too ambitious or driven by protectionist motives. 
In my view, a future code of conduct or a set of guidelines must cover two central issues 
if they are to be effective. First, to quell the concerns of recipient countries with respect 
to politically motivated investments, a code of conduct must contain governance 
prescriptions that ensure that SWFs are not driven by political objectives. The 
institutional design of modern central banking may offer some clues as to the appropriate 
form of such prescriptions. Central banks and sovereign wealth funds obviously pursue 
fundamentally different objectives but share the risk of being hijacked by governments 
for political aims. In the case of central banks, this problem has been successfully 
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addressed by the adoption of an institutional design based on two powerful features: a 
clear mandate and statutory independence to pursue it. 
Second, to preclude a resurgence of state ownership in our economies, and to alleviate 
fears about excessive meddling of governments in private companies, SWF guidelines 
need to spell out upper limits to individual investment stakes in foreign private 
companies. Such limits should be set significantly below the typical threshold of a 
controlling minority, let alone an absolute majority. 
As long as a recipient country can be confident that a particular SWF operates in 
accordance with these two guidelines, there is no reason to demand intricate levels of 
portfolio transparency from SWFs. Transparency is unlikely to solve the problems 
outlined here. Indeed, I fear that, in some cases, extensive transparency requirements for 
SWF portfolios could actually end up triggering protectionist reactions in mature 
markets. There is, of course, a host of other reasons why more transparency makes sense 
for sovereign wealth funds. Accountability is clearly one of them. Incidentally, the 
history of central banking suggests that the more independent a central bank becomes in 
pursuing its stated mandate, the clearer becomes its institutional obligation to be 
accountable and thus transparent. The same may turn out to be true for sovereign wealth 
funds. 
Future prospects 
There are a number of difficult questions that need to be addressed before a set of SWF 
guidelines can become operational. What do we mean by a non-political investment 
mandate? How do we gauge to what extent there might or might not be political 
interference in the pursuit of such a mandate? Will there be a need for a referee to 
determine whether a SWF complies with a particular set of guidelines? What happens if a 
SWF initially signs up to a code of conduct but subsequently fails to comply with its 
guidelines? Much work remains to be done and the timeframe is tight. Ideally, a first set 
of guidelines will be agreed upon jointly between the G7 countries and the most 
prominent SWFs by the 2008 spring meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. If well 
designed and agreed upon, such a set of guidelines could serve as a basis for determining 
which sovereign wealth funds will continue to enjoy full market access in mature 
economies. 
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de la Dehesa: How to avoid further credit and liquidity confidence 
crises 
19 October 2007 
Uneven supervision gave an edge to risk takers in some nations on the up side, but the 
pain is being felt all around Europe on the downside. To avoid future crises, all mortgage 
originators should be regulated, banks should have to retain their “equity” or first loss 
risk, the rating agencies should be more transparent and independent, and Europe’s 
coordination failure among national supervisors should be fixed.  
The US banking authorities and the EU finance ministries, central banks and supervisory 
authorities are both trying to design a roadmap to strengthen financial stability and crisis 
prevention after experiencing the effects of present confidence crisis. In principle, the 
best way to try to avoid another credit confidence crisis is just to learn from what went 
wrong in the present one, to make the necessary changes and to develop new policies. By 
now, it seems clear that some market, regulatory and supervisory failures have taken 
place in the last few years of low interest rates and leveraging euphoria that need to be 
addressed. 
Subprime mortgage lending is not new. It has existed for a long time in consumer finance 
both in the US and Europe although subprime mortgage finance is much more important 
in the US. The key to successful subprime lending is to develop a very good credit 
scoring based on data concerning the historical behaviour of borrowers, both collectively 
and individually. These are then applied interest rates for every type of borrower and 
marked high enough to more than compensate for their expected levels of non-
performing loan losses. 
The main problems with subprime mortgage lending in the US have been the following: 
First, half of their originators are agents and brokers, which are not part of a banking 
group and thus fall outside federal banking regulation. Moreover, these agents and 
brokers get paid by commissions based on the number of mortgage loans that they are 
able to sell to households, so that their incentives have nothing to do with the default risk 
involved in the loan, but, on the contrary, the higher the risk of the borrower, the larger 
the commission. 
Second, the other half is originated by banks, which sometime ago tended to hold the 
mortgage for some years in their books, so as to have an incentive to be careful about its 
non-performing risks. But today, both brokers and banks which originate these loans sell 
them very quickly either directly or through another financial intermediary than 
securitizes and sells them to investors, thus losing their traditional incentive to monitor 
their risk. The way these mortgages are securitized is based on pooling thousands of 
mortgages and other loans in an off-balance-sheet vehicle which issues marketable CDOs 
or CLOs representing shares in the pool. 
Third, unlike in most countries in Europe, under the US legal system, subprime mortgage 
loans carry a much higher risk for the lender because there is no legally binding property 
register; the loan does not give the lender the right to repossess the property, regardless of 
who owns house and the repossessing system varies from one state to another. 
Fourth, there are always risk-hungry investors who are ready to invest in higher risk-
higher-yield financial products like the CDOs, but the problem this time is that these 
products are so complex that either they were not able to understand fully what they were 
buying or did not wanted to invest enough on disentangling their supporting models 
before to purchase them. The fact is that even the more sophisticated risk-hungry 
investors (as the hedge funds) did not really know well enough how to value these assets 
and eventually they had to trust the rating given by the independent rating agency 
involved in the securitization. 
Fifth, although securitization is a great innovation which makes it possible for banks to 
extend affordable mortgages to many more households (mainly the low income ones) and 
to small and medium firms, such a complex financially structured products are extremely 
difficult to value and also to rate. In the old times, a triple or double “A” rating was 
usually given to security issued by a highly stable and solvent country or company which 
was quoted daily in an organized market. Today, one of these CDOs can achieve a triple 
or double “A” rating, when they are composed of blocks of different ratings, from 
“senior” (double or triple A) and “mezzanine” (triple B) to “equity” (triple B-, triple C or 
less). 
It looks like “alchemy” but sophisticated mathematical models were supporting this 
ratings based on the fact that, given the large number of loans pooled, their probability of 
default was much less correlated than in the case of one single or several loans, since, in 
principle, it is more unlikely that all default at the same time. Moreover, these structured 
products do not trade and are not quoted in organized markets. They are mostly 
customised to suit different investors, so that they are only sold over the counter. As such, 
their price transparency and market liquidity tend to be extremely low. 
Sixth, the rating agencies have been classifying these products and their different 
tranches with their own models without any apparent problem. However, since last June, 
they have started to downgrade them quickly, given the accelerating rate of non-
performing subprime loans and the progressive falling of average house prices in the US. 
This general and fast downgrading has had a detonating negative effect to the investor’s 
confidence on the real value of these products. This, in turn, has triggered the present 
situation of general uncertainty and lack of liquidity for these and other related products 
collateralized with mortgages and even of other medium and long term loans. 
Credit agencies: charges and counter-charges 
The rating agencies have come under attack for their role in all this. They have a conflict 
of interest (they are paid by the issuer of these products and not by the buyer) and their 
ratings do not seem to have ‘got it right’ at least according today’s market. Even if 
nowadays there are still few transactions, the ABX.HE indexes (January = 100) show 
that, on average, some triple A rated asset backed mortgage structured securities are 
being sold with a loss of 6 percentage points, that double A show a loss of 20 percentage 
points, that single A sell at a loss of 50 percentage points, that triple B show a losses of 
65 percentage points and that triple B minus trade a loss of 70 percentage points. 
The rating agencies have counterattacked by showing that, at the demand of the sellers, 
their ratings were made only on the default risks of these securities, which have been 
downgraded accordingly to the new information appearing in the marketplace, but not on 
their market and or liquidity risks, which are even more complex (and expensive) ratings. 
They argue that it is the present lack of liquidity what makes those securities loose value 
and not so much their probability of default which was rightly captured by their ratings. 
The curious geographical transmission of the crisis 
Another problem is how is it possible that a relatively minor and expected issue (with 
present losses of about $200 billion) arising in the subprime mortgage market in the US, 
has been able to contaminate so many American and European banks and markets. The 
answer is: because of the large proliferation of conduits and SIVs created by them off-
balance-sheet, in order to avoiding regulatory capital consumption, to invest in long-term 
assets, financing them by issuing commercial paper backed by these assets. 
Their basic aim was to borrow short and invest long (as banks always do) in a way that 
was more profitable since it allowed them to lend without “consuming” their regulatory 
capital, i.e. without having the investment ‘on balance sheet’ and therefore counting in 
their loans-to-capital requirements. The volume of conduits created is large (around $600 
billion in the US banks and around $500 billion in European banks).These banking 
conduits did invest in CDOs and CLOs issued by American and other European banks 
which had subprime loans among other better rated corporate and mortgage securities. 
Nevertheless, the main problem with banks in the US and Europe is not only that their 
conduits invested in subprime and other low quality credit structured products, (when 
their assets were meant to be of higher grades) but that, when their asset backed 
commercial paper market financing dried up, the borrow-short-lend-long wheel stopped. 
The conduits have to pay off their short-borrowing positions, but have problems selling 
off their long lending positions. 
This left the banks with two options: take them into their balance sheets, provoking a 
credit crunch, or get enough temporary liquidity from a central bank to refinance them — 
to keep the wheel turning, as it were. The credit crunch in the case of the Euro Area 
banks would not be very large but substantial. The average ratio of regulatory capital to 
total loans is 8% in Euro-Area banks. The total volume of conduits needed to be taken 
into their balance-sheets would absorb only 0.7 percentage points of that ratio, that is, on 
average, they would have to reduce total lending by 8,75% to absorb these conduits. But 
for some banks with lower capital levels the impact would be fairly large. 
Avoiding future crises 
Regulators, supervisors and central banks should try to solve these perverse incentives 
and conflict of interest problems that lead to the crisis. Here are some of the measures 
they should take besides continue to inject liquidity until some confidence is regained: 
First, the American banking authorities should regulate all American agents and brokers 
which are originating these mortgage loans in order to avoid their perverse incentives 
when dealing with their potential borrowers and to try to standardise their property 
registration and collateral execution systems across states. 
Second, all banking supervisors should oblige all banks, which originate and sell loans 
and mortgages, to retain their “equity” or first loss risk block, as it happens today in some 
European countries, in order to make them share part of the risk when they sell them to 
intermediaries or final investors and, therefore, to be much more careful when monitoring 
their credit risks and when choosing the mortgages to be pooled for sale. 
Third, the banks and financial institutions, which structure and securitize these loans, 
should be extremely transparent about their package processes, their supporting models 
and their associated risks. Moreover, they should try to increase the standardization of 
these products up to making them suitable to be traded in an organized and transparent 
market. 
Fourth, the rating agencies should try to regain credibility by showing that they are truly 
independent and that their rating process is fully transparent and reliable, mainly for these 
complex structured products. 
Fifth, in the case of conduit proliferation there has been a major supervisory coordination 
failure, at least in Europe, given that some central banks (as in Spain) have not allowed 
their supervised banks to create these conduits while other supervisors have done so at 
large. It is clear that these conduits have been created mainly by sophisticated wholesale 
banks and not so much by more traditional retail banks, but it is even clearer that in those 
countries where the banking supervision is not done by the central bank, but by another 
government agency or institution, the problem created by conduits has been much larger 
in size and risk involved. The main examples are Germany, the UK and the US (with the 
Netherlands the main exception to this rule). The case in point is probably the UK, where 
the tripartite division of responsibility between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
FSA has complicated to the extreme an, in principle rather easy, sale of Northern Rock to 
another bank, which eventually has ended in an expensive bank run and a bail out. 
This issue is extremely important for two reasons. First, some supervisors in the Euro 
Area without coordinating with their other Euro-Area colleagues or even with their 
central banks, have allowed their supervised banks to develop a competitive advantage 
versus other competing Euro-Area banks, in the same single market, by allowing them to 
create large and highly profitable (but risky) conduits. Second, now, when such decisions 
have proved to be wrong and the conduits are on the verge of producing a credit crunch 
unless they are refinanced by the ECB System, all the rest of banks without conduits in 
the Euro-Area are also suffering the consequences of that decision. Something needs to 
be done about these supervising structures to avoid this lack of coordination in the future. 
 
Persaud: The inappropriateness of financial regulation 
1 May 2008 
Financial regulation never works the way it should. Here one of the world’s most 
experienced analysts of the global financial system presents some remarkably clear 
thinking on why we should not just do more of the same. An alternative model for policy 
action is proposed. 
I have had the misfortune or fortune of being up close and personal with seven major 
financial crises in my banking career, from the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 
1980s to today’s credit crunch. In each crisis I have observed a “cycle” in the response to 
the crisis. In the middle of a crisis, when circumstances look dire and chunks of the 
financial system are falling off, proposals get radical. I recall in December 1992, with the 
UK and Italy having already been ejected from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
and Spain and Portugal looking vulnerable, some European policy makers flirted with 
capital controls. But a few months after each crisis is over, these radical plans are tidied 
away and we are left with three things. And they are always the same three things: better 
disclosure, prudential controls and risk management. 
These measures are the regulatory version of apple pie and ice cream. Who would say 
no? The thing is – we have been investing heavily in these areas for the past twenty years 
and do not have much to show for it in terms of financial stability. Over the past eleven 
years we have had the Asian Financial Crisis, LTCM, the “dotcom bezzle” and now the 
credit crunch. While more disclosure, controls, and risk management are generally good 
things and necessary fraud reducing measures, there are few crises I have known from the 
inside that would not have happened if only there was more disclosure. People knew that 
subprime was a poor risk – it is called subprime, after all. 
Regulatory shortcomings 
The problem is more fundamental, and, unless we address these fundamental issues, we 
will be condemned to repeat the cycle of boom and bust. Lying close to the heart of the 
problem in all of these recent crises, from today’s credit crunch to the Savings and Loans 
debacle and beyond, is the inappropriateness of financial regulation. 
My own view of banking regulation would be considered quaint next to today’s practice. 
I consider the primary objective of intervening in the banking market to be mitigating the 
substantial systemic consequences of market failure in banking. It is therefore puzzling to 
me that market prices are now placed at the heart of modern financial regulation, whether 
in the form of mark-to-market accounting or the market price of risk in risk models. It is 
not clear to me how we can rely on market prices to protect us from a failure of market 
prices. I have discussed this before many times so I will focus on the secondary objective, 
which is to avoid the discouragement of good banking. 
A good bank is one that lends to a borrower that other banks would not lend to because of 
their superior knowledge of the borrower or one that would not lend to a borrower to 
which everyone lends because of their superior knowledge of the borrower. Modern 
regulators believe this is too quaint, and, to be fair, many banks were not any good at it. 
But instead of removing banking licenses from these banks, regulators decided to do 
away with relationship banking altogether and promoted a switch away from bank 
finance to market finance where loans are securitised, given public ratings, sold to many 
investors including other banks, and assessed using approved risk tools that are sensitive 
to publicly available prices. Now, bankers lend to borrowers that everyone else is lending 
to, the outcome of a process where the public price of risk is compared with its historic 
average and a control is applied based on public ratings. 
Market finance 
This switch to market finance improved “search liquidity” in quiet times. Credit risk that 
was previously bundled with market and liquidity risk was separated, priced and traded. 
This has improved the transparency and tradability, but it comes at the expense of 
systemic liquidity in noisy times. 
Almost every economic model will tell you that if all the players have the same tastes 
(reduce capital adequacy requirements) and have the same information (public ratings, 
approved risk-models using market prices) that the system will sooner or later send the 
herd off the cliff edge (Persaud 2000). And no degree of greater sophistication in the 
modelling of the price of risk will get around this fact. In this world, where falling prices 
generate more sell-orders from price-sensitive risk models, markets will not be self-
stabilising but destabilising and the only way to short-circuit the systemic collapse is for a 
non-market actor, like some agent of the tax payer, to come in and buy up assets to put a 
floor under their prices. (I wrote about this liquidity trade-off with some colleagues; 
Laganá et al. 2006) 
Now this is a legitimate model: the marketisation of finance and the resulting 
improvement in search liquidity in quiet times, coupled with direct state intervention in 
the crisis. It is the model we have today. But I venture that it is a highly dangerous model. 
It is expropriation of gains by bankers and socialization of costs by taxpayers. Paying for 
a decade of bank bonuses can be very expensive for the taxpayer and the opportunities 
for moral hazard are enormous. 
An alternative approach 
The alternative model rests on three pillars. The first recognises that the biggest source of 
market and systemic failure is the economic cycle and so regulation cannot be blind and 
deaf to the cycle – it must put it close to the centre. Charles Goodhart and I 
<http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/560http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/
560>  have proposed contra-cyclical charges – capital charges that rise as the market 
price of risk falls as measured by financial market prices – and a good starting point for 
implementation of such charges is the Spanish system of dynamic provisioning 
(Goodhart and Persaud 2008). 
The second pillar focuses regulation on systemically important distinctions, such as 
maturity mismatches and leverage, and not on out-dated distinctions between banks and 
non-banks. Institutions without leverage or mismatch should be lightly regulated – if at 
all – and in particular would not be required to adhere to short term rules such as mark-
to-market accounting or market-price risk sensitivity that contribute to market 
dislocation. Bankers will argue against this, saying that it creates an unlevel playing field, 
but financial markets are based on diversity, not homogeneity. Incentivising long-term 
investors to behave long-term will mean that there will be more buyers when banks are 
forced to sell. 
The third pillar is requiring banks to pay an insurance premium to tax payers against the 
risk that the tax payer will be required to bail them out. If such a market could be created, 
it would not only incentivise good banking and push the focus of regulation away from 
process to outcomes, but it would provide an incentive for banks to be less systemic. 
Today, banks have an incentive to be more systemic as a bail out is then guaranteed. The 
right response to Citibank’s routine failure to anticipate its credit risks is not for it to keep 
on getting bigger so that it can remain too big to fail, but for it to whither away under 
rising insurance premiums paid to tax payers. 
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Leijonhufvud: Bubble, bubble, toil and trouble 
26 October 2007 
Here's some deep thinking on the linkages between monetary policy and financial 
instability. The trouble with inflation targeting in present circumstances is that constant 
inflation gives you no information about whether your monetary policy has hit the 
Wicksellian ‘natural rate’. Inflation targeting might mislead us into pursuing a policy 
that is actively damaging to financial stability. 
Editors’ note: This is shortened version of the author’s Policy Insight “Monetary and 
Financial Stability.” 
As recently as twenty-five years ago, monetary stability in the United States was based 
on the Federal Reserve System’s control of the quantity of money. Financial stability was 
ensured by the comprehensive regulations of the Glass-Steagal act. Today, these 
regulations are gone and a great wave of innovations has entirely changed the financial 
landscape. And we no longer know how one might define the “quantity of money” for 
control purposes. 
In this new environment, price level stability is supposed to be taken care of through 
inflation targeting while financial stability is supposed to take care of itself given the 
many new ways of diversifying and trading risk that have evolved since deregulation. 
Inflation targeting is an adaptive strategy keyed to on movements of the inflation rate. If 
inflation rises, the Central Bank should counter by raising the interest rate. The 
presumption is that, if the inflation rate is low and steady, monetary policy is “just right.” 
Acting on that presumption in a period during which CPI-inflation in the U.S. was 
stabilised largely through the exchange rate policies of major trading partners, the Federal 
Reserve System kept its rate too low for too long. The result has been asset price 
inflation, high leverage ratios in the financial system and widespread deterioration of 
credit standards (See VoxEU, June 27: “The Perils of Inflation Targeting,”  < 
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/322>). This is the legacy with which markets and 
policy makers are now struggling. 
Securitisation and risk transfer instruments were supposed to have made the financial 
world a safer place. But although securitisation dispersed risk away from the banks where 
it used to be concentrated, in the system as a whole there is more of it, it is less 
transparent and we know less about how it is distributed. Losses in the subprime 
mortgage market started to mount already in the Fall of 2006, but it was only after some 
prominent funds failed in late June that the credit crisis became general as the asset-
backed commercial paper and the interbank markets froze up. Suddenly, assets which had 
been eminently marketable at short notice yesterday had no ascertainable market value 
today in the total absence of buyers. Three months later the panic that gripped Wall Street 
has eased but much toil and trouble remain before the overall size of losses and their final 
distribution are worked out. 
There has been much brave talk about the “real economy” still going strong as if finance 
were no more than froth on its surface. But if the economy has to go through a period of 
substantial de-leveraging, as seems more than plausible, a recession is inevitable. If 
everyone, on average, tried to buy less and sell more in order to reduce indebtedness, the 
result has to be excess supply of goods and services, falling prices and rising 
unemployment. 
Beyond the immediate prospects, Central Banking doctrine needs to be reconsidered. 
What recent experience has now demonstrated is that a monetary policy, which succeeds 
in keeping the CPI inflation rate on target, may still do damage. But many adherents of 
inflation targeting have been adamant that central banks should not let themselves be led 
astray by asset prices since what is or is not a bubble cannot be known in advance of it 
actually popping. (Is deterioration in credit quality equally ambiguous, one wonders? Or 
might ninja loans be at least a clue?) This attitude is strongly reinforced by the political 
pressures on policy makers. When a bubble is inflating, all the institutions and 
individuals who see themselves getting rich will oppose any Central Bank attempt to 
deflate it – with no countervailing interest of political consequence on the other side. 
After the bubble has burst, however, the political pressures are all for the Bank to pick up 
the pieces. 
This political asymmetry is all the worse because of the economy’s asymmetric response 
to policy. It is easy to feed a bubble but very hard to reflate it once it has burst. 
Greenspan managed to reflate after the dot.com bust, but Japan’s inability to do so for so 
many years after its double crash in 1990 is a more ominous example. 
A further exacerbating factor is the cyclical asymmetrical response of the major financial 
institutions. Risk managers lose influence on the upswing and only regain it after a bust. 
No big exogenous shock set the current crisis in motion. What this almost certainly 
means is that the occurrence of crises is an endogenous property of the world financial 
system as we have let it evolve over the last twenty-some years. The various asymmetric 
responses noted above would tend to impart this kind of behaviour to the system. The 
summer of 2007 experience will no doubt induce some regulatory changes. But it is safe 
to assume that they will be of marginal significance—which means that we have other 
crises coming down the pike towards us. 
 
 
De Grauwe: There is more to central banking than inflation targeting 
14 November 2007 
Inflation targeting proponents view central banks’ responsibilities as minimalist. But the 
subprime crisis shows that central banks cannot avoid taking responsibilities that include 
the prevention of bubbles and the supervision of all institutions that are in the business of 
creating credit and liquidity. 
The credit crisis that hit the world economy in August teaches us many lessons about the 
workings of integrated financial markets. It also teaches us a lesson about the 
responsibilities of central banks.89 
Until the eruption of the credit crisis, the consensus view was that central banks should 
target inflation, and that’s pretty much all they should do.90 In this view, central banks 
should not target (or try to influence) asset prices, either - as was stressed by Alan 
Greenspan - because central banks cannot recognise bubbles ex ante, or - if they can - the 
macroeconomic consequences of bubbles and crashes are limited as long as central banks 
keep inflation on track. Inflation targeting, we were told, is the new 'best practice' central 
banking that makes it unnecessary for central bankers to try to influence asset prices.91 
                                                 
89 This is an expanded version of a Financial Times column published on November 2, 
2007. 
90 An influential paper making the case that central banks should not try to influence asset 
prices is Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (2001), Should Central Banks Respond to 
Movements in Asset Prices?, American Economic Review, May, pp. 253-57. Although 
this has become the consensus view, there are prominent dissenting views also. An 
example is Cecchetti, S., H. Genberg, J. Lipsky and S. Wadhwani (2000): Asset Prices 
and Central Bank Policy, Geneva Report on the World Economy 2, CEPR and ICMB. 
Among the major central banks it is remarkable that the ECB has defended the view that 
central banks should lean against the wind when asset bubbles arise, (see Monthly 
Bulletin, April 2005). 
91 Proponents of this view have argued that flexible inflation targeting that takes a 
sufficiently long term perspective is sufficient to deal with asset bubbles, i.e. flexible 
The credit crisis has unveiled the fallacy of this hands-off view. If the banking system 
were insulated from the asset markets, the view that monetary policies should not be 
influenced by what happens in asset markets would make sense. In that case, asset 
bubbles and crashes would only affect the non-banking sector, and a central bank is not in 
the business of insuring private portfolios. 
The problem that we have seen in the recent crisis is that the banking sectors were not 
insulated at all from movements in the asset markets.  Banks were heavily implicated 
both in the development of the bubble in the housing markets, and its subsequent crash. 
And since the banking system was heavily implicated, the central banks were also heavily 
involved by the very fact that they provide insurance to the banks in the form of the 
lender of last resort. Some may wish that central banks would abstain from supplying this 
insurance. Economic theory, however, tells us that central banks should intervene to 
provide liquidity if the liquidity crisis risks disrupting the payments system, thereby 
hurting many “innocent bystanders”. In addition, reality ensures that central banks are 
forced to provide liquidity when a crisis erupts, as they are the only institutions capable 
of doing so. 
Thus, when asset prices experience a bubble, it should be a matter of concern for the 
central bank because the bubble will be followed by a crash, and that’s when the balance 
sheet of the central bank will inevitably be affected. It is not reasonable for a central bank 
to argue that asset bubbles and crashes should not be a source of concern and therefore 
that it should not try to intervene when a bubble arises, when it knows that the bubble 
will have large implications for its future balance sheet, and its profits and losses. 
There is a second reason why the hands-off approach has been shown to be wanting. 
During the last few years, a significant part of liquidity and credit creation has occurred 
outside the banking system. Hedge funds and special conduits have been borrowing short 
and lending long, and as a result, have created credit and liquidity on a massive scale, 
thereby circumventing the supervisory and regulatory framework. As long as this 
liquidity creation was not affecting banks, it was not a source of concern for the central 
bank. However, banks were heavily implicated. Thus, the central bank was implicitly 
extending its liquidity insurance to institutions outside the regulatory framework. It is 
unreasonable for a central bank to insure activities of agents over which it has no 
oversight, very much as it would be unreasonable for an insurance company selling fire 
insurance not to check whether the insured persons take sufficient precautions against the 
outbreak of fire. 
Policy implications 
So, what can be done about this? There are two possible solutions. The first one is for the 
central bank to recognise that asset bubbles are a source of concern and that it should act 
upon the emergence of such a bubble. The argument that a bubble can never be 
recognised ex ante is a very weak one. One had to be blind not to see the bubble in the 
US housing market, or the internet bubble. And this is the case for most asset bubbles in 
                                                                                                                                                 
inflation-targeting can be  tailored  in such a way that the longer-run consequences of 
asset prices are taken into account when setting interest rates. (see Charles Bean, Asset 
Prices and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Australia, Nov. 2003) 
history. When asset prices increase at a rate of 20% or more per year, and when credit 
aggregates increase by similar percentages in a sustained way during several years, one 
can be pretty sure that a bubble is on the move, and that a crash is imminent. 
It has been argued that even if central banks can detect bubbles, they are pretty much 
powerless to stop them. This argument is not very convincing. It is not inherently more 
difficult to stop asset bubbles than it is to stop inflation. And central banks have been 
very successful at stopping inflation. 
This is not an argument to target asset prices. Few economists today would make that 
argument. What is possible, however, is a “leaning against the wind” approach, whereby 
the emergence of a bubble leads the central bank to tighten policy more than it would do 
otherwise.  This was in fact proposed by the ECB in its Monthly Bulletin of April 2005. 
Second, central banks should be involved in the supervision and regulation of all 
institutions that create credit and liquidity. The UK approach of dissociating monetary 
policy from banking supervision has not worked. Central banks are the only insurers 
against liquidity risks. Therefore they are the ones who should control those who create 
credit and liquidity. Failure to do so will continue to induce agents to create excessive 
amounts of liquidity, endangering the financial system. 
The fashionable inflation targeting view is a minimalist view of the responsibilities of a 
central bank. The central bank cannot avoid taking more responsibilities beyond inflation 
targeting. These responsibilities include the prevention of bubbles and the supervision of 
all institutions that are in the business of creating credit and liquidity. 
 
 
 
Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach: Can monetary policy really be used to 
stabilise asset prices? 
12 March 2008 
Many observers have argued that central banks should use monetary policy to prevent 
the rise of asset price bubbles. Recent research shows that monetary policy is too costly 
and too slow to serve such a role. 
The subprime crisis and falling property prices in the US and elsewhere have put central 
banks back in the firing line.92 Many commentators are noting that asset price booms, in 
particular those affecting residential property prices, have triggered many previous 
episodes of financial instability (Ahearne et al. 2005, Goodhart and Hofmann 2007). 
Thus, the argument goes, the most recent developments provide additional evidence that 
central banks should react proactively to asset prices movements, and do so “over and 
                                                 
92 The views expressed are our own and are not necessarily shared by the Swiss National 
Bank. 
beyond” what these imply for aggregate demand and inflation (Borio and Lowe 2002, 
Cecchetti et al. 2000). 
Of course, conducting monetary policy in this way is not easy. In addition to the fact that 
the central bank must form a view of whether a particular asset price increase is 
dangerous or not, it requires monetary policy to have predictable effects on asset prices. 
Furthermore, the size of interest rate movements required to prevent a bubble from 
developing must not be so large as to cause output and inflation to fall substantially 
below the central bank’s objectives for them (Bean 2004, Bernanke 2002, Kohn 2006). 
Finally, the effects of monetary policy on different asset prices must occur at about the 
same speed, since otherwise policy-makers will have to choose between which precise 
asset prices they wish to stabilise. 
While these issues are all eminently empirical, somewhat surprisingly they do not appear 
to have a prominent role in policy discussions of this issue. In a forthcoming CEPR 
discussion paper, we seek to address them by studying the responses of real residential 
property prices and real equity prices, the price level and the level of real GDP to 
monetary policy shocks using a panel of 17 OECD countries — Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US — over the period 1986 - 2006. 
In our paper we disregard differences across countries and focus instead on the average 
responses of the economies to an unexpected tightening of monetary policy.93 
Responses to monetary policy 
Of course, it is important to be clear about what we mean by such a monetary policy 
shock. There is much agreement that in setting interest rates, central banks react to 
current inflation and the current state of the business cycle. By contrast, and barring 
exceptional circumstances, monetary policy responds to asset prices only over time if 
they are seen to diverge from the levels with which the central bank feels comfortable. 
We therefore view contemporaneous comovements between interest rates and the price 
level, and interest rates and real GDP, as reflecting reactions by the central bank to these 
variables, and contemporaneous comovements in interest rates and asset prices as 
reflecting market reactions to monetary policy news. 
Figure 1 analyses the effects of a 100 basis points increase in interest rates. Note that 
after about 8 quarters, interest rates have declined but remain about 35 basis points above 
their initial level. After 12 quarters, they have fallen further to a level some 10 basis 
points above the starting point. Overall, the increase in interest rates will dissipate in 
about three years. 
Figure 1. Responses to a monetary policy shock 
                                                 
93 Technically, we discuss the results from estimates of a panel VAR. The working paper 
contains information about the choice of data and the estimation approach. 
 
Turning to real property prices, we note that these start to fall in response to the 
tightening of monetary policy. After 16 quarters, they reach a bottom of about 2.6% 
below the initial level and then start to return gradually to their starting level. Overall, 
property prices react quite slowly to monetary policy actions. 
Next we consider the responses of real GDP.94 The figure shows that it also reaches a 
trough after 16 quarters, when it is some 0.8% below its initial level.95 Thus, the 
responses of real GDP are almost exactly 1/3 of those of real property prices.96 This is an 
important finding. To see why, suppose that monetary policy makers come to believe that 
a real property price bubble of 15% has developed, and decide to tighten monetary policy 
in order to bring down asset prices. In doing so, the average central bank in the 17 
countries we study should also expect to depress the level of real GDP by 5%, a truly 
massive amount. 
Finally, we consider the responses of real equity prices. Interestingly, these fall by about 
2% —or almost as much as real property prices — but do so immediately. After 16 
                                                 
94 We do not discuss the impact on policy on the level of prices (which is negative but 
small) since it is well known that the econometric technique we use is likely to 
underestimate the impact of policy on prices. This could occur because the way in which 
we “identify” monetary policy shocks, which is standard, neglects any reactions by 
central banks to forecasts of future inflation. 
95 The responses of output are somewhat more persistent than those typically found in the 
literature but comparable to those obtained when estimating individual country VARs on 
the same data set. The higher persistence is likely due to the fact that panel estimates are 
less susceptible to idiosyncratic noise in the data. 
96 We emphasise that the finding that real GDP responds 1/3 as much as real property 
prices does not depend on the exact assumptions we made about monetary policy when 
constructing the graph. 
quarters, when real property prices reach their trough, real equity prices are less than 
0.5% below their initial level. The finding that property and equity prices react at very 
different speeds is important since it implies that central banks cannot stabilise both. This 
is yet another reason why we believe that the idea of using interest rate policy to forestall 
asset prices bubbles is not practicable. 
Conclusions 
Whatever merits such a stabilisation policy has in theory, our research suggests that in 
practice, monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to be used to target asset prices — 
the effects on real property prices are too small, given the responses of real GDP, and 
they are too slow, given the responses of real equity prices. In particular, there is a risk 
that setting monetary policy in response to asset price movements will lead to large 
output losses that exceed by a wide margin those that would arise from a possible bubble 
burst. 
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Buiter & Sibert: A missed opportunity for the Fed 
18 August 2007 
The Fed’s 17-8-07 move was a missed opportunity. It should have effectively created a 
market by expanding the set of eligible collateral, charging an appropriate "haircut" or 
penalty interest rate, and expanding the set of eligible borrowers at the discount window 
to include any financial entity that is willing to accept appropriate prudential supervision 
and regulation. 
In response to the credit and liquidity crunch that has recently spooked global financial 
markets the Federal Reserve reduced, on Friday 17 August 2007, its primary discount 
rate from 6.25 percent to 5.75 percent. The discount rate is the rate that the Fed charges 
eligible financial institutions for borrowing from the Fed against what the Fed deems to 
be eligible collateral. It is normally 100 bps above the target Federal Funds rate, which is 
the Fed's primary monetary policy instrument and which is currently 5.25 percent. We 
believe that this cut in the discount rate was an inappropriate response to the financial 
turmoil. 
The market failure that prompted this response was not that financial institutions are 
unable to pay 6.25 percent at the discount window and survive (given that they have 
eligible collateral). The problem is that banks and other financial institutions are holding 
a lot of assets which are suddenly illiquid and cannot be sold at any price. That is, there is 
no longer a market that matches willing buyers and sellers at a price reflecting economic 
fundamentals. Lowering the discount rate does not solve this problem; it just provides a 
50 bps subsidy to any institution able and willing to borrow at the discount window.  
What the Fed should have done 
Instead of lowering the price at which financial institutions can borrow, provided they 
have suitable collateral, the Fed should have effectively created a market by expanding 
the set of eligible collateral and charging an appropriate “haircut” or penalty. 
Specifically, it should have included financial instruments for which there is no readily 
available market price to act as a benchmark for the valuation of the instrument for 
purposes of collateral. 
There is no apparent legal impediment to doing this.97 Allowable collateral includes a 
wide range of government and private securities, including mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 allows the Federal Reserve to 
lend, in a crisis, to just about any institution, organisation or individual, and against any 
just about any collateral the Fed deems fit. Specifically, if the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System determines that there are “unusual and exigent circumstances” 
and at least five out of seven governors vote to authorize lending under Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve can discount for individuals, partnerships 
                                                 
97 See our 13 August 2007 Vox column for details. < 
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/459>  Also see David H. Small and James A. Clouse 
(2004), "The Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized under the Federal Reserve 
Act", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Paper Series - FEDS 
Papers 20004-40, July. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=622342. 
and corporations (IPCs) ”notes, drafts and bills of exchange ... indorsed or otherwise 
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank...”. The combination of the 
restriction of “unusual and exigent circumstances” and the further restriction that the 
Federal Reserve can discount only to IPCs “unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions”, fits the description of a credit 
crunch/liquidity crisis like a glove. 
How to avoid planting the seeds of the next crisis  
It is of course essential that ‘moral hazard’ be minimised.98 This 'bail out' of the illiquid 
by the Fed should be sufficiently costly that those paying the price would still remember 
it during the next credit boom, and act more prudently. Second, where no market price is 
available, the Fed should base its valuation on conservative assumptions about the 
creditworthiness of the counterparty and the collateral offered by the counterparty. They 
counterparty should not expect to get 90 cents on the dollar for securities that it could not 
find a willing private taker for at any price. Third, the highest 'liquidity haircut' in the 
Fed's arsenal should be applied to this conservative valuation.  
The Fed should also enlarge the set of eligible counterparties at the discount windows. 
This should not just be banks and other depository institutions, but any financial entity 
that is willing to accept appropriate prudential supervision and regulation. The nature of 
the supervision and regulation required will differ depending on the nature of the 
institution. Hedge funds or private equity funds need different prudential regulation from 
depository institutions, investment banks or pension funds. At the very minimum, 
however, transparency grounded in comprehensive reporting obligations should be 
required of any institution eligible to use the discount window. 
The wisdom of leaving the monetary policy rate untouched 
At least the Fed did not cut the monetary policy rate (the Federal Funds target which 
remains at 5.25%). A cut in the Federal Funds target is warranted only if the Fed were to 
believe that the recent financial market kerfuffles are likely to have a material negative 
effect on real activity in the US or on the rate of inflation.  There is no evidence as yet to 
support such a view. If and when it happens, the Fed should act promptly. But addressing 
the problem of illiquid financial markets using the blunt instrument of monetary policy, a 
cut in the monetary policy rate, would be clear confirmation that the Fed is concerned 
about financial markets over and above what these markets imply for the real economy. 
Such regulatory capture would effectively redirect the 'Greenspan put' from the equity 
markets in general to the profits and viability of a small number of financial institutions. 
It would not be a proper use of public money.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Here is one definition of <a 
href="http://www.thefreedictionary.com/moral+hazard">moral hazard 
  
Buiter & Sibert: The Central Bank as the Market Maker of last Resort: 
From lender of last resort to market maker of last resort 
13 August 2007 
Last week's actions by the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of Japan were not particularly 
helpful – a classic example of trying to manage a credit crisis or liquidity squeeze using 
the tools suited to monetary policy-making in orderly markets. Monetary policy is easy; 
preventing or overcoming a financial crisis is hard; managing the exit from a credit 
squeeze without laying the foundations for the next credit and liquidity explosion is 
harder still. Central bankers should earn their keep by acting as market makers of last 
resort. 
When banks were the main providers of credit, the financial stability mandate of central 
banks could be summarised as their lender of last resort function: in times of crisis, lend 
freely, at a penalty rate and against collateral that would be good in normal times but may 
be impaired in times of crisis. The counterparties of the central bank in these lender of 
last resort operations were commercial banks (shorthand for deposit-taking institutions 
whose main liabilities were deposits withdrawable on demand and subject to a sequential 
service (first-come, first served) constraint. Their main assets were illiquid loans. This 
financial structure invited bank runs when confidence in the banks was undermined, for 
whatever reason. In the days when banks were the dominant intermediaries, a credit 
crunch or liquidity squeeze manifested itself in the inability of banks to borrow; a lender 
of last resort that targeted banks was the right vehicle for dealing with liquidity crises and 
credit squeezes in that set-up. 
These days are gone in the globally integrated modern financial systems characterising all 
advanced industrial countries and an increasing number of emerging markets.  
Today, external finance to non-financial corporations and to financial institutions is 
increasingly provided not through banks but through the issuance of tradable financial 
instruments directly to the financial markets or indirectly to the financial markets through 
banks and other financial institutions whose assets are, thanks to securitisation and 
similar techniques, liquid in normal times.  Now that financial markets (and non-bank 
financial institutions) have increasingly taken over the function of providing credit and all 
forms of finance to deficit spending units, a credit crunch or liquidity crunch manifests 
itself in a different way from the world described by Walter Bagehot’s lender of last 
resort (see Walter Bagehot (1873), Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market).  
Today, a credit crunch or liquidity squeeze manifests itself as disorderly financial 
markets. Because of pervasive Knightian uncertainty (risk that is perceived as 
immeasurable and not possible to calculate or quantify), fear and in the limit, panic, little 
or no trade occurs in certain classes of financial instruments (say subprime mortgage-
backed ‘collateralised debt obligations’ CDOs) because there is no market maker with 
both the knowledge to price these financial instruments and the deep pockets to credibly 
post buying and selling prices. The precise way in which such micro-market failure (the 
failure to match willing buyers and sellers at prices acceptable to both) occurs differs for 
exchange-traded instruments and over-the-counter financial instruments (instruments for 
which bilateral bargaining over a deal is the normal exchange mechanism), but the 
solution is the same: the central bank has to become the market maker of last resort. 
The mechanics of the market maker of last resort function 
The market maker of last resort function can be fulfilled in two ways. First, outright 
purchases and sales of a wide range of private sector securities. Second, acceptance of a 
wide range of private sector securities as collateral in repos, and in collateralised loans 
and advances at the discount window.  
Outright purchases and sales of illiquid private sector securities 
The first and most direct way to discharge the market maker of last resort function is 
through open market operations in a much wider range of financial instruments, 
especially private sector securities, than central banks normally are willing to trade in. 
Open market operations here means outright sales and purchases of financial instruments 
(i.e. not collateralised loans or advances).  
As regards making markets in private sector securities during times of crisis, central 
banks appear to have moved in the opposite direction to what the logic of financial 
system development would suggest. Since 1933, “…the Federal Reserve has gradually 
narrowed the scope of securities that it purchases (or with which it conducts repurchase 
agreements in the open market” (David H. Small and James A. Clouse (2004), “The 
Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized under the Federal Reserve Act”, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Paper Series - FEDS Papers 20004-
40,July; this is also the source from which the information on the Fed’s eligible 
counterparties and eligible securities is taken; see also the Federal Reserve Act 
itself). There have been no purchases of state or local government debt since 1933 and of 
bankers’ acceptances since 1977. Repos using bankers’ acceptances were discontinued in 
1984. Outright purchases of US agency debt ceased in 1981. Effectively, outright 
purchases and sales in the open market have in recent decades been restricted to gold and 
foreign exchange, and securities issued or guaranteed by the US Federal government and 
certain US government agencies. 
For outright sales and purchases in the open market to be effective instruments with 
which to address a credit crunch, the Federal Reserve should be able to buy and sell 
outright a range of private sector credit instruments. The private instruments explicitly 
authorised for outright purchase and sale by the Federal Reserve Act are bankers 
acceptances and bills of exchange that meet certain “real bills criteria”, derived from a 
now defunct, at best irrelevant, and in most of its versions internally inconsistent theory 
of credit and money. However, while the Federal Reserve Act contains no language 
authorising the Federal Reserve to purchase corporate bonds, bank loans, mortgages, 
credit-card receivables or equities, it also does not forbid it. After all, the Federal Reserve 
Act also does not authorise the sale or purchase of options, yet the Fed of New York sold 
options on overnight repo transactions with exercise dates around the 1999 year-end, to 
forestall any Y2K problems.  
The history of the ECB, which did not start operations until January 1, 1999 is short. Its 
legislative mandate and operating practices are less encumbered by history than those of 
the Fed.  
The ECB accepts, in principle, a very wide range of both marketable and non-marketable 
assets both for outright purchase and as collateral in repos or collateralised loans (see, 
European Central Bank (2006), The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area, September 2006; General Documentation on Eurosystem Monetary Policy 
Instruments and Procedures, ISSN 1725-714X (print), ISSN 1725-7255 (online)). The list 
of eligible instruments for outright open market operations (and the criteria for 
establishing that list) is effectively the same as that for instruments eligible as collateral 
in repos and discount window operations.  
Among the marketable instruments it accepts are, for instance, many asset-backed 
securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). As counterparties, it accepts 
central banks, public sector entities, private sector entities, or international or 
supranational institutions. The issuer must be established in the EEA or in one of the non-
EEA G10 countries (this includes the USA, Canada, Japan and Switzerland).  
There are some strange restrictions. For instance, in the case of ABS, the “cash flow-
generating assets backing the asset-backed securities must “… not consist, in whole or in 
part, actually or potentially, of credit-linked notes or similar claims resulting from the 
transfer of credit risk by means of credit derivatives.” (ECB(2006)). Why credit risk, or 
derivatives based on credit risk would be treated differently from market risk, and 
derivatives based on market risk, is a deep mystery. Functionally, risk is risk; as long as it 
can be priced, it is fungible. 
There is also the rather wimpish restriction that the debt instrument must be denominated 
in euro, which means that it cannot be helpful to BNP Paribas in establishing a market for 
the (presumably dollar-denominated) CDOs backed by pools of US subprime mortgages. 
Why would the ECB wish to avoid collateral denominated in currencies other than the 
euro? Exchange rate risk can be hedged. Whether it ought to be hedged, or to what 
extent, should depend not on the currency composition of the balance sheet of the ECB, 
but on the contribution of the currency risk of the entire financial system of the Eurozone 
to the optimal risk-return combination of that financial system – of which currency risk 
and return are but one component. Clearly, the ECB should accept collateral denominated 
in currencies other than the euro if it takes its systemic stability role seriously. 
The minimum credit rating it requires for eligible securities is A (that is, nothing below 
A-). This could be quite restrictive in a liquidity crunch/credit crisis. On the other hand, if 
the three leading rating agencies could convince themselves (and the markets) that the 
higher tranches of CDOs secured against a pool of subprime home mortgages could be 
rated AAA, there might be no lower bound to the credit worthiness of instruments rated 
A. Even so it would seem desirable to permit central banks, under exceptional and 
extreme circumstances, to accept as collateral for rediscounting, loans, advances or repos, 
financial instruments with any credit rating or unrated (junk) securities, provided they are 
appropriately priced and have appropriate haircuts applied to them. 
Fortunately, the list of eligible counterparties and eligible instruments for the ECB and 
the ESCB is not fixed by law. It is decided by the ECB’s Governing Council and can be 
changed at the drop of the collective hat.  We would argue that the hat has dropped and 
that, in extremis, the ECB should consider the broadest possible set of counterparties and 
the most unrestricted possible set of eligible financial instruments.  
The practical implementation of the market maker of last resort function can be done in 
many different ways. In the simplest case, the central bank could announce that for the 
next N trading hours/days, it would buy at least X amount of a given type of credit-
impaired, illiquid security with a risk-free price P, at a price P1 < P and/or sell at most Y 
amount of that security at a price P2 > P1. The discount relative to the risk-free price and 
bid-ask spread P2 – P1 would reflect the central bank’s assessment of the risk 
fundamentals and of the penalty required to avoid moral hazard. Note that both the 
selling price and the buying price set by the central bank would be set without the benefit 
of a contemporaneous market price for the security.  
Acceptance of illiquid private securities as collateral for repos and at the discount 
window 
The second way for the central bank to act as a market maker of last resort is to accept 
illiquid private securities as collateral for repos and at the discount window. This, 
indirectly, requires the central bank to establish a valuation of these securities. By 
engaging in both repos and reverse repos for the same illiquid private financial 
instruments, the central bank could establish the same implicit buying and selling prices 
P1 and P2 as it can through outright purchases and sales of these instruments. In the case 
of repos, which would, in the simplest case, be at the policy rate of interest set by the 
central bank, the penalty component of the contract would be determined both by the 
relationship of P1 and P2 to the risk-free price, and by the 'haircuts' (additional liquidity 
discounts) applied to these valuations by the central bank.  
For the ECB, this should be but a small step, because the ECB already accepts non-
marketable assets as collateral in repos and collateralised loans, specifically credit claims 
and non-marketable retail mortgage-backed debt instruments. Extending the scope of 
assets eligible as collateral to assets that are marketable under normal conditions but have 
become non-marketable owing to the disorderly markets characteristic of extreme credit 
crunches and liquidity crises should be simple.  
It is clear the Federal Reserve Act permits the Fed, under unusual and exigent 
circumstances, to lend or repo against any collateral, including dead dogs and illiquid 
CDOs backed by subprime mortgages.  
The lender of last resort function and the discount window 
While the market maker of last resort function is a defining function of the modern 
central bank, the traditional lender of last resort function can also be relevant in the 
resolution of a crisis.  Repos are collateralised open market operations; we define the 
lender of last resort function as bilateral transactions between the central bank and a 
private counterparty at the discount window. With the diminished importance in the 
financial system of banks and similar deposit-taking institutions, it is important that the 
central bank be able to exercise this function also vis-à-vis a wider range of 
counterparties, and against a richer array of collateral than that traditionally offered by 
commercial banks.  
Eligible counterparties and eligible securities in a crisis 
Fortunately, the Federal Reserve Act (1913) allows the Federal Reserve to lend, in a 
crisis, to just about any institution, organisation or individual, and against any collateral 
the Fed deems fit. Specifically, if the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
determines that there are “unusual and exigent circumstances” and at least five (out of 
seven) governors vote to authorise lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act, the Federal Reserve can discount for individuals, partnerships and corporations 
(IPCs) “notes, drafts and bills of exchange indorsed or otherwise secured to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank …”. The combination of the restriction of 
“unusual and exigent circumstances” and the further restriction that the Federal Reserve 
can discount only to IPCs “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking institutions”, fits the description of a credit crunch/liquidity crisis like a glove.  
It is, of course, key that such (re)discounting be at a penalty rate and against collateral 
deemed adequate by the central bank. The Fed’s discount window has three different 
facilities and associated rates; the benchmark primary credit rate currently stands at 
6.25%, 1.00% above the Federal Funds target rate; the secondary and seasonal credit 
rates exceed the primary rate. The ECB’s Marginal Lending Facility currently charges a 
5.00% rate, also 1.00% above the ECB policy rate, the Main Refinancing Operations 
Minimum Bid Rate, which stands at 4.00%. Financial instruments eligible for collateral 
in discount operations (or repos) are valued at their market prices and a 'haircut' is applied 
to them. 
The combination of the 100bps extra cost of the discount window over the policy rate and 
the haircut would be a sufficient incentive not to abuse the discount window if there were 
a meaningful market price at which the securities offered as collateral could be valued. 
Of course, in a crisis, such market prices cannot be found. This is where the job of the 
central bank becomes difficult, politically contentious and of vital importance. In its 
discount window operations during crisis times, that is, when acting as lender of last 
resort to some institution or IPC, the central bank will also often have to act as market 
maker of last resort because it will have to value financial instruments for which no 
meaningful market price is available. 
How have central banks managed liquidity crises and credit crunches? 
When acting as market maker of last resort, as when acting as lender of last resort, the 
central bank inevitably plays a central role in assessing and pricing credit risk; through 
this, the central bank will have a profound influence on the allocation of credit in the 
economy (see Small and Clouse (2004)). While the central bank should not be in this 
business during ordinary times, when markets are orderly and price formation and price 
discovery proceeds without the direct intervention of the central bank, it cannot avoid 
being in this business when markets are disorderly and fail to match buyers and sellers of 
securities.  
Central banks have not been doing the job of market maker of last resort effectively, 
indeed they have barely been doing it at all. Following the stock market collapse of 1987, 
the Russian default of 1998 and the tech bubble crash of 2001, all that the key monetary 
authorities have done is (1) lower the short risk-free interest rate and (2) provide vast 
amounts of liquidity against high-grade collateral only, and nothing against illiquid 
collateral. The result has been that the ‘resolution’ of each of these financial crises 
created massive amounts of high-grade excess liquidity that was not withdrawn when 
market order was restored and provided the fuel that would produce the next credit boom 
and bust. By focusing instead on illiquid collateral, it should have been possible to 
achieve the same effect with a much smaller injection of liquidity. 
The incipient financial crunch of mid-2007 has not, thus far, been met with interest rate 
cuts by any of the key central banks – the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Bank 
of England. That is just as well, because there is, as yet, nothing excessive about the level 
of the (default-) risk-free short nominal interest rate levels in the US, the Eurozone, Japan 
or the UK. A credit crunch is the time for central banks to start worrying about the next 
credit boom. Lowering the risk-free rate is not the solution to any credit crunch/liquidity 
crisis problem. It only encourages further borrowing and leverage by those already 
excessively prone to such acts. 
The problems we are seeing today are the result of four to five years of (1) excessively 
low risk-free interest rates at all maturities in the US, Euroland and Japan, and (2) 
ludicrously low credit risk spreads across the board (not just in the subprime mortgage 
markets). 
These two asset market anomalies resulted in many highly leveraged open positions that 
were predicated on the persistence of low risk-free rates and low spreads. Regulatory and 
supervisory failures compounded the magnitude of the debt and credit risk bubble that 
had been created. The supervisory and regulatory failures in the US mortgage markets 
(and not just at the subprime end of the spectrum) are so manifest that those on whose 
watch they occurred ought to be called to account.  
When the great normalisation finally came (starting with rising risk-free real and nominal 
long-term rates and rising risk-free nominal short-term rates, and picking up steam with 
the normalisation of credit risk spreads, starting from the US subprime residential 
mortgage markets and derivatives based on them), a growing number of these highly 
leveraged open positions went belly-up.  At the junk end of the market, realised default 
rates began to be recorded that exceeded those that had been priced into the primary and 
derivative securities issued in past years in these markets. 
Some funds heavily invested in these mis-priced subprime mortgage-based securities 
went bankrupt. That is as it should be. Others, as in the case of three BNP Paribas funds 
exposed to the US subprime mortgage market, suspended the ability of investors to 
withdraw their investments from the funds, because the funds’ managers and their BNP 
Paribas owners argued they had no way to value the funds’ assets, which had become 
illiquid in the turbulent asset market conditions of the past week.   
It is possible, indeed quite likely, that more funds that made highly leveraged bets whose 
success depended on the continuation of low risk-free rates and low credit spreads, will 
go bankrupt – and not only funds exposed to the US subprime mortgage market; the 
problem of financial hubris was much more widespread than that.  Financial institutions 
heavily exposed to such funds and insufficiently diversified in other ways, may also go 
bankrupt. Among the ranks of the potential victims could be investment banks and 
deposit taking institutions. That again is as it should be, and does not call for intervention. 
It certainly does not call for lower central bank policy rates. Darwin must have his pound 
of flesh also in the financial markets, lest the central banks create a credit risk put that 
would put Greenspan's equity puts in the shade.  
What is not as-it-should-be is that fear and panic causes financial markets to dry up, 
making it impossible for firms that need to raise cash to do so either by selling assets that 
would have realisable value in orderly markets, or by borrowing using these assets as 
collateral. Even if the assets are impaired, there should still be a market to sell them at a 
discount appropriate to the central bank’s assessment of its risk of default and the central 
bank’s assessment of the orderly market price of risk. Collateralised borrowing against 
such impaired assets should likewise be possible at the same default-risk-appropriate 
discount (as assessed by the central bank). If the markets for selling impaired assets or for 
borrowing using impaired assets as collateral seize up and cease to function, the central 
bank must step in to perform its market maker of last resort function.  
During the past week, the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of Japan have injected well over 
$200 billion worth of liquidity into the markets to stop the relevant private benchmarks 
from rising above their policy rate targets (in the US, the Federal Funds rate was 
threatening to rise sharply above 5.25%; in Euroland, the overnight interbank rate was 
threatening to rise above 4.00% and in Japan the overnight rate likewise was threatening 
(somewhat less convincingly) to rise above 0.50%).  We consider this action not to have 
been particularly helpful: even where the open market purchases were collateralised 
against mortgage bonds, the central banks chose high-grade mortgage bonds for which 
there still was a private market and price rather than illiquid mortgage bonds for which 
the market had stalled and no market price was available.  This was a classic example of 
central banks trying to manage a credit crisis or liquidity squeeze using the same tools 
and routines they use to make monetary policy in orderly markets.  
A credit crunch and liquidity squeeze is instead the time for central banks to get their 
hands dirty and take socially necessary risks which are not part and parcel of the art of 
central banking during normal times when markets are orderly. Making monetary policy 
under conditions of orderly markets is really not that hard. Any group of people with IQs 
in three digits (individually) and familiar with (almost) any intermediate macroeconomics 
textbook could do the job. Dealing with a liquidity crisis and credit crunch is hard. 
Inevitably, it exposes the central bank to significant financial and reputational risk. The 
central banks will be asked to take credit risk (of unknown) magnitude onto their balance 
sheets and they will have to make explicit judgments about the creditworthiness of 
various counterparties. But without taking these risks the central banks will be financially 
and reputationally safe, but poor servants of the public interest.  
So: monetary policy is easy; preventing or overcoming a financial crisis is hard; 
managing the exit from a credit squeeze without laying firm foundations for the next 
credit and liquidity explosion is harder still. Our central bankers should earn their keep by 
acting as market makers of last resort. Covering the central bank's posterior is less 
important than preventing avoidable financial instability. 
Editor’s note: this column greatly exceeds the normal length limit due to the complexity 
and rapidly evolving nature of the problem. 
  
  
Spaventa: Avoiding disorderly deleveraging 
8 May 2008 
The global financial system may be caught in a downward spiral as market and funding 
illiquidity reinforce each other. The author of CEPR Policy Insight 22 presents a radical 
proposal that would break the feedback loop by not valuing illiquid assets at market 
prices under crisis conditions. 
Prolonged financial distress, which has now lasted for almost a year, is debilitating the 
financial system and risking a full-fledged crisis. Central bank interventions have thus far 
prevented worst-case outcomes, but they have alleviated symptoms rather than the 
underlying causes. Financial intermediaries are still in the process of shrinking their 
balance sheets, thus activating a channel of transmission of financial distress to the real 
economy. 
The recent turmoil is a product of deep flaws in banks’ new business model and recent 
financial innovations. Many proposed reforms may reduce the risk of these events 
repeating, but most cannot undo the effects of the present crisis and insure a smooth 
transition. The immediate problem is a spiral of forced deleveraging and illiquidity, as the 
link between market and funding illiquidity strains balance sheets. Proposed remedies are 
either insufficient or unsatisfactory, which means that more radical interventions may be 
required. In CEPR Policy Insight 22, I propose a bold alternative. 
Structural problems and medium-term solutions 
The current turmoil can be attributed to a business model in which banks would pool and 
securitise credits that they originated to distribute them and transfer their risks to a 
myriad of investors. Though the new model promised benefits in credit allocation, new 
risk-return investment opportunities, and financial stability, it is now known to have 
suffered from a catalogue of problems. These range from excessive credit due to 
permissive monetary policies to flaws in ratings agencies’ risk models, from perverse 
incentives guiding the agencies and bank managers to regulatory failures. While mending 
those fault lines is an important task that will require international cooperation, it will at 
best take care of the future, not the present. 
Forced deleveraging and the liquidity spiral 
The immediate problem is the disorderly reaction to the unprecedented growth of the 
financial system’s leverage and its exposure to risk. As demand for asset-backed 
securities has disappeared, prices have collapsed without finding a floor. Banks are 
reporting losses that strain their capital positions. The loss of market liquidity affecting 
all classes of debt securities directly or indirectly owned by intermediaries has translated 
into a sharp decline of funding liquidity, the more so because short-term debt issued on 
wholesale markets has become a major component of banks’ funding. The forced 
adjustment of banks' balance sheets could, in the worst case, result in a credit crunch with 
painful consequences on the real economy. 
Can we break the link between the illiquidity of banks’ securitised assets, which prevents 
their orderly liquidation, and the shortage of funding liquidity, which is the driving force 
of the negative feedback originating from the process of deleveraging? 
For funding liquidity, emergency liquidity support from central banks has helped lower 
the temperature in the worst moments, but it is not a long-term solution. Setting a 
collateral value of illiquid securities does not provide a market for them and hence does 
not set a floor to their market prices; the collateralized securities remain on the 
intermediaries’ books, affecting the quality of their balance sheets. Capital increases are 
also insufficient to break the spiral, as injections of capital may prove inadequate only a 
few weeks after their announcement. 
For market liquidity, suggested remedies are equally inadequate. Mandated full 
disclosure of losses might reduce uncertainty, but unless market liquidity is instantly 
restored, full disclosure of the situation at time t offers no guarantee that it will be the 
same at time t+1. Similarly, retreating from marking financial products to market or 
model during this time of crisis would face a number of difficulties. 
More radical solutions 
The feedback between market and funding liquidity problems demands more radical pre-
emptive solutions. As long as “there is no immediate prospect that markets in mortgage-
backed securities will operate normally”, “the situation will improve only if the overhang 
of illiquid assets on the banks’ balance sheets is dealt with” (Bank of England 2008). In 
creating its Special Liquidity Scheme, the Bank of England has moved to serve as the 
“market maker of last resort.” 
The scheme allows banks and building societies to swap some of their illiquid assets, 
including debt securities rated no less than triple A, for specially issued Treasury Bills for 
up to three years. Eligible securities will be valued at market prices, if available, or, if 
not, at a price calculated by the Bank, with haircuts for private debt securities. Changes in 
market prices or in valuations will require re-margining. The credit risk will remain with 
the banks, so that there will be a loss for the lender only if the borrower defaults and the 
value of the collateral falls below that of the bills originally acquired in the operation. 
Is the initiative bold enough? The scheme does not set a floor for assets’ market prices 
and uses market prices to value collateral, despite the fact that during a negative bubble 
they do not reflect fundamentals. Downward instability may moreover occur if haircut 
discounted collateral values trigger a convergence process for market prices requiring 
repeated re-margining. 
In CEPR Policy Insight 22 
<http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/CEPR_Policy_Insight_022.asp>, I recommend 
the creation of a publicly sponsored entity that could issue guaranteed bonds to banks in 
exchange for illiquid assets, drawing on US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady’s solution 
to the Latin American sovereign debt crisis in 1989. This new entity, preferably 
multilateral, would value assets based on discounted cash flows and default probabilities 
rather than crisis-condition market prices. 
As a firm floor is set to valuation and illiquid assets otherwise running to waste are 
replaced by eminently liquid Brady-style bonds, funding difficulties and, at the same 
time, the market liquidity problems besetting the banks’ balance sheets would be 
removed. Shielding the banks’ assets from the vagaries of disorderly markets is a 
necessary condition to dispel the uncertainty that prevents a proper working of credit 
markets. 
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Frankel: The euro could surpass the dollar within ten years 
18 March 2008 
One of the world's leading international economists explains how the euro could surpass 
the dollar as the premier international currency and examines the geopolitical 
implications of such a shift. 
The International Economy recently asked experts: Ten years from now, which will 
likely be the next great global currency? 
My answer is that it just might be the euro.   Contrary to fevered popular speculation in 
the 1990s, the yen and the mark never had the potential to challenge the dollar as the 
leading <a href="http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/RESCURR$.FA5.PDF" 
target="_blank">international currency</a>:  their home economies were smaller than 
the US and their financial markets less well-developed and liquid than New York. The 
euro, however, is a credible challenger: Euroland is roughly as big as the United States, 
and the euro has shown itself a better store of value than the dollar. 
To be sure, rankings of international currencies change only very slowly.  Although the 
US surpassed the UK in economic size in 1872, in exports in 1915, and as a net creditor 
in 1917, the dollar did not surpass the pound as number one international currency until 
1945.  Thus one must account for the lags.   In 2005, when Menzie Chinn and I used 
historical data on central bank holdings of foreign exchange reserves to <a 
href="http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/Euro&$ResChinn&F2007.pdf" 
target="_blank">estimate the determinants</a>, even our pessimistic scenarios did not 
have the euro overtaking the dollar until 2022. Thus we could not have asserted that the 
dollar would be dethroned "ten years from now." 
But the dollar has continued to lose ground. We have now updated <a 
href="http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/EuroVs$-IFdebateFeb2008.pdf" 
target="_blank">our calculations</a>, particularly to recognize that London is usurping 
Frankfurt's role as the financial capital of the euro, notwithstanding that the UK remains 
outside of EMU. Now we find that the tipping point could come within the ten-year 
horizon: the euro could overtake the dollar even as early as 2015. 
Figure 1. The euro and the dollar's projected international reserve shares 
 
Source: Chinn and Frankel (2008). 
Figure 1 shows one of our simulations. In this scenario, the UK does not join the euro, 
but 20% of London turnover counts toward euro area financial depth, and currencies 
depreciate at the 20-year rates experienced up to 2007. The result is that the euro 
overtakes the dollar by 2015. 
Geopolitical Implications 
One might ask why this would matter. Some of the reasons are economic: the US would 
lose the "exorbitant privilege" of being able to finance its international deficits easily. But 
there are also possible geopolitical implications. 
In the past, US deficits have been manageable because allies have been willing to pay a 
financial price to support American global leadership; they correctly have seen it to be in 
their interests. In the 1960s, Germany was willing to offset the expenses of stationing US 
troops on bases there so as to save the United States from a balance of payments deficit. 
The American military has long been charged less to station troops in high-rent Japan 
than if they had been based at home. Repeatedly the Bank of Japan, among other central 
banks, has been willing to buy dollars to prevent the US currency from depreciating (late 
1960s, early 1970s, late 1980s). In 1991, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a number of other 
countries were willing to pay for the financial cost of the war against Iraq, thus briefly 
wiping out the US current account deficit. 
Unfortunately, since 2001, during the same period that the US <a 
href="http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/SalvatoreDeficitsHegemonJan26Jul+.pdf" 
target="_blank">twin deficits</a> have re-emerged, America has lost popular sympathy 
and political support in much of the rest of the world. The hegemon has lost its claim to 
legitimacy in the eyes of many.  In sharp contrast to international attitudes at the dawn of 
the century, <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_ektid23986.aspx" 
target="_blank">opinion surveys</a> report that the US is now viewed unfavourably in 
most countries. The next time the US asks other central banks to bail out the dollar, will 
they be as willing to do so as Europe was in the 1960s, or as Japan was in the late 1980s 
after the Louvre Agreement? I fear not. 
The decline in the status of the pound during the course of the first half of the 20th 
century was part of a larger pattern whereby the United Kingdom lost its economic pre-
eminence, colonies, military power, and other trappings of international hegemony. As 
some wonder whether the United States might now have embarked on a path of "imperial 
over-reach," following the British Empire down a road of widening budget deficits and 
overly ambitious military adventures in the Muslim world, the fate of the pound is 
perhaps a useful caution. The <a 
href="http://http/www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/boughton.htm" 
target="_blank">Suez crisis</a> of 1956 is frequently recalled as the occasion on which 
Britain was forced under US pressure to abandon its remaining imperial designs.  But the 
importance of a simultaneous run on the pound and President Eisenhower's decision not 
to help the beleaguered currency through IMF support unless the British withdrew its 
troops from Egypt should also be remembered. 
Editors' Note: This column is based on posts on <a 
href="http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/" target="_blank">Jeff 
Frankel's weblog</a>. 
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Eichengreen: The euro: love it or leave it? 
19 November 2007 
Adopting the euro is effectively irreversible. Leaving would require lengthy preparations, 
which, given the anticipated devaluation, would trigger the mother of all financial crises. 
National households and firms would shift deposits to other euro-area banks producing a 
system-wide bank run. Investors, trying to escape, would create a bond-market crisis. 
Here is what the train wreck would look like.  
The world economy is continually changing, but one constant is dissatisfaction with the 
euro. Toward the beginning of the decade, the main complaint was that the euro was too 
weak for booming economies like Ireland. Now the complaint is that it is too strong for 
growth-challenged countries like Italy. 
To be sure, the source of the current problem is external. It stems from the fall of the 
dollar, reflecting a combination of economic and financial problems in the United States, 
and the insistence of the Chinese authorities that the renminbi should follow the 
greenback. But that does nothing to defuse the complaints. 
The negative impact is being felt by all euro-area members. But some countries where 
growth was already stagnant, such as Italy, are least able to cope. Already in June 2005, 
following two years of euro appreciation, then-Italian welfare minister Roberto Maroni 
declared that “the euro has to go.” Then-prime minister Silvio Berlusconi followed by 
calling the euro “a disaster.” But this earlier episode of appreciation pales in comparison 
with what has happened since. And if the dollar depreciates further and the US falls into a 
full-blown recession – both of which are more likely than not – calls like these will be 
back. 
So is the euro doomed? After seeing the number of euro-area countries rise from 10 in 
1999 to 15 at the beginning of 2008, will the process shift into reverse? If one country 
leaves the euro area by reintroducing its national currency, will others follow? Will the 
entire enterprise collapse? 
The answer is no.  The decision to join the euro area is effectively irreversible.99  
However attractive the rhetoric of defection is for populist politicians, exit is effectively 
impossible - although not for the reasons suggested in earlier discussions. 
A first reason why members will not exit, it is argued, is the economic costs.  A country 
that leaves the euro area because of problems of competitiveness would be expected to 
devalue its newly-reintroduced national currency.  But workers would know this, and the 
resulting wage inflation would neutralise any benefits in terms of external 
competitiveness.  Moreover, the country would be forced to pay higher interest rates on 
its public debt.  Those old enough to recall the high costs of servicing the Italian debt in 
the 1980s will appreciate that this can be a serious problem. 
But for each such argument about economic costs, there is a counterargument.  If 
reintroduction of the national currency is accompanied by labour market reform, real 
wages will adjust.  If exit from the euro area is accompanied by the reform of fiscal 
institutions so that investors can look forward to smaller future deficits, there is no reason 
for interest rates to go up.  Empirical studies show that joining the euro-area does result 
in a modest reduction in debt service costs; by implication, leaving would raise them.  
But this increase could be offset by a modest institutional reform, say, by increasing the 
finance minister's fiscal powers from Portuguese to Austrian levels.  Even populist 
politicians know that abandoning the euro will not solve all problems.  They will want to 
combine it with structural reforms. 
A second reason why members will not exit, it is argued, is the political costs.  A country 
that reneges on its euro commitments will antagonise its partners.  It will not be 
welcomed at the table where other European Union-related decisions were made.  It will 
                                                 
99 For details, see <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13393" target="_blank">The 
Breakup of the Euro Area</a>. Barry Eichengreen. NBER Working Paper No. 13393. 
be treated as a second class member of the EU to the extent that it remains a member at 
all. 
Political costs there would be, but there would also be benefits for politicians who could 
claim that they were putting the interests of their domestic constituents first.  And politics 
have not rendered countries like Denmark and Sweden that have steadfastly refused to 
adopt the euro second-class EU member states. 
The insurmountable obstacle to exit is neither economic nor political, then, but 
procedural.  Reintroducing the national currency would require essentially all contracts - 
including those governing wages, bank deposits, bonds, mortgages, taxes, and most 
everything else - to be redenominated in the domestic currency.  The legislature could 
pass a law requiring banks, firms, households and governments to redenominate their 
contracts in this manner.  But in a democracy this decision would have to be preceded by 
very extensive discussion.   
And for it to be executed smoothly, it would have to be accompanied by detailed 
planning.  Computers will have to be reprogrammed.  Vending machines will have to be 
modified.  Payment machines will have to be serviced to prevent motorists from being 
trapped in subterranean parking garages.  Notes and coins will have to be positioned 
around the country.  One need only recall the extensive planning that preceded the 
introduction of the physical euro. 
Back then, however, there was little reason to expect changes in exchange rates during 
the run-up and hence little incentive for currency speculation.  In 1998, the founding 
members of the euro-area agreed to lock their exchange rates at the then-prevailing 
levels.  This effectively ruled out depressing national currencies in order to steal a 
competitive advantage in the interval prior to the move to full monetary union in 1999.  
In contrast, if a participating member state now decided to leave the euro area, no such 
precommitment would be possible.  The very motivation for leaving would be to change 
the parity.  And pressure from other member states would be ineffective by definition.   
Market participants would be aware of this fact.  Households and firms anticipating that 
domestic deposits would be redenominated into the lira, which would then lose value 
against the euro, would shift their deposits to other euro-area banks.  A system-wide bank 
run would follow.  Investors anticipating that their claims on the Italian government 
would be redenominated into lira would shift into claims on other euro-area governments, 
leading to a bond-market crisis.  If the precipitating factor was parliamentary debate over 
abandoning the lira, it would be unlikely that the ECB would provide extensive lender-of-
last-resort support.  And if the government was already in a weak fiscal position, it would 
not be able to borrow to bail out the banks and buy back its debt.  This would be the 
mother of all financial crises. 
What government invested in its own survival would contemplate this option?  The 
implication is that as soon as discussions of leaving the euro area become serious, it is 
those discussions, and not the area itself, that will end. 
Chronology 
28 December 2006 
Ownit Mortgage Solutions files for bankruptcy. 
 
7 February 2007 
U.S. Senate Banking Committee holds hearing on predatory lending in subprime sector. 
 
22 February 2007 
HSBC losses top $10.5 billion. Head of HSBC U.S. mortgage lending business is fired.  
 
7 March 2007 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issues a cease and desist order against 
subprime lender Fremont Investment & Loan, which had been “operating without 
adequate subprime mortgage loan underwriting criteria.” 
 
8 March 2007 
Donald Tomnitz, the CEO of D.R. Horton, the largest U.S. homebuilder, tells investors, 
“I don't want to be too sophisticated here, but '07 is going to suck, all 12 months of the 
calendar year.” 
 
12 March 2007 
Lenders to New Century Financial, a large subprime lender, cut off its credit lines.  
Trading in its shares is suspended by the New York Stock Exchange.   
 
16 March 2007 
Subprime lender Accredited Home Lenders to sell, at heavy discount, $2.7 billion of 
loans.  The New York Attorney General announces an investigation of subprime lending. 
 
2 April 2007 
New Century Financial files for bankruptcy. 
 
24 April 2007 
The National Association of Realtors announces that existing home sales fall 8.4 percent 
during March, the greatest drop in 18 years. 
 3 May 2007 
GMAC, the finance arm of General Motors, reports losses of $1 billion. UBS closes its 
U.S. subprime business. First comprehensive plan to help homeowners avoid foreclosures 
presented in U.S. Senate.  
 
6 June 2007 
The Bank of England reduces the overnight bank rate by 25 basis points to 5.5 percent. 
 
22 June 2007 
Bear Stearns injects $3.2 billion into two of its hedge funds hurt by falling CDO prices.   
 
4 July 2007 
UK authorities take action against 5 brokers selling subprime mortgages.  
 
10 July 2007 
All three major credit ratings agencies announce review of subprime bonds. 
 
13 July 2007 
General Electric to sell WMC Mortgage, its subprime lending business.  
 
18 July 2007 
U.S. housing starts down 20 percent from the previous year. 
 
31 July 2007 
The two Bear Stearns hedge funds that were under stress file for bankruptcy protection 
 
6 August 2007 
American Home Mortgage, one of the largest U.S. home loan providers, files for 
bankruptcy.  
 
9 August 2007 
BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds hit by subprime crisis. AIG warns that 
mortgage defaults spreading beyond subprime sector. 
 10 August 2007 
The ECB provides 61 billion euros of funds for banks. The Fed said it would provide as 
much overnight money.  The interest rate on 15-day AAA asset-backed commercial 
paper hits 6.14 percent for a historically high  
  
13 August 2007 
Goldman Sachs to pump $3 billion to rescue a hedge fund.  The ECB and central banks in 
the U.S. and Japan continue supplying liquidity to markets.  
 
16 August 2007 
Countrywide draws down its $11.5 billion credit line. 
 
17 August 2007 
The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate to 5.75 percent. 
 
23 August 2007 
Bank of America purchases 16 percent of Countrywide Financial for $2 billion.  Four 
large U.S. banks announce coordinated borrowing of $2 billion from the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window. 
 
28 August 2007 
German bank Sachsen Landesbank is sold to Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg.  The 
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for second quarter 2007 is down 3.2 percent from a 
year earlier, the greatest drop in the 17-year history of the index. 
 
31 August 2007 
Subprime lender Ameriquest files for bankruptcy. 
 
1-3 September 2007 
The Federal Reserve’s annual Jackson Hole conference focuses on the link between 
housing and monetary policy. 
 
3 September 2007 
IKB, German regional lender, records $1 billion loss due to U.S. subprime market 
exposure.  
 
4 September 2007 
Bank of China reveals $9 billion in subprime losses. 
  
6 September 2007 
The delinquency rate on 1-4 family mortgages reaches 5.1 percent, according to the 
Mortgage Bankers Association. 
 
13 September 2007 
Global Alpha, a hedge fund managed by Goldman Sachs, reveals that it lost 22 percent 
during August. 
 
14 September 2007 
A run on the deposits of British mortgage lender Northern Rock begins. 
  
18 September 2007 
The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate by 50 basis points to 4.75 percent.  This is the 
first cut since 2003. 
 
1 October 2007 
UBS and Citigroup announce losses of $3.4 billion and $3.1 billion respectively.  
 
9 October 2007 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average closes at 14,164, its all-time high. 
 
10 October 2007 
The U.S. government teams up with mortgage servicers and investors to launch the 
HOPE NOW alliance, to encourage the voluntary modification of adjustable-rate 
mortgages to fixed-rate. 
 
14 October 2007 
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, with the support of the Treasury 
Department, announce a plan to form a Master-Liquidity Enhancement Conduit (MLEC) 
that would purchase asset-backed commercial paper from liquidation Structured 
Investment Vehicles. 
 
15 October 2007 
Citigroup and Japanese bank Nomura announce subprime losses of $5.9 billion and $621 
million, respectively.  
 
16 October 2007 
The National Association of Home Builders confidence index hits 19, the lowest since 
the series began in 1985. 
 
26 October 2007 
Countrywide Financial reports a loss of $1.2 billion for third quarter 2007.  This is its 
first loss in 25 years. 
 
30 October 2007 
Merrill Lynch announces losses of $7.9 billion and the resignation of CEO Stan O'Neal.  
 
31 October 2007 
The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.5 percent. 
Deutsche Bank reveals a  2.2 billion loss.  
 
1 November 2007 
Credit Suisse discloses a $1 billion loss. Fed injects $41 billion. 
 
5 November 2007 
Citigroup announces that its $55 billion portfolio of subprime-related investments has 
declined in value between $8 billion and $11 billion. CEO Charles Prince resigns. 
 
8 November 2007 
Morgan Stanley and BNP Paribas disclose mortgage losses of $3.7 billion and  197 
million, respectively.  Insurance company AIG writes down $2 billion of mortgage 
investments. 
 
9 November 2007 
Wachovia announces $1.7 billion loss.  
 
13 November 2007 
Bank of America announces $3 billion subprime loss.  
 
14 November 2007 
Japan's second largest banking group, Mizuho reports full-year operating profit fell 13 
percent. HSBC reports losses of $3.4 billion.  
 
15 November 2007 
Barclays reveals $2.7 billion loss. The U.S. House of Representatives passes the 
Predatory Lending and Mortgage Protection Act.  
 
16 November 2007 
Goldman Sachs forecasts financial losses due to subprime crises at $400 billion. 
 
19 November 2007 
Reinsurance company Swiss Re to lose $1 billion on insurance of client hit by subprime 
crises.  
 
20 November 2007 
Freddie Mac reports a $2 billion loss.  
 
27 November 2007 
Freddie Mac and Citigroup raise $6 billion and $7.5 billion of capital respectively. U.S. 
house prices record biggest quarterly drop in 21 years.   
 
5 December 2007 
New York Attorney General sends subpoenas to major investment banks to investigate 
subprime mortgage securitization. 
 
6 December 2007 
Royal Bank of Scotland to write off £1.25 billion due to subprime crisis. The Bank of 
England cuts UK interest rates.  
 10 December 2007 
UBS and Lloyds TSB report $10 billion and £200m losses due bad debts in the U.S. 
housing market. 
 
11 December 2007 
The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.25 percent.  
Washington Mutual subprime losses to reach $1.6 billion. 
 
12 December 2007 
The Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which 
will auction a fixed amount of funds to the banking system, initially set at $20 billion.  
The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank also 
announce that they will engage in currency swaps of up to $20 billion to the ECB and $4 
billion to the SNB.  The Bank of England and Bank of Canada also announce that they 
will increase their liquidity facilities. 
 
14 December 2007 
Citigroup takes $49 billion worth of SIV assets back on its balance sheet.  
 
17 December 2007 
Federal Reserve makes $20 billion available to commercial banks. 
 
18 December 2007 
The Federal Reserve Bank tightens rules on subprime lending. ECB lends European 
commercial banks $500 billion. Bank of England makes £10 billion available to UK 
banks.  
 
19 December 2007 
As subprime losses reach $9.4 billion, Morgan Stanley sells 9.9 percent stake in the 
company.  
 
21 December 2007 
The spread of 15-day AAA asset-backed commercial paper over equivalent duration 
AAA nonfinancial commercial paper hits 173 basis points as banks scramble for funding 
through the end of the year.  The spread is usually less than 10 basis points. 
 22 December 2007 
The M-LEC plan to rescue struggling SIVs is abandoned by the sponsoring banks. 
 
4 January 2008  
U.S. job losses in residential construction and mortgage lending for year 2007 estimated 
at 35,000.  
 
9 January 2008 
Bear Stearns reveals subprime losses of $1.9 billion. CEO James Cayne steps down. 
World Bank says that world economic growth will slow in 2008 due to subprime crisis 
credit crunch.  
 
11 January 2008 
Bank of America buys Countrywide for $4 billion after its shares plunge 48 percent. 
Merrill Lynch doubles projection of subprime losses to $15 billion. 
 
15 January 2008 
Citigroup reports a $9.8 billion loss for the fourth quarter, including $18 billion loss in 
mortgage portfolio. 
 
17 January 2008 
Lehman Brothers retires from wholesale mortgage lending and will cut 1,300 jobs. 
 
19 January 2008 
Fitch Ratings lowers the rating of Ambac, the second-largest monoline insurer after 
MBIA, from AAA to AA.  This is the first downgrade of a large monoline. 
 
22 January 2008 
In a surprise move between regularly-scheduled meetings, the Federal Reserve cuts the 
federal funds rate by 75 basis points to 3.50 percent. 
 
24 January 2008 
French bank Société Générale announces that it lost €4.9 billion due to the unauthorized 
activity of one of its traders.  While the bank closed out the trades during a holiday 
weekend in the United States, stock markets plunged around the world. 
 
30 January 2008 
The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 3.00 percent.  
Regularly-scheduled auctions for municipal debt of the state of Nevada and Georgetown 
University fail due to lack of bidders and uncertainty about monoline insurers.  The debt 
issuers are forced to pay a penalty rate. 
 
13 February 2008 
President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.  The act provides 
approximately $100 billion of tax rebates to be distributed during summer 2008 and $50 
billion of investment incentives. 
 
14 February 2008 
UBS announces fourth quarter 2007 loss of CHF 12.4 billion ($12 billion). 
 
15 February 2008 
Problems in the auction-rate securities market continue to spread; over 1,000 auctions fail 
this week.  Investment banks do not allow investors to withdraw funds invested in those 
securities. 
 
28 February 2008 
AIG, a large insurance company, announces fourth quarter 2007 losses of $5.3 billion due 
to more than $11 billion of losses on its credit default swap portfolio. 
 
6 March 2008 
The delinquency rate on 1-4 family mortgages was 5.82 percent during fourth quarter 
2007, up 87 basis points from a year earlier, according to MBA's National Delinquency 
Survey. 
 
11 March 2008 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces the creation of the Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF), which lets primary dealers swap AAA-rated securities for 
Treasury securities.  The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Swiss National 
Bank increase the size of their dollar swap lines to $30 billion and $6 billion respectively. 
 
14 March 2008 
Investment firm Carlyle Capital defaults on $17 billion of debt.  The fund is leveraged 
more than 30 to 1 and invests mostly in agency-backed RMBS. 
 16 March 2008 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces the creation of the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF), which essentially opens the discount window to primary dealers, 
including non-depository institutions. 
 
17 March 2008 
Investment bank Bear Stearns is acquired by JPMorgan Chase for $2 per share. Bear 
Stearns stock had been trading at $60 the previous week before a run pushed it to near-
insolvency.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York agrees to guarantee $30 billion of 
Bear Stearns assets, mostly mortgage-related. 
 
18 March 2008 
The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate by 75 basis points to 2.25 percent. 
 
24 March 2008 
JPMorgan Chase raises its bid for Bear Stearns to $10 per share and agrees to indemnify 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York against the first $1 billion of losses on the $30 
billion that it guaranteed. 
 
8 April 2008 
Washington Mutual, one of the largest U.S. mortgage originators, raises $7 billion from 
TPG, a private equity firm.  The IMF’s Global Financial Stability estimates total credit 
losses of $1 trillion.  
 
15 April 2008 
Alpha magazine reports that hedge fund owner John Paulson is the highest-paid trader in 
2007.  His fund Paulson & Co. rose more than $20 billion during the year shorting the 
mortgage market. 
 
18 April 2008 
Citigroup announces another $12 billion of losses related to subprime mortgages, 
leveraged loans, exposure to monoline insurers, auction-rate securities, and consumer 
credit. 
 
21 April 2008 
National City Corp., a large regional U.S. bank, announces a $7 billion capital infusion 
from Corsair Capital, a private equity firm. 
 
22 April 2008 
Royal Bank of Scotland announces that it will raise about £16 billion pounds from 
investors and by selling assets. 
 
30 April 2008 
The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 2.0 percent. 
 
6 May 2008 
UBS AG announces CHF 11.5 billion ($11.1 billion) loss during first quarter 2008. 
 
12 May 2008 
Monoline insurer MBIA announces a $2.4 billion loss during first quarter 2008. 
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Glossary 
 
ABX.HE Index: An index produced by Markit that tracks prices on credit default swaps 
on tranches of selected asset-backed securities composed of residential mortgages. 
 
Alternative-A (or Alt-A): a category of mortgage borrower, generally with FICO scores 
that qualify them for prime rates but are not eligible for prime for other reasons, such as 
lack of income documentation. 
 
Asset-Backed Security (ABS): a security collateralized by financial assets, such as 
mortgages. 
 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP): see Commercial Paper. 
 
Auction-Rate Security: A municipal bond whose interest rate is set at specified intervals, 
often two weeks, at auction.  In early 2008 a large number of auctions failed due to lack 
of bidders, causing the municipalities to pay high penalty rates. 
 
Basel II: a revision to the international rules governing bank capital allocation.  
Coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements.  It was designed to lessen the 
amount of regulatory arbitrage that occurred under its predecessor, Basel I.  European 
banks were supposed to implement Basel II rules by 2008, while U.S. banks 
implementation may occur in 2009. 
 
Commercial Paper (CP): Bonds with maturity less than 270 days.  CP can be issued by 
corporations, banks, or trusts holding securities.  The latter is usually referred to as asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP).  ABCP was one of the first casualties of the crisis, 
starting to decline rapidly in August 2007 as the Structured Investment Vehicles 
unwound.  
 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): a structured finance product composed of debt 
instruments such as corporate and consumer loans, mortgages, and bonds.   The cash 
flows from the underlying debt are paid out to the tranches of the CDO according to their 
seniority.  CDO issuance averaged $500 billion in 2006 and 2007. 
 
Conduit: a financial entity whose purpose is to buy financial assets from correspondents, 
repackage them, and sell interests in the new securities to other entities. 
 
Credit Default Swap (CDS): a type of insurance against a firm defaulting on its debt.  
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the notional amount of CDS 
outstanding was $43 trillion as of June 2007. 
 
Discount Window: The mechanism through which the Federal Reserve lends directly to 
banks, thrifts, and other chartered depository institutions.  The PDCF essentially extended 
the discount window to primary dealers. 
 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac: U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that enhance 
the flow of credit to the mortgage market.  The GSEs purchase mortgages from banks and 
thrifts and either keep the mortgages or package them into RMBS and sell them to the 
secondary market. 
 
FICO score: a numerical rating of the credit history of individuals, developed by the Fair 
Isaac Corporation. 
 
LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate, the interest rate that banks charge each other to 
borrow money.  Denominated in various currencies.  U.S. dollar LIBOR is usually tied 
closely to the federal funds rate but diverged beginning in August 2007 due to a 
combination of credit and liquidity risk. 
 
Monoline Insurer: An insurance company that specializes in insuring the performance of 
financial instruments, usually mortgage-related.  Most offer private mortgage insurance, 
which is used to insure payments on mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios.  Many also 
insured AAA-rated portions of CDOs. 
 
Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS):  A security that is composed of mortgages.  Often 
separated into MBS backed by residential mortgages (RMBS) and commercial mortgages 
(CMBS).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dominated MBS issuance in the United States 
until 2004 when private-label MBS, often of subprime mortgages, became more 
prevalent.  Payments of interest and principal on the underlying mortgages can be paid 
pro-rata (pass-through MBS) or in a “waterfall” fashion, with “tranches” getting paid in 
order of seniority.  
 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF): A new policy introduced by the Federal Reserve 
that essentially opens the discount window to primary dealers.  Normally only banks and 
other depository institutions have access to the discount window.  The PDCF was 
introduced by the Federal Reserve the same weekend that Bear Stearns was acquired by 
JPMorgan Chase. 
 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS): see Mortgage-Backed Security. 
 
Securitization: the practice of bundling securities into new securities.  Used by financial 
institutions as a way of moving assets off their balance sheets in order to lend more.  
Mortgages are most commonly securitized but other debt instruments can also be 
included.  In the United States, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac actively promote mortgage 
securitization. 
 
Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV): A fund that holds long-term securities (such as 
mortgages) and funds its investments with commercial paper. 
 
Subprime: borrowers whose poor credit history does not qualify them for prime interest 
rates.  In the United States, about 20 percent of mortgage originations totaling over $1 
trillion in 2005 and 2006 were subprime, far above historical levels. 
 
Term Auction Facility (TAF): an auction held by the Federal Reserve for a set quantity of 
money.  The TAF was introduced in December 2007 in response to pressures for short-
term lending in the money markets.  
 
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF): The TSLF is an arrangement by the Federal 
Reserve to lend Treasuries and accept other AAA-rated financial instruments as 
collateral. 
 
Tranche: A method of apportioning cash flows in a structured finance product, such as an 
asset-backed security.  Senior tranches are paid principal and interest first, and junior 
tranches are paid with whatever cash is left.  Senior tranches have more security and 
consequently earn lower interest rates than junior tranches.  Several tranches may be 
rated AAA.  The most senior of the AAA tranches is often called “super-senior.” 
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